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THIRD ANNUAL SURVEY OF
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW*
The Third Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law is designed
to review cases decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court during
the past two terms of court and to supplement past and future Surveys
in presenting developments in North Carolina case law over a period
of time.
It is not the purpose of the Survey to discuss all the cases that
were decided during the period of its coverage. It is intended to dis-
cuss only those decisions which are of particular importance-cases
regarded as being of significance and interest to those concerned with
the work of the Court, and decisions which reflect substantial changes
and matters of first impression in the law of North Carolina.
Most of the research for and writing of this article was accomplished
by selected members of the Student Board of Editors of the Law Re-
view, working under the supervision of the Faculty of the Law School
of the University of North Carolina. Some sections, however, repre-
sent the individual work of a faculty member.
Student members of the Law Review and the sections for which
they are responsible are:
Richmond G. Bernhardt, Jr. (Torts); Herbert S. Falk (Criminal
Law and Municipal Corporations); Paul B. Guthery, Jr. (Adminis-
trative Law, Corporations, Credits, and Sales); C. Theodore Leonard
(Civil Procedure) ; John L. Rendleman (Future Interests, Real Prop-
erty, and Wills and Administration); William P. Skinner, Jr. (Courts,
Domestic Relations, Equity, and Trusts); Morton A Smith (Con-
stitutional Law, Damages, and Evidence); Lewis Poindexter Watts,
Jr. (Agency and Workmen's Compensation, Contracts, and Insurance).
Throughout this article the North Carolina Supreme Court will
be referred to as the "Court" unless it appears by its full title. The
United States Supreme Court will be designated only by its full name.
North Carolina General Statutes will be signified by "G. S."
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The first several cases with which we are concerned in this section
are those involving findings of fact of an administrative agency and
judicial review of these findings.
* The period covered embraces the decisions of the North Carolina Supreme
Court is reported in 240 N. C. 567 through 242 N. C. 532.
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In Aylor v. Barnes' a jurisdictional finding-the place of residence
of the deceased-of the Industrial Commission in a workman's compen-
sation case was excepted to by the employer and appeal was made to
the superior court. The superior court found that the exceptions should
be overruled and the findings affirmed. The Court, on the appeal from
this decision, reaffirmed the rule in Aycock v. Cooper2 that while ordi-
narily findings of fact by the commission are conclusive when supported
by competent evidence, when the jurisdiction of the commission is
challenged, the findings are not conclusive on the reviewing court. The
superior court has the power and the duty on appeal by either party to
consider the evidence in the record and find the jurisdictional facts
without regard to the findings of the commission. Therefore, held the
Court, it is not enough for the superior court to affirm the findings
and overrule the exceptions. It must make its own findings with re-
gard to jurisdictional facts.
The Court in Manuel v. Cone Mills Corp.8 had before it an appeal
from a decision of the Industrial Commission in which no question of
jurisdiction of the commission was raised. Accordingly, the Court ad-
hered to the established rule that the commission's findings, if supported
by competent evidence, will be affirmed on appeal.
4
However, if the findings of fact do not support its decision, the Com-
mission will be reversed. In Employment Security Commission v. Sky-
land Crafts, Inc.5 the Court held that the Commission's determination
that defendant was an "employer" during 1952 within the meaning
of G. S. § 96-8 (f) (2)6 was not supported by the findings of fact. The
opinion included a summary of the procedure to be followed before
the Employment Security Commission.
When the superior court determines that the evidence does not sup-
port the Commission's findings, and remands the case to the Commission,
that body may not merely make the same findings over again phrased
in different language. The Court so held in Johnson v. Cleveland Coun-
ty Board of Education.7 The Commission was bound by the order of
the superior court on the first appeal; and had plaintiff wished to con-
test this order, the procedure was to appeal to the Supreme Court.
1242 N. C. 223, 87 S. E. 2d 269 (1955).
2 202 N. C. 500, 163 S. E. 569 (1932).
2242 N. C. 309, 87 S. E. 2d 553 (1955).
'Case Survey, 33 N.-C. L. REv. 157, 158 (1955).2240 N. C. 727, 83 S. E. 2d 893 (1954).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 96-8 (f) (2) (1950) defines "employer" as follows: "Any
employing unit which acquired the organization, trade or business or substantially
all the assets thereof, of another which at the time of such acquisition was an
employer subject to this chapter ... !" According to the Court, the statute con-
templates a transaction in which the purchaser, instead of buying physical assets
as such, succeeds to the organization, trade, or business. Under the facts found
there was not the requisite continuity.
7241 N. C. 56, 84 S. E. 2d 256 (1954).
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This case involved a commission award under the Tort Claims Act.8
Rules and Regulations
In Hatchett v. Hitchcock Corp.9 an injured employee received long
and toilsome care by his mother while he was in bed in a cast which
prevented him from caring for himself. The Industrial Commission
awarded the mother compensation for her service, but this award was
held invalid by the Court because the rules of the Commission require
written authorization for such services to be obtained from the Com-
mission in advance, and this was not done. The Workmen's Compen-
sation Act provides that the employer will be liable for this type of
treatment, but only when ordered by the Commission.'0
An extreme injustice has obviously resulted here. Mothers cannot
be expected to know the requirements of the regulations and statutes.
Regulations should provide that notice of such a statute and regulation
be given to the injured employee and anyone caring for him by the
employer or the Commission. It was plain to all concerned that some-
one would have to care for the helpless employee in this case.
Tobacco boards of trade are provided for by the Legislature to
regulate the sales of tobacco in North Carolina and are authorized "to
make reasonable rules and regulations for the economical and efficient
handling of the sale of leaf tobacco at auction on the warehouse floors
in the several towns and cities in North Carolina in which an auction
market is situated."" In Co-operative Warehouse v. Lumberton To-
bacco Board of Trade2 the Court upheld as reasonable a regulation
whereby the number of baskets of tobacco that may be sold by a mem-
ber-warehouseman depends upon the total floor space of the ware-
houses of that member in relation to the entire floor space of all
warehouses in the market. Moreover, the plaintiff in this case, by
virtue of being a member of the defendant-board of trade, was deemed
by the Court to have consented to all reasonable rules and regulations
pertaining to the business, including these floor space regulations. The
Court, following Motsinger v. Perryman,'3 pointed out that administra-
tive agencies may be given power to make subordinate rules so long
as a policy is laid down and a standard established by the statute. The
Lumberton case is followed in the subsequent case of Day v. Asheville
Tobacco Board of Trade.
14
8 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291 to -300 (1952).
"240 N. C. 591, 83 S. E. 2d539 (1954).
10 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-90 (a) (1950).
N . C. GEN. STAT. § 106-465 (1952).
12242 N. C. 123, 87 S. E. 2d 25 (1955).
13218 N. C. 15, 9 S. E. 2d 511 (1940).
14242 N. C. 136, 87 S. E. 2d 18 (1955).
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Public Convenience and Necessity
In Utilities Commission v. Story'5 the Court held that the Wildlife
Resources Commission had authority to undertake a project for a wild-
life management area, but before lands for the purpose could be ac-
quired by condemnation, a certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity was required from the Utilities Commission, which had authority
to issue the certificate only on proper application. The Court found
that there was no authorization by the Wildlife Commission for such
application where the Commission only authorized its Director to nego-
tiate for the purchase of certain land or to purchase the land. The
Court said, "For the Commission to authorize the purchase is one
thing-to authorize condemnation is something else. Under proper
circumstances the Commission can purchase when the land is desirable
for its legitimate purposes. Only the force of necessity gives the right
to condemn."'16
Notice and Hearing
The city of Goldsboro assessed a railroad for the cost of paving
streets abutting land owned by the railroad, not only where the streets
paved crossed its right of way, but also where a street paralleled its
right of way for a considerable distance. In Goldsboro v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. R.'7 the Court, after finding that the city of Goldsboro
had authority from the Legislature to assess the abutting property of
the railroad for the cost of street paving, quotes from the opinion of
Adams, J., in Gunter v. Sanford :18 "It is also established that the Legis-
lature has the power to determine by the statute imposing the tax what
property is benefited by the improvements; and when it does so its
determination is conclusive upon the owners and the courts, and the
owners have no right to be heard upon the question whether their
lands are benefited or not, but only upon the validity of the assessment
and its proper apportionment."'19 Where the owner is denied the right
to be heard as to the benefit, and the cost is so disproportionate to the
benefit, query whether this does not amount to confiscation of the rail-
road's property.
Lutz Industries, Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores"° involves an action to
recover for damage caused by fire resulting from the negligent installa-
tion of electrical wiring and fixtures. Motions to strike allegations that
defendants violated the provisions of the National Electrical Code of
15241 N. C. 103, 84 S. E. 2d 386 (1954).
l' Id. at 109, 84 S. E. 2d at 390.
'241 N. C. 216, 85 S. E. 2d 125 (1954).18 186 N. C. 452, 120 S. E. 41 (1923).
'19 Id. at 457, 120 S. E. at 43.
0'242 N. C. 332, 87 S. E. 2d 333 (1955).
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1951, which violation caused the fire, were denied. The Court, in af-
firming, found that a Building Code Council was set up by statute2' and
directed to draw up a building code for the state; that in 1936 the
Council promulgated a building code which required electrical systems
in buildings to be installed in conformity with the National Electrical
Code; that in 1941 the Legislature passed an act 22 which, among other
things, ratified and adopted the provisions of the 1936 building code
and gave the Council the authority to make changes subject to the
approval of the Insurance Commissioner provided it did not adopt
rules, restrictions, etc. more rigid than those in the 1936 Code.
The Court held that the adoption by reference in the 1941 statute
of the 1936 Code promulgated by an administrative agency, the Build-
ing Code Council, was valid. The regulations set out there have the
force and effect of law and therefore are admissible in evidence. The
Court distinguished codes of informative nature not having the force
and effect of law. Relevant parts of the National Electrical Code of
1951 adopted as rules and regulations by the North Carolina Building
Code Council23 are admissible in evidence if approved by the Commis-
sioner of Insurance provided that they do not establish any rule, restric-
tion or regulation more rigid than provided in the 1936 Code.
AGENCY AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AGENCY
Confidential Relation: Attorney and Client'
In Dobias v. White2 the client told his attorney to draw a deed to
certain property, making the client's debtors the grantors and the client
himself the grantee, this being the result of an accord on a debt.3  The
attorney drew the deed; called the grantors into his office, where they
signed it and delivered it to the attorney. The client refused to accept
the deed, allegedly after learning that it had been executed. Instead,
the client foreclosed the deed of trust he held on the property, bought
.'N. C. Gax. STAT. § 143-139 (1952).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. § 143-139 (1952).
' The 1953 Edition of the North Carolina Building Code is the latest pro-
mulgation of rules and regulations by the Council.
'In Higgins v. Beaty, 242 N. C.479, 88 S. E. 2d 80 (1955), the question before
the Court was the measure of damages to be awarded an attorney discharged
without just cause by his client; see CONTRACTS, p. 29 infra. In passing, the
Court stated that by contracting for a fixed fee for a specified service before the
confidential relation is created, the parties dealt at arm's length; that no pre-
sumption exists against the attorney as in contracts made after the fiduciary rela-
tion is established. The Court cited only 5 Am. JuR., Attorney at Law § 159
(1936). Cf. Annot., 19 A. L. R. 847 (1922).
2240 N. C. 680, 83 S. E. 2d 785 (1954).
'See first appeal: Dobias v. White, 239 N. C. 409, 80 S. E. 2d 23 (1954),
and Case Survey, 32 N. C. L. Rxv. 379, 409-10 (1954).
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it in at the foreclosure sale for less than the debt, and obtained a de-
ficiency judgment.4 The attorney was permitted to testify that his
(former) client had instructed him to prepare the deed and that he
had accepted delivery of it for the client. The client objected that such
testimony was a breach of the confidential relation. The Court said,
however, that the very purpose of the client's instruction to prepare
the deed was to have information relayed to the grantors. Thus, from
the nature of the communication, it was apparent that the parties did
not regard it as confidential; therefore, it was not privilegedY
Dual Capacity of Agent
The administratrix of a debtor's estate was sued by a bank to collect
an overdue promissory note. The administratrix alleged as a set-off
that the bank official who had negotiated the loan was also an agent
of a life insurance company; that when the note was first made, the
bank official issued a credit life insurance policy for the term of the
note; that upon renewal, the bank official agreed to renew the life
policy, but negligently failed to do so. The debtor died before the
renewed note was due. The Court affirmed6 the validity of the defense
alleged, on the bank's motion to strike, saying that it would be a matter
of proof in the trial below whether the renewal premium, if paid, was
paid to the bank official as agent of the bank or as agent of the in-
surance company, independent of the bank. The Court emphasized
that the pleadings alleged a contract with the bank, through the bank's
agent, for insurance to be taken out. Also, the allegations were charac-
terized as describing the contract for insurance as an "integral feature
of the loan renewal transaction."
'7
A new statute8 prohibiting rebates or reductions of premiums to
loan agencies, etc., contains some broad and confusing language. It is
thought, however, that it would not prohibit a licensed insurance agent
from being a bank employee or make the particular agency relation-
ship relied upon here unlawful as to the future.9
"Not a purchase money transaction; here the buyer mortgaged "Blackacre,"
which he already owned, to secure notes given on the purchase price of "Green-
acre." See Case Survey, 32 N. C. L. Rav. 379, 421 (1954).
See Amnot., 26 A. L. R. 2d 858, 864-65 (1952) (not cited by Court). The
Court did cite Annot., 141 A. L. R. 553, 562 (1942), among other authorities,
for the proposition that "where two or more persons employ the same attorney
to act for them in some business transaction, their communications to him are
not ordinarily previleged inter sese:" Dobias v. White, 240 N. C. 680, 685, 83
S. E. 2d 785, 788 (1954). The rule stated in the annotation, however, seems
restricted to disclosures made by the parties in the presence of each other.
'Bank of French Broad, Inc. v. Bryan, 240 N. C. 610, 83 S. E. 2d 485 (1954).
SCf. Rutherford v. Rideout Bank, 11 Cal. 2d 479, 80 P. 2d 978 (1938).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 58-44.7 (Supp. 1955).
9 In this case the bank argued that it could be fairly inferred from the plead-
ings that its official pocketed the commissions himself, and that he was therefore
working only for himself as an insurance agent. The statute would seem to
[Vol. 34
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G. S. § 20-71.11°-Registration Evidence of Ownership of Motor Vehicle
Since the last Survey, the Court has decided four cases dealing
with this statute. In one case'1 the allegations of registration and
ownership were admitted, which, of course, was enough to take the
case to the jury on the agency issue.
In another case12 the plaintiff's intestate (fifteen year old daughter
of the plaintiff) was killed in an automobile accident. Several people
were in the car, including the owner of the automobile against whom
this wrongful death action was brought. The plaintiff apparently had
three alternative theories: (1) the defendant owner was driving; (2)
the car was being driven either by the intestate or one of the other
passengers under the defendant's direction and control; or (3) the
defendant interfered with whoever was driving and thus caused the
accident. Although the plaintiff contended that he was entitled to
have his case go to the jury under G. S. § 20-71.1, a nonsuit was
granted. The Court affirmed, pointing out that the plaintiff had alleged
neither agency1 3 nor the negligence of any agent, reiterating that the
statute provides a rule of evidence and will not supply omissions in
pleadings.' 4
The family purpose doctrine 5 was coupled with this statutory pro-
vision in the remaining two cases. In Davis v. Lawrence16 the plaintiff
alleged the registration and ownership of the automobile on the part
of one defendant; that it was driven by the other defendant at the
time of the accident; that the driver was a member of the same house-
hold as the owner; and that there was agency under the family purpose
doctrine. The defendant owner contended that no actual evidence of
any agency relationship had been introduced by the plaintiff in the
trial, and that as to him, at least, the nonsuit granted below was proper.
The Court ruled, however, that the allegations of the complaint coupled
prohibit a bank from sharing any commission unless the bank itself were a licensed
insurance agent; this is not clear, however, since the evil aimed at seems to be
rebates on or reductions of premiums and provides that nothing in the statute
will prevent licensed agents from receiving commissions. The word "bank" is
not used in the statute, but the word "creditor" is used and would probably be
applicable to banks as lenders.piN. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-71.1 (1953).
"' Hatcher v. Clayton, 242 N. C. 450, 88 S. E. 2d 104 (1955) ; see also Davis
v. Lawrence, 242 N. C. 496, 87 S. E. 2d 915 (1955).
12 Osborne v. Gilreath, 241 N. C. 685, 86 S. E. 2d 462 (1955).
: The Court apparently did not think the plaintiff's allegation that the car
was being driven "by someone under the direction and control of the defendant"
a sufficient allegation of agency.
"' This has been a troublesome problem, although the Court has made its
position clear. See Case Survey, 32 N. C. L. REv. 379, 383-84 (1954).
1' The language of the statute seems applicable to the family purpose doctrine
when it speaks of "vehicle . . . being operated by and under the control of a
person for whose conduct the owner was legally responsible . . .
16 242 N. C. 496, 87 S. E. 2d 915 (1955).
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with the admission in the answer as to registration and ownership was
sufficient to take the agency issue to the jury upon a new trial.
In the other case17 invoking the family purpose doctrine, the car
was registered in the name of the father. The father offered testimony
that the equitable owner of the car was his seventeen year old son, who
drove it exclusively as his own, and that the few times he (the father)
had used the car were with the son's permission. The note for the
unpaid balance due on the purchase price of the automobile was in
the father's name because the son was a minor. The insurance taken
out by the father was Class "C," which is designed to cover a situation
where a minor is the principal driver. Evidence was offered that the
son himself was making installment payments on the indebtedness out
of the money earned on his paper route, and that the son had earned
the major portion of the money already paid on the car and its in-
surance premiums. The jury gave a verdict against both father and
son in the personal injury suit arising out of an accident caused by
the alleged negligence of the son. Upon the father's appeal, the Court
held that the issues of (1) ownership and (2) agency under the family
purpose doctrine were exclusively within the province of the jury under
G. S. § 20-71.1; furthermore, with such disputed facts as to ownership
and responsibility, both issues would have gone to the jury even with-
out the aid of the statute.
1 8
"Ratification" by an Undisclosed Principal
In General Air Conditioning Co. v. Douglass'0 the plaintiff entered
into a contract with the husband alone to install heating units on prop-
erty owned by the husband and his wife by the entireties.20 The plain-
tiff joined the husband and wife as defendants in an action for breach
of contract, but the trial court granted a nonsuit as to the wife. Upon
its appeal the plaintiff argued that the wife was also liable, either upon
an agency -or estoppel theory. The Court affirmed the general rule
that the marital status of itself raises no presumption of agency,2 ' and
found no element of estoppel since the wife herself had done nothing
to mislead the plaintiff to its prejudice. 22 The Court also dispatched
the ratification argument made by the plaintiff, since the husband did
not purport to be acting as an agent at all.28 The language used by the
' 7 Elliott v. Killian, 242 N. C. 471, 87 S. E. 2d 903 (1955).
" Part of the testimony tending to establish agency was to the effect that the
son often drove his mother and sister in the car, the son taking his sister with
him to the school they both attended every morning. The Court did not com-
ment upon this aspect of the evidence.
10241 N. C. 170, 84 S. E. 2d 828 (1954).
20 See REAL PRoPERTY, p. 69 infra.
21 RESTAImEENT, AGENCY § 22, comment b (1933).
21Cf. id. § 103.
'3 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 85 (1933).
[Vol. 34
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Court still leaves in doubt its position as to whether an unidentified
(partially disclosed) principal may ratify. The rule quoted by the
Court said literally that the agent must purport to act for the principal.





G. S. § 97-2 (e) provides that where the "shortness of time" or
"casual nature" of the employment make it "impractical" to compute
the average weekly wage by mathematical average, "regard shall be
had" to the average wage of "a person of the same grade and character
employed in the same class of employment in the same locality or
community." 27  The plaintiff in the case of Harris v. Asheville Con-
tracting CoP8 had worked only two days in his new job prior to his
accident; there was no contention that his work was of a casual nature.
The plaintiff testified to the contract price29 for which he was hired and
introduced as corroborative evidence the defendant employer's report of
the accident, 30 which listed this figure8 1 in the space labelled "Average
Weekly Wage." The Industrial Commission found the average wage,
on which it based the amount of the award granted, to be the exact
amount listed on the employer's report.32  The defendant excepted
on two grounds: (1) the report was incompetent as evidence; (2) the
method of computation should have been on the basis of the average
earnings of employees doing the same work in the plaintiff's locality.
The Court said that even though the employer's report is not effec-
tive as notice of a claim for compensation,33 it is competent as evi-
dence in a hearing.34  As for the method of computing the average
24 REINSTATEMENT, AGENCY § 85, comment b (1933).
2 See Breckenridge, Ratification in North Carolina, 18 N. C. L. REV. 308,
316-17 (1940).
"8 Guest v. Brenner Iron & Metal Co., 241 N. C. 448, 85 S. E. 2d 596 (1955)
is treated in Note, 33 N. C. L. Rv. 637 (1955).
"See 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 60.11 (1952).28 240 N. C. 715, 83 S. E. 2d 802 (1954).
29 In terms of hourly wage and overtime rate at a stipulated number of hours
per week.
Industrial Commission Form 19.
31 In the appeal record it appears that the contract price listed on the em-
ployer's report was actually a few dollars higher than that listed by the employee
in his claim for compensation. This was apparently a discrepancy caused by
the employee's failing at first to figure his overtime rate at time-and-a-half.
2Cf. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 60.21 (1952).
22Whitted v. Palmer Bee Co., 228 N. C. 447, 46 S. E. 2d 109 (1948).
' The Court cited no authority, yet the plaintiff had cited Russell v. Western
Oil Co., 206 N. C. 341, 174 S. E. 101 (1934), in his brief, a case which held
the employer's report competent evidence in a hearing; accord, Carlton v. Barn-
hardt-Seagle Co., 210 N. C. 655, 188 S. E. 77 (1936). N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-
81 (b) (1950) provides: "These reports shall not be used as evidence against
19551
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wage, it was stated that the defendant did not challenge the correctness
of the report it had submitted or try to challenge the accuracy of the
plaintiff's evidence as to the wage for which he had been hired. Perhaps
the most substantial factor in the case, however, was that neither party
offered evidence as to the average wage of workers doing the same
type of work in the locality. 5
Jurisdiction and Procedure
The Industrial Commission was deceived by fraud into awarding
compensation to the mother of the deceased married employee, and
the employer paid the compensation in a lump sum. Later when the
wife appeared and made her claim, the Commission reopened the origi-
nal proceeding and added her as a party plaintiff. The Commission,
holding that the employer was discharged from further liability, ordered
the mother to pay the award over to the wife. The Court affirmed 80
the conclusion that the employer was discharged, 7 but held that it was
beyond the Commission's jurisdiction to adjudicate between parties
plaintiff. The remedy suggested to the wife was that she institute an
independent suit in the superior court.38
In Aylor v. Barnes"9 the Full Commission, with one dissent, granted
an award. The dissenting Commissioner thought the plaintiff had not
sustained the necessary burden of proof on a fact requisite to give the
Industrial Commission jurisdiction in the case. The superior court
overruled the defendant's exceptions and affirmed the findings and
conclusions of the Commission. The Supreme Court remanded for
error on the ground that the Commission's findings of jurisdictional
any employer in any suit at law brought by any employee for the recovery of
damages." The term "suit at law" is not thought to cover hearings before the
Commission. Cf. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-92 (b) (1950).
"' The rationale of this case seems to be that the Court sustained the Com-
mission's discretion in finding the average wage from the only competent evidence
offered. It seems likely that the wage for which the plaintiff was hired -was
approximately the local average over a year's period; certainly the contract
price would be accurate in many of the more stabilized positions, such as that
of bank clerk. If, however, the employer had proved that the particular week
of the accident was a busier week than the average, in which the employee got
overtime pay not normal during other seasons of the year, it is thought the Court
would have sustained a Commission finding of a reduced average wage. It is
suggested that employers making a report of an accident might indicate on Form
19 itself whenever the mathematical average does not represent the true wage
situation.
" Green v. Briley, 242 N. C. 196, 87 S. E. 2d 213 (1955).
"7 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-48 (c) (1950).
"See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-24 (b) (1950), which allows a plaintiff a one-
year tolling of the statute of limitations in which to begin a new suit in the
superior court. This remedy is provided when the "claim" is not under the pro-
visions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The section is not thought appli-
cable, however, in this situation, where the erroneously-brought Commission action
reveals the cause of action to be against a person other than the employer.
"242 N. C. 223, 87 S. E. 2d 269 (1955).
[Vol. 34
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fact are not conclusive ° and that the superior court has "both the
power and the duty to consider all the evidence in the record, and find
therefrom the jurisdictional facts, without regard to the findings of fact
by the Commission." 41  (Emphasis added.) The statement of facts
in the case shows that the judge of the superior court carefully con-
sidered all the evidence in the record, as required. In overruling the
defendant's exceptions, the judge below must have given prime con-
sideration to the evidence supporting the jurisdictional finding, because
it was the cause of the dissent in the Commission.
The Court is now, for the first time,42 carrying its earlier statement
of the jurisdictional fact rule48 to its logical end. It is possible that
a judge completely cognizant of the rule, in merely overruling the ex-
ceptions and affirming the findings of jurisdiction made below, might
only be taking the position that the Commission's findings were reason-
able ones upon conflicting evidence. Now it is emphasized that the
superior court has the duty to find jurisdictional facts independently.44
Nursing Services
The plaintiff's mother received an award for practical nursing serv-
ices, although the Commission had given no written authorization in
advance. The defendant objected on the ground that the 1945 Rules
and Regulations of the Commission, in effect at the time of the accident,
required such advance written authority.45 The Full Commission said
that the general policy of allowing nursing claims, set out in Commission
Rule VIII,46 overrode the specific provision, and that the Commission
could "relax" its rules on occasion. The Court reversed47 the award
Annot., N. C. W. C. A. ANN. § 97-86 (1952).
Aylor v. Barnes, 242 N. C. 223, 226, 87 S. E. 2d 269, 272 (1955), quoting
from Aycock v. Cooper, 202 N. C. 500, 505, 163 S. E. 569, 571 (1932).
" Aycock v. Cooper, supra note 41 was a case where the superior court
reversed the Commission's findings; upon affirming, the Court had used the quoted
language to uphold the "power and the duty" of the superior court to reverse the
Commission on a jurisdictional fact. The other cases cited by the Court as
"recognizing" the rule are similarly distinguishable ones or were instituted at
common law in the superior court originally, with the defendant claiming the
action to be under the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission. Cf. Reaves v.
Earle-Chesterfield Mill Co., 216 N. C. 462, 5 S. E. 2d 305 (1939), where a juris-
dictional fact was in dispute; the superior court merely affirmed the findings of
the Commission; the Supreme Court reversed, but because it disagreed on the
evidence, without mentioning the "power and the duty" of the superior court to
make independent findings.
422 LARsoxr, WORK-M EN's COmPENSArION § 80.40 (1952) states that the juris-
dictional fact rule has been discredited by a majority of states.
"It is believed that the judge would not have to make new and detailed find-
ings seriatim from the evidence, but that a recital that he had exercised inde-
pendent judgment and had found in favor of jurisdiction would be sufficient. Per-
haps he could even "adopt" the findings below as his own.
'" The Court observed that the 1951 Rules and Regulations retained the same
requirement as to advance authority.
,"[T]he fees in the following schedule are the ones which will ordinarily
be approved by the Commission." The schedule listed nursing fees.
,7 Hatchett v. Hitchcock Corp., 240 N. C. 591, 83 S. E. 2d 539 (1954).
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because one of the statutes providing for medical fees contained the
wording "other treatment required, when ordered by the Cominis-
sion .... *"48 (Emphasis added.) However, the Court raised the fur-
ther question whether the Commission had statutory authority at all
to grant nursing fees, since it was not provided by the act in terms.
The Court seemed to doubt whether the words "other treatment"
would cover such nursing services, but declined to base its reversal
on this ground.49
Disablement from Asbestosis or Silicosis
In Huskins v. United Feldspar Corp.50 the Court reversed an award
to the plaintiff for disablement from silicosis on the ground that there
was no evidence to support the Commission's finding that the disable-
ment occurred within two years from the last exposure.5 ' The plain-
tiff had not been exposed to dust since 1946,52 and was making, up
to the time of the hearing, far more money from subsequent jobs of a
substantially regular nature than he had made at his dusty trade. The
Commission had granted its award on the basis that the plaintiff was
disabled from doing normal work as a mucker in a mica mine.
In a delibrate dictum, the Court said53 the Commission had used
the wrong test of disablement, and that the Commission had "miscon-
strued" its opinion in Honeycutt v. Carolina Asbestos Co.54 In that
case the plaintiff was instructed to quit his job by the Commission; he
then got a job as a policeman, working twelve hours a day, seven days
a week, making more money than before. There was evidence that he
had lost some time from his police work because of his asbestosis, and
that the employment was too heavy for him to continue working long.
The Court praised him for not going on public relief and affirmed the
,8 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-25 and -26 (1950) provided for medical fees gen-
erally; § 97-26 contained the quoted phrase.
' The 1955 General Assembly apparently took notice of this case and amended
N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-25, -26, -29, and -90 (a) (Supp. 1955) to insert in each sec-
tion or subsection a reference in terms to "nursing services, medicines, sick travel."
N. C. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 1026, §§ 2 to 4, 5 (d). Dental services, also listed on
the Commission schedule, were not mentioned; see Statutory Survey, 33 N. C. L.
REv. 513, 603 (1955).
50241 N. C. 128, 84 S. E. 2d 645 (1954).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-58 (a) (1950), rewritten by N. C. Sess. Laws 1955,
c. 525, § 6; the "two years after the last exposure" provision was left unaffected,
however.
'2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-58 (b) (1950) provides that an employee has two
years in which to file a claim for asbestosis or silicosis from the time of first
being told by competent medical authority of the presence of the disease. How-
ever, as the principal case holds, this does not relieve the employee from proving
that his actual disablement occurred within two years of the last injurious ex-
posure per § 97-58 (a). Huskins found out by accident from a routine chest
X-ray taken in 1952 that he had silicosis.
" Huskins v. United Feldspar Corp., 241 N. C. 128, 133-34, 84 S. E. 2d 645,
648-49 (1954).
1235 N. C. 471, 70 S. E. 2d 426 (1952).
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award, based on his average weekly wage as an asbestos worker. It
was held that, as to Honeycutt, the "last occupation in which remu-
neratively employed" 55 was the work in the asbestos factory.
In the principal case, the Court distinguished the Honeycutt decision
by saying: (1) the defendant in Honeycutt admitted the disablement;
(2) the work Honeycutt had taken as a policeman was one of those
"odd jobs a self-respecting employee, driven by stark economic neces-
sity, will accept and attempt to perform so as to eke out a living for
himself and his family rather than to become the recipient of charity
or government aid."'56 The Court in Huskins stated clearly that "the
last occupation in which remuneratively employed" 57 and "the place
of last injurious exposure" 58 were not synonymous. This position went
a great distance toward lessening the distinction once thought59 to be
drawn between "disablement" and "disability" provided in G. S. § 97-
54. It is interesting to note that the 1955 General Assembly has gone
even further than the Court and abolished all distinction between the
two words for any practical purpose.60
CIVIL PROCEDURE
PARTIES
Real Party in Interest-Absence as Fatal Defect
Lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a cause of action are fatal
defects of which a court may take notice at any time with a resulting
dismissal of the plaintiff's litigation. Mahan v. Read1 verified that the
absence of the real party in interest as a party plaintiff is a third such
fatal defect, for which the court may dismiss ex mero motu. A pre-
vious decision2 had laid down the rule in clear and concise language,
but the unusual fact situation may have obscured its significance.
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-54 (1950); see infra note 60 for 1955 amendment.
" Huskins v. United Feldspar Corp., 241 N. C. 128, 134, 84 S. E. 2d 645,
649 (1954).
SIlnfra note 60.
" Paraphrase by the Court from N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-57 and -58 (a) (1950);
see supra note 51 as to 1955 amendment of § 97-58 (a) (Supp. 1955).
' See Young v. Whitehall Co., 229 N. C. 360, 49 S. E. 2d 797 (1948) ; Annot.,
N. C. W. C. A. ANN § 97-54 (1952).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-54 (1950) defined "disablement" as the employee's
being "actually incapacitated . . . from performing normal labor in the last
occupation in which remuneratively employed ...... N. C. Sess. Laws 1955, c.
525, § 1, amends the language to read: "actually incapacitated . .. to earn, in the
same or any other employment, the wages which the employee was receiving at
the time of his last injurious exposure ... " See Statutory Survey, 33 N. C. L.
Rv. 513, 603-05 (1955).
-240 N. C. 641, 83 S. E. 2d 706 (1954). A mother having brought suit in
her own name to collect support payments, the Court held that the children were
the real parties in interest.. For a further discussion of this case, see DoMrsTIc
RELATIoNs, p. 50 infra.
2 Dare County v. Mater, 235 N. C. 179, 69 S. E. 2d 244 (1952). County was
attempting to close a bingo establishment, and the Court said the plaintiff was
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In some prior cases the defense that plaintiff was not the real
party in interest had been treated as new matter which could only be
raised by affirmative pleading by the defendant.8 These later cases
properly indicate that no such rule operates when the facts pleaded or
proven by plaintiff show, as a matter of law, that plaintiff cannot be
the real party in interest. This North Carolina position is in substan-
tial agreement with the provisions of Federal Rule 12(h) regarding the
absence of an indispensable party.4 It may be pointed out that in
neither North Carolina case was the question raised until the case
reached the Supreme Court, and in the later case it was first noticed by
the Court.
Misjoinder of Parties5
The real party in interest question caught another litigant in quite
a different way in Hendersonr v. New Bern.0 A group of businessmen had
sought to intervene as defendants in an action to enjoin the City of
New Bern from taking a lease on property to be used for an off-street
parking lot. The Court held that they were neither necessary nor
proper parties but must be heard through the defendant municipality
which was the real party in interest. An examination of the authority
cited for this position7 indicates that in order to enter a suit as a party
defendant there must be a direct interest in the outcome of the litigation,
an indirect effect (in this case a possible increase in business) not be-
ing enough.
In a similar fact situation, plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the
City of Reidsville from tearing down a housing project; other tax-
payers, desiring that the project be torn down, successfully moved to
join as parties plaintiff. They then filed a complaint which alleged
facts in opposition to those of the original complaint, and asked that
the injunction not be granted. The Court disapproved the lower court's
joinder of the additional parties as plaintiffs, reserving the question
actually seeking to abate a public nuisance and such actions must be maintained
in the name of the State.
'See for example, Morrow v. Cline, 211 N. C. 254, 190 S. E. 207 (1937).
'"A party waives all defenses and objections which he does not present either
by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his answer
or reply, except . . . the defense of failure to join an indispensable party...
FFn. R. Crv. P. 12(h).
For a study of this entire topic, see Brandis, Permissive Joinder of Parties
and Causes in North Carolina, 25 N. C. L. REv. 1 (1946) ; Brandis, A Plea for
Adoption by North Carolina of the Federal Joinder Riles, 25 N. C. L. REv. 245
(1947). The cases in this area have not been treated fully in view of the scheduled
publication of an article which will discuss the developments in the joinder field
since 1946.
6 241 N. C. 52, 84 S. E. 2d 283 (1954). For a discussion on a different aspect
of this case, see MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIoNs, p. 62 infra.
7 Mullen v. Louisburg, 225 N. C. 53, 33 S. E. 2d 484 (1945).
s Burton v. City of Reidsville, 240 N. C. 577, 83 S. E. 2d 651 (1954).
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as to whether they could have been joined as defendants.0 The hold-
ing was that an intervener as a party plaintiff in a taxpyer's action
must come into the case as it exists, and conform to the pleadings as
he finds them.
An analysis of the two cases and their cited authority indicates that
in order to intervene successfully in a taxpayer's action, a party must
be seeking the same relief as the original plaintiff; or, if in opposition
to the plaintiff's action, have an interest in the result so direct that
granting the relief sought will cause him to suffer immediate loss. In
an earlier decision the Court had refused to allow the Carolina Power
and Light Company to join as a party defendant, even though the
granting of the relief sought by the plaintiff would result in the can-
cellation of its contract to supply wholesale electric energy to the de-
fendant.10 Perhaps the rule is that the resulting injury to the inter-
vener must arise simultaneously with the judgment, and the fact that
an injury will result from the action taken by the defendant munici-
pality, acting on the decision, is not sufficient.
Necessary and Proper Parties
Once again the Court found it necessary to state that a suit can
be brought only by persons in being, and, in the absence of statute,
non-existent parties cannot be represented by a guardian ad litemY1
In Cutler v. Winfield,12 where a guardian ad litem had been appointed
to represent the interest of deceased school trustees, notice was taken
ex mero motu of the guardian's lack of authority and he was dismissed
from the suit.
Ruling on another aspect of this case, the Court pointed out that
all of those having reversionary interest in the real property appeared
to be dead and that there were no successors to them; consequently,
the University of North Carolina was a necessary party to the action
in order that any right of escheat might be adjudicated. The cause
was remanded to enable the University to be made a party.
In Story v. Waleott13 the action was for specific performance of a
clause in a deed which gave to the grantor the first right of repurchase
'As the parties seeking to intervene in this action had no direct interest in
the outcome of the litigation, the decision in Henderson v. New Bern would
rule out their joinder as parties defendant.
" Mullen v. Louisburg, 225 N. C. 53, 33 S. E. 2d 484 (1945). The governing
body of the defendant municipality had voted to tear down the town power plant
and to purchase wholesale electric energy from Carolina Power and Light Com-
pany. Following the vote, a contract was made with the Company and steps
were taken to sell the machinery from the municipal power plant. Action was
to enjoin the town from selling the equipment.
"McPherson v. First & Citizens National Bank, 240 N. C. 1, 81 S. E. 2d
386 (1954). See Case Survey, 33 N. C. L. Ray. 157, 167 (1955).
1 241 N. C. 555, 85 S. E. 2d 913 (1955).
1s240 N. C. 622, 83 S. E. 2d 498 (1954).
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should the grantee desire to sell the land. The grantee had contracted
to sell to the State and the ultimate issue was who was entitled to pur-
chase the land.14 The application of G. S. § 1-731r resulted in a ruling
that the known prospective buyer was a necessary party to the action
to permit a complete determination of the controversy.
Another holding of some interest was to the effect that in an action
to secure an increased allowance from the estate of an insane veteran
confined in a Veteran's Hospital, all persons who would be entitled
to a distributive share of the veteran's estate in case of his death are
necessary parties, and the Veteran's Administration is a proper party.Y'
Class Actions
The community of interest necessary to allow a party to bring a
class action was given further interpretation in a ruling that an owner





A material variance between the allegations and the proof may
deprive a court of jurisdiction and invalidate the judgment rendered.
In Andrews v. Burton'8 the plaintiffs sued for damages for the wrong-
ful cutting of timber from their land. The allegations of the complaint
showed the tract of land to be triangular in shape, while the evidence
and findings of fact established a quadrangular parcel. The trial court
found for the plaintiffs and awarded damages based on the quadrangular
tract. The judgment contained a description conforming with that
established by the findings of fact. The Court ruled that the lower
court had jurisdiction only over the land as described in the plaintiffs'
allegations, and the defendant's motion of nonsuit should have been
allowed both for lack of jurisdiction and for a material variance.
The Court was not through with the case at this point. The de-
fendant in his answer had described a tract of land and asked that he
be adjudged the owner of it. The matter in answer was treated as
The original grantor by specific performance of the clause in the deed, or
the State by specific performance of the contract to sell.
" "The court either between the terms, or at a regular term, according to
the nature of the controversy, may determine any controversy before it, when
it can be done without prejudice to the right of others, but when a complete
determination of the controversy cannot be made without the presence of other
parties, the court must cause them to be brought in. .. ."
"Patrick v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 241 N. C. 76, 84 S. E. 2d 277
(1954).
" Mills v. Carolina Cemetery Park Corp., 242 N. C. 20, 86 S. E. 2d 893
(1955). This case contains examples of defective statements of a good cause
of action and defective causes of action.
18242 N.C. 93, 86 S. E. 2d 786 (1955). Plaintiffs in this case were granted
the right to move for leave to file amended pleadings.
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alleging a cross-action which had not been decided by the lower court,
and the cause was remanded for a trial of the cross-action.' 9
G. S. § 20-71.120 creates a rule of evidence which is intended to
assist a plaintiff in proving agency in a case where it is charged that
the negligence of a nonowner-operator of a motor vehicle caused injury
to person or property. ' To take advantage of this statute a complaint
must contain allegations of agency and of negligence of the purported
driver. In Osborne v. Gilreath,22 where the complaint alleged that
the plaintiff's intestate had been killed as a proximate result of the de-
fendant-owner's negligence, the Court, on the ground of material var-
iance, refused to allow the plaintiff to utilize the statute and affirmed
the judgment of nonsuit.
Other examples of fatal variances were: (1) allegation in an auto-
mobile collision case that the defendant failed to stop before coming
onto a primary road from a secondary highway, and evidence that both
roads were public roads of equal dignity ;23 (2) allegations in a personal
injury suit that plaster fell from the roof of a motion picture theatre
due to seepage of water from a leaky ceiling, and evidence that the water
leakage was due to overflow from a clogged toilet drain.
2 4
Before a nonsuit will be granted the variance must be material
and prejudicial to the opposing party. Thus, in a counterclaim for
fraud, the Court did not feel that an allegation of actual scienter with
proof of at most constructive scienter misled the plaintiff, and a non-
suit was properly refused by the lower court.25
Alternative Theories
The submission of alternative theories to the jury won approval
in two instances during the past year. In Dennis v. City of Albe-
vnarle26 the crucial issue was the height of certain power lines on a
given date. The evidence was conflicting as to whether the wires had
been torn down and replaced by the defendant, or had remained in
their original location. The trial court sent the case to the jury on
the alternative theories, even though the complaint had alleged only
that the wires had been torn down and replaced. The Court, in ap-
'o Compare Bourne v. Southern Ry. Co., 224 N. C. 444, 31 S. E. 2d 382 (1944),
where the Court held that when the defendant moves for a judgment as of a
nonsuit, he, in effect, submits to a voluntary nonsuit on his counterclaim.
"0 This statute provides that proof of ownership of a motor vehicle at the time
of collision or accident shall be prima facie evidence that the motor vehicle was
being operated with the authority, consent and knowledge of the owner." Hartley v. Smith, 239 N. C. 170, 79 S. E. 2d 767 (1953).
22 241 N. C. 685, 86 S. E. 2d 462 (1955). The evidence tended to show that
plaintiff's intestate (his daughter) was herself operating the car at the time
of the accident.
23 Brady v. Nehi Beverage Co., 242 N. C. 32, 86 S. E. 2d 901 (1955).
24 Messick v. Turnage, 240 N. C. 625, 83 S. E. 2d 654 (1954).
25 Zager v. Setzer, 242 N. C. 493, 88 S. E. 2d 94 (1955).
26 242 N. C. 263, 87 S. E. 2d 561 (1955).
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proving, stated that the variance between the allegations and the proof
was not prejudicial. A better procedure would have been to amend
the pleadings to set forth the alternative theories, but such an amend-
ment was not essential.
Thormer v. Lexington Mail Order Co.Y illustrates a different as-
pect of the alternative theories problem. The complaint alleged a con-
tract, duly performed by plaintiff, to provide illustrations for a mall
order catalog. There was conflicting testimony as to the nature of
the illustrations to be provided, but it was established that defendant
received the illustrations and kept at least one for use. The lower
court sent the case to the jury on theories of both express and implied
contract. On appeal the case was reversed, but the Court seemed to
approve submission of the alternative theories, saying that while the
better practice is to allege implied and express contract separately, such
is not required. The complaint was held to be broad enough to support
a recovery on implied contract.
28
While the principle of the two cases is similar, the nature of the
alternatives is different. In the first case the jury was called upon
to choose between alternative fact situations, with but one theory of
liability. In the second case the alternative factual contentions also
involved alternative theories of recovery.
While the Court acted with modern liberality in dealing with alter-
native theories, it disapproved in two instances the use of the term
"and/or" in pleadings.29 If there was ever any doubt that allegations
containing this phrase would be summarily dealt with, such doubt should
now be removed.
AMENDMENT
G. S. § 1-167 provides in part:
"The plaintiff or defendant respectively may be allowed on mo-
tion to make a supplemental complaint, answer or reply . . .by
filing with the clerk the original and one copy of the proposed
amended pleadings and motion, which copy shall be forwarded
27241 N. C. 249, 85 S. E. 2d 140 (1954).
2" Compare Graham v. Hoke, 219 N. C. 755, 14 S. E. 2d 490 (1941), where
it was suggested that, though express and implied contract theories may properly
be joined in the same complaint, the plaintiff may be compelled to elect between
them. See also Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N. C. 542, 8 S. E. 2d 813
(1940). In the Thoriner case apparently no motion to require election was made.
However, submission of the alternative theories seems preferable to requiring
election. It is much more consistent with the laudable modem trend toward
trying the entire case on the merits as speedily as possible.
"'Johnson v. Cleveland County Board of Education, 241 N. C. 56, 84 S. E.
2d 256 -(1954). (Naming of one party defendant "and/or" another party de-
fendant not proper.); Thomas & Howard Co. v. American Mut. Liability Ins.
Co., 241 N. C. 109, 84 S. E. 2d 337 (1954). (Allegation of "property and/or
inventory" loss insufficient to support recovery.)
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to the opposing party or counsel and in which motion the clerk
shall name a day and time of not less than ten days, unless by
consent, to hear any objection to the same; from the determina-
tion of the clerk, either party may have the matter sent to the
judge of, or holding courts in the judicial district in which the
matter is pending, by giving notice thereof to the clerk and op-
posing party or counsel within ten days from such date of hear-
ing by the clerk: Provided, such motion shall be made at least
thirty days before the convening of a term of court at which the
cause may be calendered for trial."
This statute is to be strictly construed and applied only to those
situations specifically set forth therein. Enacted to provide a method
by which a party could obtain leave to amend out of term, it places
no restriction upon the broad authority of a presiding judge under
G. S. § 1-163.8o In Dobias v. Whites ' the plaintiff, relying on G. S. § 1-
167, assigned as error the order of the court permitting the defendants
to amend their answer after the cause was calendered for trial and with-
out ten days' notice. The Court held that the plaintiff was basing his
appeal on the wrong statute and that the judge presiding was well
within the authority given him by G. S. § 1-163.
The liberality with which the amendment statute may be applied
was again demonstrated when the action of a trial court, permitting a
plaintiff to amend his complaint after verdict and before judgment,
was upheld.3 2 The purpose of the amendment was to describe land
more definitely, in conformity with the proof. This case when com-
pared with Andrews v. Burton3 strikingly illustrates the different re-
sult which may be secured by the proper utilization of the amendment
statute as contrasted with the situation in which no effort has been made
to conform pleadings to proof.
MOTION TO STRIKE
8 4
Does the Clerk of Superior Court have jurisdiction to rule on a
motion to strike pleadings under G. S. § 1-153 .35 This question was
" "The judge or court may, before and after judgment, in furtherance of
justice, and on such terms as may be proper, amend any pleading, process or
proceeding, by adding or striking out the name of any party; by correcting a
mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; by inserting
other allegations material to the case; or when the amendment does not change
substantially the claim or defense, by conforming the pleading or proceeding to
the fact proved. .. ."
81240 N. C. 680, 83 S. E. 2d 785 (1954).
8 Reynolds v. Earley, 241 N. C. 521, 85 S. E. 2d 904 (1955).
242 N. C. 93, 86 S. E. 2d 786 (1955). There was nothing to indicate that
the plaintiff in this case ever attempted to amend his pleadings to conform with
the findings of fact.
84 For a full discussion of this subject, see Brandis and Bumgarner, The Motion
to Strike Pleadings in North Carolina, 29 N. C. L. REv. 3 (1950).
"5"If irrelevant or redundant matter is inserted in a pleading, it may be
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raised by the Court but no direct answer to it was offered.30 In dis-
cussing the matter the Court pointed out that the language of the
statute refers to a judge, and that the prejudicial effect of objectionable
allegations in a pleading ordinarily arises when these allegations are
read to a jury. At first blush it may appear that the Court has
answered its own question, but there are several things which should
be considered. First, while it is true that the word "judge" is used in
the statute, the word is used only in that part of the statute which was
added by amendment in 1949. Prior to that time the term "court"
was used throughout the statute, and there is no question that the Clerk
is a court of limited jurisdiction.37 Until the word "judge" was used
in the amendment to the statute, the jurisdiction to rule on motions
to strike pleadings would appear to have been within the scope of the
powers given a Clerk.38  The use of the term "judge" in the amend-
ment may have deprived the Clerk of jurisdiction. However, such a
conclusion seems strained since the amendment was designed to expe-
dite the framing of issues prior to trial by allowing motions to strike
to be heard by a judge out of term, even in the absence of consent.80
Second, it is beyond argument that the prejudicial effect of objec-
tionable allegations results from the reading of the pleadings to the
jury. However, if the purpose of the amendment is to expedite the
disposal of preliminary motions, there is good reason why the Clerk
should be permitted to rule on such motions. Since a Superior Court
judge is not bound by the decision of the Clerk, no harm could result,
while the busy judge might be freed from ruling on motions to strike
which are not strongly controverted.
It is to be hoped that the Court's comments do not indicate a final
decision on the matter. Jurisdiction to rule on a motion to strike seems
logically within the powers of a Clerk and practical considerations sup-
port its inclusion.
stricken out on motion of any person aggrieved thereby, but this motion must
be made before answer or demurrer, or before an extension of time to plead is
granted. When the allegations of a pleading are so indefinite or uncertain that
the precise nature of the charge or defense is not apparent, the court may require
the pleadings to be made definite and certain by amendment. Any such motion
to strike any matter out of any pleading may, upon ten days' notice to the adverse
party, be heard out of term by the resident judge of the district or by any judge
regularly assigned to hold the courts of the district." The last sentence of the
statute was added by amendment in 1949.
" Gallimore v. Highway Commission, 241 N. C. 350, 85 S. E. 2d 392 (1954).
"'Keen v. Parker, 217 N. C. 378, 8 S. E. 2d 209 (1940) ; Beaufort County v.
Bishop, 216 N. C. 211, 4 S. E. 2d 525 (1939). See also MCINTOSH, NORTH CARO-
LINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CMIL CASES § 71 (1929).
"8 "The clerk of the superior court has jurisdiction to hear and decide all ques-
tions of practice and procedure and all other matters over which jurisdiction is
given to the superior court, unless the judge of the court or the court at regular
term is expressly referred to." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-13 (1953).
" A SURVEY OF STATUTORY CHANGES IN NORTH CAROLINA IN 1949, 27 N. C. L.
Rv. 405, 434 (1949).
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INCONSISTENT ALLEGATIONS
A demurrer to a complaint for failure to state a cause of action
admits the truth of every material fact properly alleged.40 This rule
has certain qualifications, one of which is illustrated in Lindley v. Yeat-
man.41 The plaintiff sued for breach of contract, attaching to the com-
plaint and incorporating by reference the letter containing the con-
tractual agreement. The Court's interpretation of the letter differed
from the legal effect alleged in the complaint. It was held, in effect, that
a demurrer does not admit the legal effect alleged in the complaint
when it is repugnant to the words of the instrument. The Court said
that the repugnant statements of fact destroy each other, and since in
this case the remaining allegations were insufficient to state a cause
of action, the demurrer was properly sustained.
The case does not seem, strictly speaking, to involve repugnant
factual allegations. Though alleging a contract by its legal effect is
a permissible method of pleading, it necessarily involves conclusions of
law. Therefore, when the contract itself is set forth, the court may
draw its own conclusions therefrom and reject those of the plaintiff.
42
The true reason why the complaint fails to state a cause of action is




"Res judicata is an affirmative defense and must be raised by answer
and unless the facts supporting the plea appear on the face of the com-
plaint or are alleged or admitted in the plaintiff's reply, is not avail-
able on a motion to dismiss."4 4 This statement in Reid v. Holden with
its cited authority,45 seems to draw a sharp distinction between a plea
of res judicata and a plea that there is a prior action pending. A motion
to dismiss has been granted consistently in those cases which involve
the pendency of a prior action.46 The procedure in the prior action
cases is the closest approach North Carolina has made to the motion
for summary judgment of the Federal courts,47 and the same procedure
"' Gaines v. Long Mfg. Co., 234 N. C. 331, 67 S. E. 2d 355 (1951) ; Bryant v.
Little River Ice Co., 233 N. C. 266, 63 S. E. 2d 547 (1951).
4242 N. C. 145, 87 S. E. 2d 5 (1955).
'2 Petty v. Lemons, 217 N. C. 492, 8 S. E. 2d 616 (1940).
Suppose that a complaint's allegations of a contract's legal effect fail to
state a cause of action, but the contract, set out verbatim, shows that a cause
exists. Should this be treated as failure to state a cause of action because the"repugnant" allegations are mutually destructive?
"Reid v. Holden, 242 N. C. 408, 411, 88 S. E. 2d 125, 128 (1955).
' Sanderson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 218 N. C. 270, 10 S. E. 2d 802 (1940);
Williams v. Hutton & Bourbonnais Co., 164 N. C. 216, 80 S. E. 257 (1913).
' Cameron v. Cameron, 235 N. C. 35, 68 S. E. 2d 796 (1952) ; Underwood v.
Dooley, 197-N. C. 100, 147 S. E. 686 (1929).
"7 See Brandis and Bumgarner, The Motion to Strike Pleadings in North
Carolina, 29 N. C. L. REv. 3, 15 (1950).
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would appear to be the logical and reasonable way of handling the
plea of res judicata when raised by answer. It is questionable if the
differences between the two defenses are basic enough to justify the con-
flicting treatment awarded to them.
48
The plea of res judicata was more effectively used by the defendant
in Gaither Corp. v. Skinner.49 Here, in an earlier suit for collection
of money due on a building contract, defendant owner had counter-
claimed for damages because of the contractor's failure to perform the
contract in certain specified particulars. When the former defendant
instituted the present action for damages due to the contractor's im-
proper construction of the building's roof, the Court said the former
judgment was res judicata to'the action. Since the defense was estab-
lished by the plaintiff's own evidence, an involuntary nonsuit was
proper.
To effectively bar later litigation of the same cause of action, the
defense of res judicata must be based on a judgment on the merits.
Thus, in Kelly v. Kelly,50 where the plea was based on a former action
in which an involuntary nonsuit was entered, the Court held that it
is no defense to a subsequent action in which a plaintiff "mends his
licks"; nor is there any presumption that evidence available at the
time of the former trial was introduced and considered.
CROSS ACTIONS AND COUNTERCLAIMS
When a party is brought into a suit as a defendant under a cross-
action, he is entitled to bring his own cross-action against the original
defendant. If the defendant so brought in does not desire to assert
the cross-action but prefers to institute an original suit, the failure to
assert the cross-action is not a bar to the later suit. On the other
hand, a party so brought in may not assert a cross-action or counter-
claim against any party other than the one bringing him into the suit.
1
Presumably, however, if plaintiff amends to state a cause of action
against the new defendant, the latter stands in the same position with
respect to the plaintiff as if he had been made an original defendant. It
thus appears that there are no compulsory cross-actions between de-
fendants, and that a defendant's counterclaim against the plaintiff can
be compulsory only if the plaintiff seeks relief against the defendant
with the claim.
52
"8A note to be published in the April, 1956 issue will more fully develop
the comparison betwen pendency of prior action and res judicata.
'p241 N. C. 532, 85 S. E. 2d 909 (1955).
80241 N. C. 146, 84 S. E. 2d 809 (1954).
8 Morgan v. Brooks, 241 N. C. 527, 85 S. E. 2d 869 (1955).
2 In North Carolina many counterclaims are not compulsory, even for the
original defendants. See Brandis, A Plea for the Adoption by North Carolina
of the Federal Joinder Rules, 25 N. C. L. R v. 245, 253 (1947).
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In Kelly v. Kelly53 the defendant in an ejectment suit claimed title
under a tax foreclosure deed and moved to have the foreclosing county
joined as a party defendant. When the motion was granted, the de-
fendant set forth a cross-action against the county for the purchase
price of the property in the event that he should be ejected. The court
ruled that the county was a proper party to the suit, but that the de-
fendant had no right to litigate the cross-action against the county in
the ejectment suit. The basis of the decision was that the adjudica-
tion of the cross-action was not essential to the controversy between
the plaintiff and the defendant. An examination of the record reveals
that, while the plaintiff had objected to the joinder of the county as a
party, no objection was made to the cross-action; furthermore, the
county in its pleadings admitted that it would be liable to the defendant
in the event that the ejectment action was successful. The ruling of
the case seems in conflict with the modern trend to have a final adjudi-
cation of an action in one suit whenever possible. It is difficult to see
how the cross-action could be prejudicial to the plaintiff since it was
conditional on the plaintiff's prevailing in the action and would in no
way affect his recovery. The result gives further strength to the pro-
posal that the adoption of some of the Federal Rules would provide a
more orderly system of procedure. 54
Another case of some interest restricted the application of the second
provision of G. S. § 1-24055 to those situations in which the plaintiff
fails to sue all of the alleged joint tort-feasors.5 If the plaintiff does
join all of the alleged joint tort-feasors, and the complaint fails to state
a cause of action against one of them, the other defendants have no
right to require his retention for the purpose of enforcing contribution.
This holding appears to be in conflict with previous decisions, 57 and
it is to be hoped that it will be narrowly confined. In the light of the
possible effects of the decision, a defendant who is confronted with
r3241 N. C. 146, 84 S. E. 2d 809 (1954). Discussed also under "Affirmative
Defenses."
" "A pleading may state as a cross-claim, any claim by one party against
a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any prop-
erty that is the subject matter of the original action. Such cross-claim may in-
clude a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable
to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against
the cross-claimant." FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g). (Emphasis added.)
" This statute provides in part ". .. at any time before judgment is ob-
tained, the joint tort-feasors made parties defendant may, upon motion, have
the other joint tort-feasors made parties defendant."
" Loving v. Whitton, 241 N. C. 273, 84 S. E. 2d 919 (1954).
7 Yandall v. National Fireproofing Co., 239 N. C. 1, 79 S. E. 2d 223 (1953).
See Case Survey, 32 N. C. L. Rav. 379, 400 (1954). (One defendant successfully
demurred to the complaint, but was brought back into the case when the other
defendants filed a cross-action against him.) In accord, see Canestino v. Powell,
231 N. C. 190, 56 S. E. 2d 566 (1949),
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In the past few terms of Court there was a great deal of litigation
concerning the operation of dog tracks in North Carolina. In State v.
Felton' the Court invalidated the Currituck Act of 19492 which pro--
vided for a County Racing Commission which was authorized to issue
a franchise to a person or persons for either dog or horse racing, or
both. The Court held that it violated article I, sections 73 and 314 of
the North Carolina Constitution in that it gave a monopoly and ex-
clusive emoluments to a person not in consideration of public services.5
In Taylor v. Carolinz Racing Association, Inc.,G the Court had to
decide whether the Morehead City Act7 was constitutional. This Act
differed from the Currituck Act in that it provided that the voters of
Morehead City, by their vote, could put the Act into force and effect,
and in that it did not call for a Racing Commission by its terms. The
Court held that the Morehead City Act violated the North Carolina
Constitution in three specific instances:
(1). It violated article I, section 7 in that it gave to a man or set
of men, not a political subdivision of the state, a privilege or immunity
not in consideration of public services. This was true even though
Morehead Cty received financial benefit from the operation of the track.
(2). The Act unconstitutionally delegated legislative powers to the
voters of Morehead City in that it gave them the right to determine
1 ,, . . in the event the judgment was obtained in an action arising out of a
joint tort, and only one, or not all of the joint tort-feasors, were made parties
defendant, those tort-feasors made parties defendant, and against whom judg-
ment was obtained, may, in an action therefor, enforce contribution from the
other joint tort-feasors. . . ." This is the part of the statute the Court referred
to as the first provision, and to which the defendant was directed if he had any
right to collect from the tort-feasor excused from the action. However, when
the action is postponed until after judgment, the alleged joint tort-feasor, not
having been a party, is not bound by the judgment. That is to say, as to him,
nothing is res judicata.
* For a discussion of the use of the fee determinable as a device for restricting
the use of land to whites only, see REAL PROPERTY, p. 63 infra and Note, p. 113
infra.1239 N. C. 575, 80 S. E. 2d 625 (1954).
'N. C. Sess Laws 1949, c. 541.
"'No person or set of persons are entitled to exclusive or separate emolu-
ments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services."
'"Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state and
ought not to be allowed."
'For a full discussion of this case, see Note, 33 N. C. L. REv. 109 (1954)
and Case Survey, 33 N. C. L. REv. 173, 175 (1955).
'241 N. C. 80, 84 S. E. 2d 390 (1954).
N. C. Public-Local and Private Laws 1939, c. 540.
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whether the Act should be in force and effect. Further, since the track
was not within the City limits, but in Carteret county, whose citizens
could not vote under the Act, it, in effect, would be the same as giving
t9 the citizens of Morehead City the power to authorize the track in
Clay county. A town cannot decide whether a state statute shall be in
force and effect elsewhere than in the territory comprising that particu-
lar governmental unit. Legislative power vests exclusively in the Gen-
eral Assembly s and, except as authorized by the Constitution, cannot
be delegated.
(3). Further, article II, section 29 of the North Carolina Consti-
tution provides, in substance, that the General Assembly shall not pass
any local, private or special act regulating labor, trade, etc. Since the
operation of the track was based on a local, special act and involved
trade and business, the Court concluded that the Morehead City Act
was unconstitutional in this respect also.
Chronologically tucked in between the above two cases, Surnrnrell v.
Carolina-Virginia Racing Association, Inc.9 raised Federal constitu-
tional questions in the North Carolina Court. The defendant con-
tended, among other things, that State v. Felton'° had, in effect, over-
ruled prior decisions of the Court, and that this constituted a denial of
due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution." The Court, in answering the defendant's
contentions, adopted the language and reasoning of Chief Judge Parker
in Carolina-Virginia Racing Assoc. v. Cahoon:12 "The mere fact that
a state court overrules its previous decisions on a question of state law
does not constitute a denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."'13 The defendant
further contended that, since it had operated a race track under a fran-
chise given to it by an agency of the State of North Carolina, namely,
the Currituck County Racing Commission, the judgment of the Court
impaired an obligation of his contract which is forbidden by article I,
section 1014 of the United States Constitution. Again using Chief
Judge Parker's arguments in the Cahoon case, the Court said: "First, a
8 N. C. CONsT. art. II, § 29 (1868). "The legislative authority shall be vested
into two distinct branches, both dependent on the people, to wit: a Senate and
a House of Representatives."0 240 N. C. 614, 83 S. E. 2d 501 (1954).
10239 N. C. 575, 80 S. E. 2d 625 (1954).
1 U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. ". . . . nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..±2214 F. 2d 830 (4th Cir. 1954).
12240 N. C. 614, 616, 83 S. E. 2d 501, 503 (1954).
14 "No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letter
of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but
gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, pass any bill of attainder,
ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts, or grant any
title of nobility."
1955]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
purported contract imposes no binding obligations if its validity is de-
pendent upon the provisions of an unconstitutional statute; and second,
the provsions of Art. I, sec. 10, of the Federal Constitution, protecting
the obligations of contracts against state action, is directed only against
impairment by legislation and not by judgments of courts."'I5
Freedom of Religion; Property Rights
The issue in Reid v. Johnston,' was whether the minority of mem-
bers of the Rocky Mount Baptist Church had the right to control the
church property after the majority of members had voted to leave the
Southern Baptist Convention. The Court held that this was not purely
an ecclesiastical problem, which they admitted they could not pass on,
17
but was one involving property, over which courts generally have juris-
diction.
The "church" for the purposes of holding and controlling property
is that group of persons who adhere and submit to the regular order
of the church, local and general, whether a majority or minority of
members. As to what constitutes the "regular order" of the church, the
Court declared it to be, "the characteristic doctrines, usages, customs
and practices of that particular church, recognized and accepted by both
factions before the dissension between them arose.' 8 In the instant
case, therefore, the minority who had remained loyal to the Southern
Baptist Convention, whose doctrines, usages and customs both factions
adhered to before dissension, remained in control of the church property.
The reader's attention is directed to Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathe-
dral'9 where the Supreme Court of the United States raised to the
dignity of a constitutional right a hitherto debated principle of American
church law2°--the principle that the property of a hierarchical church
is to be disposed of in accordance with the decision of its rulers, how-
ever unsound the reasons for such disposal, and however great the num-
ber of church members defying such authority.21 Query, would this
principle be applied to a non-hierarchical church? If so, who are the
rulers of a non-hierarchical church, especially when one of the basic
tenets of the Baptist church generally is the virtually complete autonomy
given to the local church.
15240 N. C. 614, 616, 83 S. E. 2d 501, 503 (1954).
16241 N. C. 201, 85 S. E. 2d 114 (1954).
17 N. C. CoNsT. art I, § 26 (1868).
18241 N. C. 201, 215, 85 S. E. 2d 114, 125 (1954).
19344 U. S. 94 (1952).
20 Cf. Trustees of, Presbytery of New York v. Westminster Presbyterian
Church, 222 N. Y. 305, 118 N. E. 800 (1918). But Cf. Landrith v. Hudgins, 121
Tenn. 556, 120 S. W. 783 (1907), and Note, 39 HARv. L. Rv. 1079 (1926).
2167 HARv. L. REv. 109 (1953).
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Auto Racing on Sundays
The defendant in State v. Chestnutt22 was convicted of violating a
local law which prohibited the racing of cars on Sunday in Wake
county 23 He contended that the law violated article II, section 29 of
the North Carolina Constitution prohibiting local, special acts, regu-
lating labor or trade. His argument was that since he was racing cars
commercially, he was engaged in labor or trade. The Court, conceding
that the Act was local and special, said, however that it was so sweeping
in its nature and terms, without regard to commercial or non-commer-
cial activity, that applying it to defendant's acts-racing for compensa-
tion-did not bring the statute under the terms "labor" or "trade" as
prescribed in the Constitution.
Removal of Judges
In Reid v. Commissioners of Pilot Mountain24 the Mayor and City
Commission attempted to remove a duly elected judge of the Recorder's
Court from that office. The Court held that the North Carolina Con-
stitution provides for the method of removal of judges 25 and that such
constitutional methods preclude any such action by the Mayor and City
Commission.
Building Codes Incorporated by Reference
Among the many issues raised in Lutz Industries, Inc. v. Dixie
Home Stores26 was the problem of whether the General Assembly had
the power to incorporate by reference the National Electric Code2 7 into
our statutes. The Court held that for the purpose of protecting life,
health and property, the General Assembly has the power to enact
by reference a specified building code promulgated and published by
the Building Code Council of North Carolina. The National Electric
Code had been so promulgated and published.
CONTRACTS
Breach of Contract with Attorney
In a case of first impression in this state,' the Court held that an
attorney engaged to defend a specific suit who was discharged without
just cause midway in his preparation was entitled to the full fixed
fee2 agreed upon in advance,3 rather than the reasonable value of his
2-241 N. C. 401, 85 S. E. 2d 297 (1955)." N. C. Sess. Laws 1949, c. 177.
2, 241 N. C. 551, 85 S. E. 2d 872 (1955).
N. C. CONsT. art. IV, §§ 2 and 31 (1868)."242 N. C. 332, 88 S. E. 2d 333 (1955).
7 . C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-136 to 143-143 (1933).
'Higgins v. Beaty, 242 N. C. 479, 88 S. E. 2d 80 (1955).
2 For cases on contingent fees, see Annot., 136 A. L. R. 231 (1942).
3For contracts not made in advance, see Annot., 19 A. L. R. 847 (1922) ; see
AGENCY AND WORKMEN'S COmPENSATlOi, p. 5 supra, n. 1.
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services to date. The Court recognized that there is a minority view
holding for the reasonable value rule, but preferred to align itself with
the majority. The minority rule holds that the right of the client to
discharge the attorney for any reason whatsoever is implied in every
contract between an attorney and his client; therefore, no recovery at
all is allowed on the contract and the attorney's only theory of recovery
is quantum meruit.4  However, where the breach of contract action is
allowed, the measure of damages often applied is the one of employ-
ment contracts generally, rather than the full contract price awarded
by the Court in this case. 5
Parol Evidence Rule
In Peek v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.0 the defendant objected to
testimony by the plaintiff that the title certificate to a certain vehicle
had been signed in blank,7 as being violative of the parol evidence rule.
The Court held, however, that the validity of the title transfer was not
in issues and the testimony was valid as relating to the question of
estoppel presented. The view that the rule applies only to contracts
in issue at the trial harmonizes with the view that it is not a rule of
evidence at all, but rather a rule of substantive law,0 declaring that
parties shall be bound by the writings they make instead of by prior
or contemporaneous parol agreements or negotiations.
Estoppel as a Defense to the Statute of Frauds
The Court in McKinley v. Hinnant ° held good against demurrer"1
a pleading which alleged an oral agreement concerning a mortgage of
realty. The Court held that the Statute of Frauds is an affirmative
defense and is not raised upon demurrer; but the language of the
opinion continued: "In proper cases an estoppel based upon grounds
'Re Montgomery, 272 N. Y. 323, 326, 6 N. E. 2d 40, 41, 109 A. L. R. 669,
671-72 (1936) ; see also Annot., 109 A. L. R. 674 (1937). Minority rule criticized,
4 Wi LsTor, CONTRACTS § 1029 (rev. ed. 1936).
15 COnIN, CONTRAcTs § 1095 (1951). Corbin lists North Carolina as still
recognizing the old "constructive service" theory of damages in employment
contracts where wages are paid in installments, citing Robinson v. McAlhaney,
216 N. C. 674, 680-81, 6 S. E. 2d 517, 520-21 (1940) (dictum). 5 CoRBIN, op.
cit. supra § 1095, n. 44. However, the rule stated in the case itself called for
reduction of damages in the amount either earned or that might have been earned
in similar employment. For cases giving full contract price, see 7 C. J. S.,
Attoritey and Client § 169 a. (2) (1937) (indicating full contract price possibly
majority rule); see also RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 455 (1933); cf. Annot., 136
A. L. R. 231, 233-42 (1942).6242 N. C. 1, 86 S. E. 2d 745 (1955).
'See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-72 (b) (Supp. 1955) now making it a mis-
demeanor to give or to accept title certificates to motor vehicles in blank.' Peek v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 242 N. C. 1, 13, 86 S. E. 2d 745,
754 (1955). See CREDIT TRANSACTIONS, p. 35 infra.
'See STANSBuRY, THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 251 (1946).
"0242 N. C. 245, 87 S. E. 2d 568 (1955).
" For failure to state a cause of action. Remanded, however, for misjoinder
of causes.
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of fraud may override the Statute of Frauds."12 The Court, however,
declined to comment whether the facts as alleged seemed to present a
"proper" case. The authorities cited'3 for this proposition reveal two
situations only: (1) where the owner of realty stands knowingly silent
while another sells the owner's property to a bona fide purchaser for
value without notice, the owner is estopped to assert his title against
such a purchaser; (2) a court of equity may declare a constructive
trust when fraud would result from the refusal to recognize a party's
oral agreement to deal with realty for the benefit of another.14
Payment of Award as an Offer
The State Highway and Public Works Commission brought a
special proceeding to condemn land; shortly after the jury of view made
its award, the Commission mailed the local clerk of the superior court
a check in the exact amount of the award. The check contained the
notation that it was "payment" of the award; the cover letter with
the check said the same thing. The Commission did not notify the
respondent that it had sent the check. Three days after the clerk re-
ceived the check, the Commission excepted to the award as excessive;
soon after this the respondent excepted to the award as inadequate.
Later, the respondent decided to accept the amount of the award and
entered a motion in the cause to prohibit the Commission from prose-
cuting its appeal. An order was issued by the clerk of the superior
court to that effect, and the Commission appealed from that order.
The Court determined' 5 from the applicable statute'0 that the Com-
mission was not required to deposit any money with the clerk in case
it wished to appeal;17 it could condemn the land, take possession, and
pay only after the amount had been finally adjudicated. Therefore,
held the Court, the payment of the check to the clerk could have been
either payment of the award or a deposit, depending upon the intent
McKinley v. Hinnant, 242 N. C. 245, 252, 87 S. E. 2d 568, 574 (1955).
" McNinch v. American Trust Co., 183 N. C. 33, 110 S. E. 663 (1922);
Callaham v. Arenson, 239 N. C. 619, 626, 80 S. E. 2d 619, 625 (1954) (dictum) ;
Haigh v. Kaye, 7 Ch. App. Cas., 469, 474 (1872) (quoted by the Court) ; Annot.,
50 A. L. R. 668 (1927) ; 19 Am. JuR., Estoppel § 92 (1939).
" It is important to distinguish this equitable estoppel from promissory estoppel
as defined in RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcrs § 90 (1932); this latter doctrine is de-
signed only as a substitute for consideration in certain cases and does not impinge
upon the Statute of Frauds. But see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrs § 178, comment f
(1932).
1 North Carolina State Highway and Pub. Works Comm'n v. Pardington,
242 N. C. 482, 88 S. E. 2d 102 (1955). Three other cases are reported as having
almost identical fact situations with the instant case: North Carolina State High-
way and Pub. Works Comm'n v. Mullican, 243 N. C. 68, 89 S.E. 2d 738 (1955)
(the three cases consolidated in the Supreme Court on appeal; held, the instant
case is controlling).1 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 136-19 (1952 and Supp. 1955).
17 The statute in terms, however, refers only to the situation where the owner,
rather than the Commission, appeals.
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of the Commission. Upon these facts, the Court decided that the Com-
mission had not intended to make mere deposit, but that it had made
a voluntary payment.
At the close of its opinion the Court stated briefly, without citation
of authority, that the voluntary payment of the Clerk was an "offer"-
which had been accepted by the respondent.1 8  The facts, however,
are rather peculiar ones for the finding of contractual intent. Treating
the mailing of the check to the clerk as an offer to perform the pre-
existing legal duty of paying the award, no contract could ever result
because of lack of consideration. Even treating the amount due as in
dispute because of the right to except and appeal, an offer to effect
an accord is revocable. Why would not the subsequent exception to
the award by the Commission act as a revocation ?19
Tender in Option Cases
Kottler v. Martin"0 has finally harmonized a troublesome statement
in an earlier case2 ' and clarified the North Carolina position on the
need for tender in cases involving options to buy realty. The general
rule is that in the absence of language in the option (1) expressly re-
quiring tender as a condition precedent, or (2) requiring payment at
the time of the exercise of the option, then notice of election to buy
the property is sufficient to make the grantor's duty to convey enforce-
able-without any need for tender of the purchase price.22 The contract
theory expressed is this: an option is merely an offer suported by con-
sideration to keep the offeror from revoking before a stipulated time;
the offeror may cast his offer as one either for a unilateral or a bi-
lateral contract; if unilateral, the contract to convey is created only
upon performance by the offeree (tender) ; if bilateral, acceptance with-
out tender will create a binding contract to convey. Even in the latter
case, though, tender of payment may be made a condition precedent to
"The original finding of offer and acceptance had been made by the clerk
of the superior court in his order. The superior court as well as the Supreme
Court apparently affirmed on this theory without examining it carefully.
"The unconditional tender of payment of the award could well indicate a
binding election to waive the right of appeal. Some support of the waiver theory
may be derived from N. C. GEN. STAT. § 40-48 (1950) (not cited by the Court) ;
Chapter 40 of the General Statutes treats eminent domain, and procedure out-
lined there has been incorporated by reference into N. C. GEN. STAT. § 136-19
(1952 and Supp. 1955); § 40-48 seems to contemplate an element of finality as to
payments or deposits made to the clerk, saying such "shall constitute a payment
to the persons entitled thereto to the extent of the moneys so paid or deposited
into court." The Court was apparently using the word "deposit" in the sense
of a refundable conditional payment, whereas this section might fairly be con-
strued to use the term in the sense of part payment.
20 241 N. C. 369, 85 S. E. 2d 314 (1955).
" Edwards Lumber and Land Co. v. Smith, 191 N. C. 619, 621, 132 S. E. 593,
594 (1926).
2"Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 98 F. 2d 609 (4th Cir. 1938);
see Annot., 101 A. L. R. 1432 (1936).
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the delivery of the deed. However, language used in different options
varies, and courts, through interpretation, may reach results difficult
to reconcile. Each option must be treated on its own facts and word-
ing.2
The Court in the instant case reviewed several of the old decisions.
It said that Hudson v. Cozart24 had held tender of payment essential
because the option expressly called for tender on a particular date, con-
currently with the execution and delivery of the deed. The Court then
listed Edwards Lumber and Land Co. v. Smith25 as one of the "other"
cases which had required tender, saying parenthetically that its only
citation of authority was the Hudson case. It seems that the position
of the Smith case was impliedly overruled. There the option read:
* * provided [the buyer] accepts said offer on or before 5 July,
1923.12o (Emphasis added.)
In the principal case the option language was that the buyer "may
at any time during the term of this lease elect to purchase said property
at the sum of . . .- 27 The only express condition precedent to this
election was that all prior rentals due be paid. The Court held tender
of payment not necessary in this situation 2 s However, it is suggested
that in case of doubt the buyer would be wise to make tender of pay-
ment at the time of the notice of his election to exercise the option, as
a precautionary measure.
29
Unconditional Acceptance of an Offer
The Court held the following words constituted a valid acceptance
of an offer to buy land :80 "Your telegram relative sale my property is
accepted subject to details to be worked out by you and [my lawyer] ."1
The defendant argued that his telegram was a conditional acceptance
only, having the effect of a counter-offer rejecting the other offer
8 2
" Annot., 101 A. L. R. 1432, 1433 (1936).
2, 179 N. C. 247, 102 S. E. 278 (1920).
22191 N. C. 619, 132 S. E. 593 (1926).
Ibid. The ruling that this language made tender of payment necessary was
apparently not essential to the decision in the case. There was another proviso
in the option requiring good title, and the seller could not give good title to all
the land involved. The Court held this condition protected the seller as well
as the buyer.27Kottler v. Martin, 241 N. C. 369, 373, 85 S. E. 2d 314, 318 (1955).
2 The Court cited and quoted Cates v. McNeil, 169 Cal. 697, 147 Pac. 944
(1915). First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Frazelle, 226 N. C. 724, 40 S. E.
2d 367 (1946) was also cited, since it held tender of payment not necessary;
this case, however, had an option calling for payment "upon receipt of said
deed." This literally seems to say that payment is not due until after delivery
of the deed.
29 In the principal case the buyer deposited the purchase price with the clerk
of the superior court prior to the expiration of the option term, after having
been refused conveyance.
"0 Carver v. Britt, 241 N. C. 538, 85 S. E. 2d 888 (1955).
31 Id. at 540, 85 S. E. 2d at 890.
121 RSTATEmENT, CoNmTAcrs § 60 (1932).
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The cases of this type lie in a borderland of interpretation of contracts.
Here the Court thought the words were an unconditional acceptance
with the phrase "subject to" relating merely to minor details of per-
formance. It is generally agreed that use of clauses which are only
gramatically conditional will not prevail over unequivocal intent as
expressed in the language as a whole.83 In Richardson v. Greensboro
Warehouse and Storage Co.,34 for example, the words "subject to the




In Nebel v. Nebel' a minority stockholder and director of the Nebel
Knitting Company sued for writ of mandamus to compel payment of
all accumulated profits as dividends, no profits having been set aside
by the stockholders as working capital under G. S. § 55-115. The
defendants alleged that these profits had been used in expanding and
modernizing the business and that this, for all practical purposes, was
compliance with the statute. The Court pointed out that, conceding
that this defense raised the question of substantial compliance by the
stockholders and directors, it also raised the question of whether plain-
tiffs are estopped, by their acquiescence in and approval of the action
of the directors with respect to corporate expansion, to demand divi-
dends from the funds used in such expansion. In its instructions to
the lower court on remanding the case, the Court, with regard to the
estoppel question thus raised, said: "We think, if it be conceded that
no action was ever taken by the stockholders of the corporation with
the specific intent to set aside any profits as working capital prior to
the institution of this action, pursuant to the provisions of G. S. § 55-
115, the plaintiffs are estopped from claiming any portion of the profits
of the corporation as being available for payments of dividends, which
has been invested in the plant expansion, new machinery, etc., with
their full knowledge and approval."'2
In addition to raising the estoppel issue, the Court went on to give
a somewhat narrower construction to G. S. § 55-115 than that statute
had generally been thought to have. According to the Court, the fact
that a corporation has inadvertently or through ignorance of the pro-
visions of G. S. § 55-115 failed to take action to set aside working
" See 1 WILISTON, CONTRACTS § 78 (rev. ed. 1936).
3,223 N. C. 344, 26 S. E. 2d 897 (1943).
Id. at 346, 26 S. E. 2d at 898.
See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTS § 77 (rev. ed. 1936); cf. REsTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS § 62 (1932).
'241 N. C. 491, 85 S. E. 2d 876 (1955).
2Id. at 503, 85 S. E. 2d at 884.
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capital does not mean that the statute can be invoked "to compel the
distribution of all the accumulated profits as dividends, irrespective
of the facts and circumstances under which the profits were accumu-
lated and reinvested in plant facilities, and without regard to the finan-
cial needs of the corporation." 3
The situation in Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indemnity Co.4 was
this: All of the common stock of Park Terrace, Inc., was held by indi-
viduals who were also stockholders in Park Builders, Inc. The two
corporations had entered into a buliding contract under which Park
Builders had erected an apartment building for Park Terrace. Later,
one McLean purchased all the common stock of Park Terrace under
a sales contract which included an express release of Park Builders from
any further liability upon the building contract. Now with McLean
as its sole stockholder, Park Terrace brings action against Park Build-
ers for damages on the building contract.
The Court held that Park Builders was not bound by the release
since, at the time the release was signed, McLean was neither stock-
holder, director, nor officer of Park Terrace, and since there was no
allegation that he was an employee with authority to act for such cor-
poration. Further, said the Court, since McLean bought his stock in
Park Terrace as an individual and signed the release as an individual,
Park Builders may not try any cause of action which it may have
against him in this suit. Therefore, he cannot be joined in the action.
Bobbitt, J., in a vigorous dissent, urged that the corporate entity be
disregarded here and that Park Terrace be denied the right to recover
where its sole common shareholder was barred.
COURTS
In three cases the Court clarified the jurisdiction of clerks of court
and of emergency and special judges.
In Deans v. Deans,' upon an appeal from a denial of a motion to
vacate a judgment originally entered by a clerk of court under G. S.
§ 1-211 (judgment by default final), the Court vacated the judgment,
notwithstanding the fact that the property involved had been sold under
the terms of the judgment and the purchase price had been paid. The
original action before the clerk had been for the enforcement of a parol
or resulting trust on certain realty. Upon failure of the defendant to
answer, the judgment by default final had been entered enforcing the
-241 N. C. at 504, 85 S. E. 2d at 885.
'241 N. C. 473, 85 S. E. 2d 677 (1954).
1 241 N. C. 1, 84 S. E. 2d 321 (1954).
1955]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
trust and ordering the sale. It was held that such an enforcement of
a trust by the clerk was not within the contemplation of G. S. § 1-211
and was thus a nullity. It would seem that by proceeding under G. S.
§ 1-212 (judgment by default and inquiry) the plaintiff could have ob-
tained his relief.
Strickland v. Kornegay2 held that the prohibition in G. S. § 7-52
against an emergency judge exercising in chambers jurisdiction after
the term expires does not apply to his open court jurisdiction acquired
during term and later exercised out of term and out of county by con-
sent of both parties. This is the same rule that is set down for regular
judges under the same circumstances.3
State v. Cagle4 concerned, among other things, the authority of a
judge-in this case a special judge-without the consent of the parties
to correct minutes nunc pro tunc of a prior term in another county
while holding court elsewhere after the expiration of that term. In this
case it was sought to change the place of confinement entered in the
minutes so as to be in accord with the statute in regard to confinement
for misdemeanors. 5 The Court declared such order of correction to be
without force and effect.6
Reid v. Commissioners of Pilot Mountain7 raised questions concern-
ing the removal of judges. The plaintiff sought the continuation of a
restraining order which would allow him, the duly elected judge of the
local Recorder's Court, to exercise his jurisdiction after an allegedly
unconstitutional removal by the defendant Mayor and Commissioners.
The interpretation of certain local laws8 by the defendants as allowing
such removal was considered by the Court to conflict with article IV,
section 31 of the North Carolina Constitution which the Court regarded
as the exclusive method of removing any judge, namely, by concurrent
resolution of two-thirds of both houses of the General Assembly. How-
ever, that section applies only in cases of mental or physical disability,
neither of which was present here.9 What of the removal of a judge
2 240 N. C. 758, 83 S. E. 2d 903 (1954).
3 Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N. C. 181, 22 S. E. 2d 576 (1942) and as
early as 1873 in Hervey v. Edmunds, 68 N. C. 243. See A Suirvey of Statutory
Changes, 29 N. C. L. REv. 384, 386 (1951).
'241 N. C. 134, 84 S. E. 2d 649 (1954).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 148-28 (1952). See N. C. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 238 for
substantive changes in confinement procedure, and CRIMINAL LAW, p. 45 infra.
I " ,... [E]xcept by consent, or unless otherwise authorized, a judge of the
Superior Court, even in his own district, has no authority to hear a cause, or
make an order substantially affecting the rights of parties, outside the county
in which the action is pending." State v. Whitley, 208 N. C. 661, 664; 182 S. E.
338, 340 (1935).
7241 N. C. 551, 85 S. E. 2d 872 (1955).
' N. C. Private Laws 1891, c. 287 and N. C. Sess. Laws 1947, c. 176 which
by different interpretation do not necessarily conflict with the constitutional pro-
vision. See N. C. Sess. Laws 1953, c. 431.' It does not appear in the report of the Reid case what grounds there were
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for malfeasance or misfeasance? G. S. § 123-5 (causes for impeach-
ment of state officers) has been held not to apply to local judges.10 An
action of quo warranto by the Attorney General is limited by statute
to cases in which there has been an act which works a forfeiture of the
office." The question remains: How can an inferior court judge lie
removed for causes other than physical or mental disability? Was it
necessary or wise to invoke the ejusdem generis rule thus preventing
the development of statutory procedures for such cases?
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
Mortgages and Deeds of Trust
In McKinley v. Hinnant' it was alleged that the plaintiff, to secure
a $310 debt, had conveyed a note in an amount over $1400, secured by
a deed of trust, to one of the defendants and had received an option to
repurchase said note and deed of trust in 90 days. It was further
alleged that the parties had agreed, at the time, that this conveyance and
option to repurchase constituted a mortgage. Plaintiff brought action
to have this transaction declared a mortgage. The Court, following
O'Briant v. Lee,' held the matter to be one of intent. The intent of
the parties must be established by facts and circumstances dehors the
deed and inconsistent with an absolute conveyance. The great difference
between the value of the property conveyed and the amount of the con-
sideration was held to be a factor showing "mortgage" intent, and the
facts alleged were held sufficient to state a cause of action. The Court
pointed out that although the O'Briant case dealt with conveyance of
land, the principles of law declared there are applicable equally to this
case.
In Peek v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co the Court found the de-
scription "1948 Auto-Car (Sleeper Cab Tractor) Motor No. -- " was
a sufficient description in a chattel mortgage to meet identification re-
quirements where all the evidence showed that the mortgagor owned
only one tractor unit. Such evidence was held to be sufficient to sup-
port a peremptory instruction on this point.
Also in the Peek case, the trust company lent money on a third
mortgage on the tractor which money, unknown to the trust company,
was used to pay off the first mortgage. The Court held that there is
for removal. The Record on Appeal, however, indicates that excessive use of
alcoholic beverages was the cause of the attempted removal. [Record, pp. 16, 30,
42, 43, and 44.]
10 Peopel v. Heaton, 77 N. C. 18 (1877).1 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-515 (1953) and People v. Heaton, 77 N. C. 18 (1877).
1242 N. C. 245, 87 S. E. 2d 568 (1955).
2214 N. C. 723, 200 S. E. 865 (1939).
S242 N. C. 1, 86 S. E. 2d 745 (1955).
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no subrogation on the part of the trust company to the rights of the
first mortgagee in such cases unless (1) the money is advanced for
the purpose of discharging the prior encumbrance and (2) it is actually
so applied. Since the trust company did not lend the money with the
intent and purpose that it be used to discharge the first mortgage, there
was no subrogation.
The Court in Redic v. Mechanics and Farmers Bank4 held that
neither G. S. § 105-409, giving the holder of lien on real property the
right to enter and pay taxes on the property and creating a lien on the
property for such payments, nor an express provision in the deed of
trust authorizing the trustee on default to enter and collect rents and
income and apply the same to taxes creates any obligation on a creditor,
whose claim is secured by a deed of trust, to pay taxes. Thus, if the
creditor buys the property at a tax foreclosure sale, his title is not sub-
ject to any trust in favor of the debtor.
It is interesting to note in connection with this case that had the
instrument of security been a mortgage instead of a deed of trust the
result would have been the opposite. In the case of a mortgagee buying
in at a tax sale property to which he holds the mortgage, the court will
impress a trust on the property for the benefit of the mortgagor.5 Query
whether there is in substance, as distinguished from theory, such a
distinction between a mortgage and a deed of trust as to justify such
widely different consequences.
G. S. § 45-21.31 provides for the payment by the trustee to the
clerk of superior court of surplus funds realized on foreclosure of a
deed of trust where there are adverse claims asserted against these
funds. The Court in Lenoir County v. Outlaw0 enforced this statute
and held that payment by the trustee to the administrator of the owner
of the property was invalid. It was pointed out by the Court that
there is no limit upon the amount which may be paid into the clerk
under this statute.
Liens
In deciding General Air Conditioning Co. v. Douglass7 the Court
proceeded on the following principles: A laborers' and materialmen's
lien arises out of a debtor-creditor relationship, and it is for the purpose
of securing the debt that the lien is created. Without a contract the
lien does not exist. Mere knowledge by the owner of work being done
or material being furnished does not enable the person furnishing the
labor or material to obtain a lien. Therefore, held the Court, a plain-
'241 N. C. 152, 84 S. E. 2d 542 (1954).
Cauley v. Sutton, 150 N. C. 327, 64 S. E. 3 (1909).0241 N. C. 97, 84 S. E. 2d 330 (1954).
7241 N. C. 170, 84 S. E. 2d 823 (1954).
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tiff who installed a furnace in a house owned by husband and wife by
the entireties, but who contracted to do so only with the husband, had
no lien on the property. A lien on property held by the entireties
cannot be acquired without the assent of both husband and wife to
the contract.
In Lenoir County v. Outlaws the Court held that where an old age
assistance lien under G. S. § 108-30.1 arose subsequent to a deed of
trust on the property, and the county ascertained that the party hold-
ing the first lien intended to foreclose, it was unnecessary for the county
to institute foreclosure proceedings based on its lien. The old age assis-
tance lien from the date of its filing became a general lien to the same
extent that a judgment would be when docketed. Therefore, when the
trustee under the deed of trust foreclosed, the county's lien was trans-
ferred to the surplus funds realized from the sale just as the lien of
any other junior encumbrance would be transferred under similar cir-
cumstances.
Conditional Sales
In Herring v. Creech9 the Court held that the seller of a trailer
under a conditional sales contract, then in default, was the true owner
of the trailer. Thus, where the seller repossessed the trailer from the
bailee of the buyer, the bailee had a complete defense in an action by
the bailor to recover the value of the trailer.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Although a great deal of the Court's business during the past two
terms was in the field of criminal law, few of the cases made any
significant changes in the law. Only the more important decisions
will be treated in this survey.
CRIMINAL LAW
Crimes Against the Family
In considering an elopement case, the Court held that the provisions
in the statute1 requiring the married woman to be innocent and virtuous
since her marriage is satisfied if the married woman was innocent and
virtuous at the time of the commencement of the defendant's acts which
led to the elopement. However, since every woman is virtuous at some
time, it was held prejudicial error to charge the jury that the woman
8 241 N. C. 97, 84 S. E. 2d 330 (1954).
p241 N. C. 233, 84 S. E. 2d 886 (1954).
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-43 (1953). "If any male person shall abduct or elope
with the wife of another, he shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall
be imprisoned not less than one year nor more than ten years: Provided that
the woman, since her marriage, has been an innocent and virtuous woman. .. "
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must be chaste and pure at the time of the elopement or at some other
time prior thereto.2
In the area of abandonment and non-support, the Court pointed
out that G. S. § 14-322 sets out two distinct and separate offenses: (1)
willful abandonment of a wife without adequate support, and (2) will-
ful abandonment of the children without adequate support.a Each of
these offenses must be separately charged in individual indictments (or
warrants) or in separate counts of the same indictment if both charges
are to be sustained. Moreover, each offense consists of two elements,
willful abandonment and willful non-support, the latter meaning willful
failure to provide support commensurate with the defendant's means
and station in life. Thus, where the defendant moved to another town,
leaving his wife behind, his earning capacity there as compared to what
it had been in the town from which he moved could be a significant
factor in determining whether there was a willful failure to provide
adequate support.4 State v. Perry5 emphasizes that demand for support
must be made on the putative father of an illegitimate child before the
warrant is issued since the warrant must be supported by the facts as
they existed at the time of its issuance. But, as the offense is a con-
tinuing one, the defendant can be prosecuted again under a new war-
rant.6
Homicide
One of the questions raised most frequently in the criminal law
field this year concerns the presumptions that arise when there is a
killing with a deadly weapon. These presumptions are: (1) that the
killing was unlawful and (2) that it was done with malice. An unlaw-
ful killing with malice is murder in the second degree. Although these
presumptions arise only where there is an "intentional killing," that
phrase is not used in the sense of specific intent to kill, but means an
intentional assault which proximately caused the decedent's death.
Where the defendant claimed that he had shot in self-defense, these
presumptions made it incumbent upon him to satisfy the jury as to
the truth of the facts which mitigated or justified the killing.7 How-
ever, if the defendant satisfied the jury that the killing was justified
and that there was no malice, he should not be found guilty of any
criminal homicide. Therefore, it was error to charge the jury that
State v. Temple, 240 N. C. 738, 83 S. E. 2d 792 (1954).
See DOMESTIC RELATiONS, p. 50 infra.
'State v. Lucas, 242 N. C. 84, 86 S. E. 2d 770 (1955).
r241 N. C. 119, 84 S. E. 2d 329 (1954).
O State v. Outlaw, 242 N. C. 220, 87 S. E. 2d 303 (1955); State v. Lucas,
242 N. C. 84, 86 S. E. 2d 770 (1955); State v. Smith, 241 N. C. 301, 84 S. E. 2d
913 (1954) ; State v. Perry, 241 N. d. 119, 84 S. E. 2d 329 (1954).
State v. Gordon, 241 N. C. 356, 85 S. E. 2d 322 (1955).
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a killing under such circumstances would still be unlawful and consti-
tute manslaughter.8
Motor Vehicle Offenses
During the past two terms of the Court there were at least three
relatively important cases dealing with involuntary manslaughter. In
State v. Norris9 the evidence showed that defendant's car was "wob-
bling" when one mile from the scene of the accident, that it was dark,
that defendant's lights were not on, that he was speeding, and that his
car struck a car in which the decedent was a passenger after the latter
car had stopped at an intersection and was proceeding across it. It was
held that this evidence was sufficient to go to the jury on the question
of culpable negligence, since the jury could find from the evidence that
defendant had wantonly violated three statutes (driving without lights,
speeding, and reckless driving)'o which were passed for the protection
of life and property. 1
However, where the only evidence bearing on the alleged culpable
negligence of the defendant was that he might not have been keeping a
proper lookout at the time of the accident, it was held that the evidence
did not warrant a finding of culpable negligence.1 2 The Court, in dis-
tinguishing culpable negligence from ordinary neglience, quoted from
State v. Stansell.'13
"Ordinary negligence is based on the theory that a person
charged with negligent conduct should have known the probable
consequences of his act; culpable negligence rests on the assump-
tion that he knew the probable consequences but was intention-
ally, recklessly, or wantonly indifferent to the results."' 4
Finally, it was held that evidence of skidding, without more, was in-
sufficient to warrant a conviction under the reckless driving statute,15
which is phrased in terms of culpable negligence.'0
In the license revocation field two cases arose concerning the plea
of nolo contendere which clarify the law on the effect of this plea.'
7
I State v. Street, 241 N. C. 689, 86 S. E. 2d 277 (1955). See also State v.
Adams, 241 N. C. 559, 85 S. E. 2d 918 (1955).
0 242 N. C. 47, 86 S. E. 2d 916 (1955).
10 N. C. GJ. STAT. §§ 20-129, 20-141, and 20-140 (1953) respectively.
" See State v. Cope, 204 N. C. 28, 167 S. E. 456 (1933).
12 State v. Becker, 241 N. C. 321, 85 S. E. 2d 327 (1955).
13203 N. C. 69, 164 S. E. 580 (1932).
' State v. Becker, 241 N. C. 321, 329, 85 S. E. 2d 327, 332 (1955).1 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-140 (1953). "Any person who drives any vehicle upon
a highway carelessly and heedlessly in wilful or wanton disregard of the rights
or safety of others, or without due caution and circumspection and at a speed
or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property,
shall be guilty of reckless driving. ..."
10 State v. Robertson, 240 N. C. 745, 83 S. E. 2d 798 (1954).
17 See Case Survey, 32 N. C. L. REv. 379, 437-438 (1954) and Note, 12 N. C.
L. REv. 369 (1934).
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When a conviction of the charge to which the plea is entered would
make it mandatory for the Department of Motor Vehicles to revoke
the defendant's license, the plea is equivalent to a conviction.1 8 The
Court regards the imposition of a mandatory revocation as a natural
and immediate result of the conviction, and, although it is true that
the plea has no effect except for the purpose of the case in which it
is entered, a mandatory revocation is regarded, in effect, as part of
the proceeding in the case in which it is entered. On the other hand,
the Department of Motor Vehicles cannot take action to suspend a
license under its discretionary powers if such action is based on the
plea of nolo contendere because such action requires a hearing which
is a separate proceeding from that of the original case.' 9 In Mintz v.
Scheidt" the plaintiff relied on the granting of a hearing (authorized
only in suspension cases under G. S. § 20-16) by the Department to
contend that his license had been suspended rather than revoked. It
was held that the plea of nolo contendere to a manslaughter charge
made revocation mandatory under G. S. § 20-17, and, that therefore
the hearing was void and could not be relied on to estop the Depart-
ment from asserting that the license had been revoked.
Aiding and Abetting
In State v. Banks2 ' the trial judge instructed the jury that mere
presence is enough to make a person an aider and abettor when the
defendants are friends. In holding this instruction to be prejudicial
error, the Court said that it is only when the bystander is a friend of
perpetrator and knows that his presence will be considered by the per-
petrator as encouragement and protection that his presence will consti-
tute aiding and abetting.
22
Former Jeopardy
After being tried and acquitted for rape, the defendant entered a
plea of former jeopardy to the charge of carnal knowledge of a chaste
girl between the ages of twelve and sixteen.23  In holding that the
defense was not available, the Court pointed out that the crimes have
different elements2O4 and that the facts alleged in the second indictment
" Fox v. Scheidt, 241 N. C. 31, 84 S. E. 2d 259 (1954) (second offense of
driving under the influence of intoxicants). See Mintz v. Scheidt, 241 N. C. 268,
84 S. E. 2d 882 (1954) (manslaughter).
" Winesett v. Scheidt, 239 N. C. 190, 79 S. E. 2d 501 (1954).
20 241 N. C. 268, 84 S. E. 2d 882 (1954).
21 242 N. C. 304, 87 S. E. 2d 558 (1955).
22 See Case Survey, 32 N. C. L. REv. 379, 429 (1954).
2s State v. Barefoot, 241 N. C. 650, 86 S. E. 2d 424 (1955).
2 Under N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (1953) (rape) chastity is immaterial and
the intercourse must be by force. Under N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-26 (1953) (carnal
knowledge) unchasteness is a defense, but consent is not, and intercourse need
not be by force.
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would not support a conviction under the first indictment.25 It was also
stated that where there is no issue of fact such as identity of the party
or of the offense, the question of jeopardy is to be decided by the trial
judge. In State v. Humbles26 it was held that where the trial judge,
in his discretion, had declared a mistrial in a noncapital case, the plea




Entrapment was raised as a defense in State v. Burnette2. where,
after several telephone calls by the defendant to the prosecutrix in
which he expressed his lust for her and in which he threatened to come
to her house and kill her if necessary to gratify that lust, the prose-
cutrix reluctantly agreed to an officer's suggestion that she meet the
defendant at the place which he had designated. With an officer hiding
in the back seat of her car, the prosecutrix met the defendant, who,
upon getting into the car, lunged at her. The Court held that the
state's evidence showed all of the essential elements of the crime of
assault with intent to rape, including the lack of consent on the part
of the prosecutrix. In holding the defense of entrapment was not
available to the defendant, in whose mind the intent and design to
commit the crime originated, the Court said:
"In certain crimes consent to the criminal act by the person in-
jured eliminates an essential element of the offense, and is, there-
fore, a good defense. Where a person arranges for a crime to be
committed against himself or his property and aids, encourages
or solicits the commission thereof, such facts are a good defense
to the accused. However, if a person knows a crime is contem-
plated against his person or property, he may wait passively and
permit matters to go on, or create the conditions under which
the crime against himself may be committed, for the purpose of
apprehending the criminal without being held to have assented
to the act."29
Self-defense
In State v. Street" it was held prejudicial error to instruct the jury
"' See State v. Stone, 240 N. C. 606, 83 S. E. 2d 543 (1954) where the de-
fendant was convicted of assault with intent to rape; a conviction in the same
trial of assault on a female was treated as surplusage because it was a lesser
offense included within the charge of assault with intent to rape.
20 241 N. C. 47, 84 S. E. 2d 264 (1954). The trial judge granted a mistrial
in an assault with a deadly weapon case for the purpose of consolidating it with
a case against the prosecuting witness.
" See Case Survey, 33 N. C. L. REv. 157, 189 (1955) on the necessity for
findings of fact in capital cases.
28 242 N. C. 164, 87 S. E. 2d 191 (1955).
.- State v. Burnette, 242 N. C. 164, 171, 87 S. E. 2d 191, 195 (1955).o241 N. C. 689, 86 S. E. 2d 277 (1955).
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that defendant had a right to order the victim off her premises and
that, when he refused, she had the right to use such force as was rea-
sonably necessary to make him leave but that she could not use "the
excessive force of taking human life." 31 The Court said:
".. . the justification or non-justification of the killing of the
deceased grew out of the circumstances connected with the de-
fendant's request to the deceased... to leave her home. Whether
the force used was actually necessary to repel the attack the de-
fendant claims was being made on her, or whether some other or
lesser force might have been adequate for her protection, was
not the question for the jury to decide, but whether, when she
did use the force which resulted in the death of the deceased,
she had under all the circumstances, reasonable cause to believe
and did believe that such force was necessary to protect herself
from impending danger or great bodily harm."
'8 2
State v. Cephus"8 also involved an instruction on the plea of
self-defense. The trial jury charged that the plea was available to the
defendant "if he himself, did not provoke the assault, and if he did
not use more force than was reasonably necessary to repel an as-
sault, or threatened assault against him, and if he did not use more
force than reasonably appeared to be necessary under the circum-
stances as they existed.' 34 This was upheld on the ground that it was
equivalent to saying that the defense was available in two situations:
(1) If the defendant did not provoke the assault and used no more
force than was reasonably necessary to repel the assault or threatened
assault, and (2) if he did not provoke the assault and used no more
force than reasonably appeared necessary under the circumstances as
they existed.
The doctrine of retreat was involved in State v. Ellis5 where the
defendant, a wildlife protector, was checking fishing licenses when as-
saulted by the deceased. It was held prejudicial error to charge the
jury that the defendant was not discharging his official duties and
therefore had no more right to shoot the deceased than an ordinary
citizen would have. The Court said that the doctrine of retreat was
not applicable in this situation because an officer engaged in the of-
ficial performance of his duties is not required, nor ordinarily permitted,
to retreat. This dictum indicates that North Carolina would allow
deadly force to be used to complete a lawful arrest, once begun, for
31 State v. Street, 241 N. C. 689, 692, 86 S. E. 2d 277, 279 (1955).
2 Ibid.
'8241 N. C. 562, 86 S. E. 2d 70 (1955).
8, State v. Cephus, 241 N. C. 562, 564, 86 S. E. 2d 70, 71 (1955).
35241 N. C. 704, 86 S. E. 2d 272 (1955).
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a felony or a misdemeanor even though the officer was in no immediate




In State v. Smith37 an officer, dressed in civilian clothes, knocked
on the defendant's door, entered upon invitation, and bought whiskey
from the defendant. The evidence of what the officer saw was held
admissible, but the Court pointed out that if the officer had obtained
entry by fraud or deceit, a more serious question as to whether there
was something bordering on a forceful or unlawful entry would have
arisen. *
Sufficiency of Warrant and Indictment
In no less than four cases3 8 the Court struck down warrants and
indictments on the ground that they insufficiently charged the crime
of resisting arrest. Where the indictment did not identify the officer
who was involved, or describe in a general way the manner in which
the defendant resisted, or indicate the official duty being performed by
the officer, the Court held that it was fatally defective, but pointed out
that the defendant could be prosecuted again under a new indictment.39
State v. Scott40 reiterates the rule that a motion to quash an indict-
ment is the most appropriate method of challenging the sufficiency of
the indictment, but that a motion in arrest of judgment may be used
to the same end. In a word of general advice on the framing of war-
rants the Court stated that where the statute uses the disjunctive "or,"
the draftsman of a warrant would be well advised in using the con-
junctive "and.1
41
In State v. Hammonds42 the warrant contained two counts, but only
the first count named the defendant. Although the defendant was not
named in the second count, it was held that the warrant was sufficient
to withstand a motion in arrest of judgment because the defendant was
apprised of the charge against her and had made her defense accord-
ingly. The Court said that the purposes of warrants and indictments
" See MACHEN, THE LAW OF ARREST p. 97 (Chapel Hill: Institute of Gov-
ernment, 1950).
37242 N. C. 297, 87 S. E. 2d 593 (1955).
"8 State v. Harvey, 242 N. C. 111, 86 S. E. 2d 793 (1955); State v. Eason,
242 N. C. 59, 86 S. E. 2d 744 (1955); State v. Faulkner, 241 N. C. 609, 86
S. E. 2d 81 (1955) ; State v. Scott, 241 N. C. 178, 84 S. E. 2d 654 (1954).
" State v. Eason, 242 N. C. 59, 86 S. E. 2d 744 (1955).,0 241 N. C. 226, 85 S. E. 2d 133 (1954).
,1 State v. Chestnut, 241 N. C. 401 85 S. E. 2d 297 (1955). See State v.
Albarty, 238 N. C. 130, 76 S. E. 2d 381 (1953) where it was stated that when
a statute specifies several means in the alternative by which a crime may be
committed, the indictment drawn under the statute should not charge those means
in the alternative.12241 N. C. 226, 85 S. E. 2d 133 (1954).
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are: "(1) To make clear and definite the offense charged so that in-
vestigation may be confined to that offense in order that proper proce-
dure may be followed and the applicable law invoked, and (2) to put
the defendant on notice as to what he is charged with and to enable
him to make his defense thereto." 4
In State v. Scales44 the indictment was framed under G. S. § 15-
144.45 The Court held that under this indictment the State could
show that the murder was committed in an attempt to rape the de-
ceased even though the statute does not expressly mention murders
committed in the perpetration of felonies. It was further held that
granting a motion for a bill of particulars is within the sound dis-
cretion of the trial judge, and that despite the rather cryptic language
of the statutory indictment, the denial of the motion in the instant case
did not prejudice the defendant because the state's theory of trial was
in substantial accord with the defendant's confession.
Trial
In State v. Banks46 the Court reiterated that, unless there is a trial
in an inferior court, the Superior Court has no jurisdiction to try a
misdemeanant upon a warrant. With certain exceptions 47 an indictment
must be used in the Superior Court when that court is initially trying
a defendant.
Since the questioning by an officer is not a judicial proceeding, a
confession by a defendant is not rendered inadmissible merely because
the officer did not warn the defendant that any statement he made
could be used against him. Moreover, "advising" the prisoner to tell
the truth if he tells anything does not render the confession incom-
petent.
48
A large number of cases before the Court during the past two terms
dealt with erroneous instructions to juries. For instance, where the
trial judge charged the jury that they could find from the evidence
"State v. Hammonds, 241 N. C. 226, 228, 85 S. E. 2d 133, 135 (1954).
"242 N. C. 400, 87 S. E. 2d 916 (1955).
""In indictments for murder . . * , it is not necessary to allege matter not
required to be proved on the trial; but in the body of the indictment, after nam-
ing the person accused, and the county of his residence, the date of the offense,
the averment with force and arms, and the county of the alleged commission of
the offense, as is now usual, it is sufficient in describing murder to allege that
the accused person feloniously, willfully, and of his malice aforethought, did kill
and murder (naming the person killed). .. ."
86241 N. C. 572, 86 S. E. 2d 76 (1955). See State v. Hall, 240 N. C. 109, 81
S. E. 2d 189 (1954) ; State v. Thomas, 236 N. C. 454, 73 S. E. 2d 283 (1952).
' In non-capital felonies, the defendant, when represented by counsel, can,
by a written waiver signed by the defendant and his counsel, waive the indict-
ment. If this procedure is followed, the prosecution is based upon an information
signed by the solicitor. N. C. GErN. STAT. § 15-140.1 (1953). See N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 15-140 (1953) in regard to waiver of indictment in misdemeanor cases.
," State v. Thomas, 241 N. C. 337, 85 S. E. 2d 300 (1955).
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or from the defendant's admissions that he had shot the deceased, and
in fact the defendant had made no such admission, the Court held the
instruction to be prejudicial error.49 An unusual example of an er-
roneous charge is found in State v. Conner.5" In this case a juror
in a first degree murder trial asked the judge whether the de-
fendant could be paroled if the jury recommended life imprison-
ment. The trial judge told the jury that he could not answer the ques-
tion. The Court, in holding the judge's reply prejudicial, said that
after the question had been posed the judge should have instructed the
jury that eligibility for parole should not be considered in determining
whether to make the recommendation. 5'
Two cases52 involved the judge's failure to charge the jury on a
lesser crime included within the crime of robbery. When there is con-
flicting evidence as to the elements of the greater offense, failure to
charge on included crimes of a lesser degree is error even though the
defendant is asking for an acquittal. 53  This error is not cured by
the fact that the defendant was convicted of the greater crime.
54
Finally, although a defendant has the right to have the jury polled,
this right must be exercised at the time the jury returns its verdict or
before it is discharged. 55
Sentencing Problems
Upon conviction of a female misdemeanant, the trial judge may not
sentence her to Central Prison unless there is a finding that the State
Highway and Public Works Commission has designated Central Prison
as a place of confinement for women prisoners.56  Although women
can be confined at Central Prison if segregated, it is commonly under-
stood that misdemeanants cannot be confined there. However, in 1955
the General Assembly revised G. S. § 148-4 to provide:
"Any sentence to imprisonment in any unit of the State Prison
system, or to jail to be assigned to work under the State High-
way and Public Works Commission shall be construed as a com-
mitment .. . to the custody of the Director of Prisons .... who
shall designate places of confinement within the State prison
system where the sentences of all such persons shall be
served .... -57
"0 State v. Adams, 241 N. C. 559, 85 S. E. 2d 918 (1955)." 241 N. C. 468, 85 S. E. 2d 584 (1955).
"1 For a detailed discussion of this case see Note, 33 N. C. L. REv. 655 (1955).
" State v. Davis, 242 N. C. 476, 87 S. E. 2d 906 (1955); State v. Hicks,
241 N. C. 156, 84 S. E. 2d 545 (1954).
State v. Hicks, supra note 52.
State v. Davis, 242 N. C. 476, 87 S. E. 2d 906 (1955).
State v. Cephus, 241 N. C. 562, 86 S. E. 2d 70 (1955).
00 State v. Cagle, 241 N. C. 134, 84 S. E. 2d 649 (1954). See COURTS, p.
mepra.
0' N. C. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 238.
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Query, whether this revision would allow the imprisonment of a mis-
demeanant at Central Prison.
Since the crime of receiving stolen goods presupposes that the prop-
erty was stolen by someone other than the receiver, a person cannot
be guilty of both stealing and receiving the same property. There-
fore, after the active sentence imposed on the receiving count was
served, the suspended sentence on the larceny count could not be
activated. The court had the power to impose sentence for one of
the offenses only, and the fact that the dual punishments did not exceed
the maximum allowed for either offense was immaterial because
punishment for a single offense cannot be suspended in part and active
in part. However, where there is a general verdict on an indictment
containing two counts, the defendant would not be prejudiced if the
sentence does not exceed the maximum allowed on either count.
9
State v. Austin6 ° adds that where a defendant has already served more
time on a single sentence under a general verdict than the maximum
allowed on either count in the indictment, he is entitled to his freedom
on a writ of habeas corpus.
Three cases 1 stated the rule that a court can suspend a sentence
upon prescribed conditions only when the defendant consents, expressly
or impliedly. Implied consent by the defendant is negated by exception
and appeal. 62  Further, the period of probation and suspension of
sentence is limited to five years by G. S. § 15-200; but if the suspen-
sion exceeds that period, only the excess is void. Thus, a judge can
activate a suspended sentence at any time within the five year period
even though the sentence was suspended for eight years.3
There must be a hearing on the violation of the conditions of a
suspended sentence before it can be activated.6 4  Furthermore, where
the sentence was suspended upon the condition that the defendant vio-
late none of the laws of the State, the condition was not broken on a
finding of violation of the laws of another state. Therefore, the activa-
tion of the sentence was error and the defendant was entitled to a writ
of habeas corpus.65 In State v. Miller"6 the evidence showed that the
defendant had no job (he had a home and some cash), that many
"it re Powell, 241 N. C. 288, 84 S. E. 2d 906 (1954). See Note, 26 N. C. L.
RZEv. 192, 195 (1948) on the practice of indicting defendants on two counts, one
for larceny, and the other for receiving stolen goods.
See Note, 26 N. C. L. RtEv. 192, 195 (1948).
60241 N. C. 548, 85 S. E. 2d 924 (1955).
01 State v. Harvey, 242 N. C. 111, 86 S. E. 2d 793 (1955); State v. Eason,
242 N. C. 59, 86 S. E. 2d 774 (1955) ; State v. Cole, 241 N. C. 576, 86 S. E. 2d
203 (1955).
62 State v. Eason, 242 N. C. 59, 86 S. E. 2d 774 (1955).
6' State v. McBride, 240 N. C. 619, 83 S. E. 2d 488 (1954).
64 State v. Haddock, 241 N. C. 182, 84 S. E. 2d 584 (1954).
62 State v. McBride, 240 N. C. 619, 83 S. E. 2d 488 (1954).
6240 N. C. 602, 83 S. E. 2d 546 (1954).
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people came to his house, that empty jugs were found in his house, and
that there was an odor of liquor present there. The Court held that
this evidence would not cause a reasonable man to conclude that the
defendant had broken the conditions of good behavior and obedience
to the laws of the State, and that, therefore, he should be discharged
as a matter of right.
DAMAGES
Wrongful Death
Where the trial judge charged the jury in a wrongful death action
on the damages that, "It is only the present worth of the pecuniary
injury resulting from the wrongful death of the deceased that may be
awarded the plaintiff," the Court held this to be reversible error It
is well established that the measure of damages for loss of human life-
is the present value of the net pecuniary worth of the deceased based
upon his life expectancy. The failure of the trial judge to use "present
value" in his charge or to explain the element of present value is con-
sidered reversible error.
Measure of Danages in Eminent Domain Proceedings
The Court held in Carolina Central Gas Co v. Hyder2 that when
the easement acquired in eminent domain proceedings was of such an
extent as to become, in effect, a fee, the damages awarded to the owner
should be for the fee, and not for a mere easement.
Damages in Suit Brought by the Next Friend of a Minor
In Shields v. McKays the father of a minor child, injured through
the negligence of the defendant, brought suit as the next friend of the
child. In the complaint he sought damages for medical expenses, loss
of earnings and disfigurement both during minority and after attain-
ing majority. The trial judge ruled that there could be no recovery
for these items.
The Court recognized the general rule that an unemancipated minor
is not entitled to recover, as an element of damage in an action for
personal injuries, loss of time and diminished earning capacity during
minority, these being recoverable by the father in a separate suit. The
Court held however, that the father of a minor may waive his (the
father's) right to recover for such loss and permit the minor to recover
the full amount to which both the child and the parent would have
been entitled if separate suits had been brought. By so casting his
pleadings, the father treats the child as emancipated in so far as re-
Caudle v. Southern Ry., 242 N. C. 466, 88 S. E. 2d 138 (1955).-241 N. C. 639, 86 S. E. 2d 458 (1955).
'241 N. C. 37, 84 S. E. 2d 286 (1954).
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covery for such elements of damage are concerned and the parent is
estopped from afterwards bringing any action in his own right.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Unlike the two earlier domestic relation surveys,1 this year's survey
seems to present no major lines of case decisions which have been
materially altered.
CUSTODY
Browning v. Htmphrey2 may possibly show the completion of a
change in emphasis by the Court in custody cases from that emphasis
which was shown in the case of In re Cranford.8 The Browning case
involved an attempt by the natural mother of an illegitimate child to
regain custody of the child from an aunt who had cared for the child
for a period of seven years with the natural mother's consent. The pre-
siding judge found that the aunt was a fit arid suitable person to have
custody of the child and that the interest of the child would best be
served by permitting the child to remain with the aunt. No finding
was made as to the natural mother's suitability. The Supreme Court
affirmed an award to the aunt.
The Cranford case concerned similar facts except that the natural
parent was also found to be a fit and suitable person. The Court
stated:
"Where the fitness of the petitioner is unchallenged the natural
right of the parent to the custody of the child cannot be denied
because a more suitable custodian or more advantageous en-
vironment is available, or because at the sacrifice of parental right
the child may have a better chance in life ..
And later:
"We observe here that the question of unsuitability is one which
must be advanced and shown by the respondent."5
Although the exact Browning situation was not present in the
Cranford case, the suggestion was inescapable in Cranford that respond-
ent, in order to retain custody, must successfully challenge the suit-
ability of the natural parent.0 Such successful challenge was not made
2 Case Survey, 32 N. C. L. Ray. 379, 443 (1954) ; Case Survey, 33 N. C. L.
Ray. 157, 193 (1955).2 241 N. C. 285, 84 S. E. 2d 917 (1954).
3231 N. C. 91, 56 S. E. 2d 35 (1949).
4 Id. at 95, 56 S. E. 2d at 39.
rlbid.
0 See 28 N. C. L. REv. 323 (1950) where the writer in discussing the reasons
for the Court's decision in the Cranford case .states that the Court asserted "...
the natural parent, unless shown to be unfit, has a legal right to the possession
of the child." This would seem to be the purport of the Cranford decision.
[Vol. 34
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
in the Browning case as is evidenced by the fact that no finding was
made as to the natural parent's suitability, yet the aunt was allowed
to retain custody. Happily, the principal case may show a completion
of a change in attitude on the Court's part from emphasis on "the
natural right of the parent" to emphasis on "the best interest of the
child."
7
This view that some change has been made is fortified by James v.
Pretlows in which the custody of two minor children was considered,
and both parties were found to be suitable custodians. Although the
Court modified the lower court's award of custody to the stepmother, it
did so because ". . . the findings of fact by the Judge do not clearly
and plainly show that their interest and welfare will be promoted by
awarding custody to their stepmother. .... 9
An interesting question was raised in Barnwell v. Barnwell'0 as to
whether jurisdiction over custody in an alimony without divorce action"l
survives the filing of a subsequent complaint in an action for absolute
divorce. 12 The Court did not rule on this because the matter, although
involved in the family situation, was not present for decision since
neither parent sought the adjudication of custody rights below.
In another custody action, Hoskins v. Currin,13 the child in ques-
tion was residing in this state when a California court, as a part of a
divorce action commenced by the wife, awarded custody to the mother.
The mother subsequently came to North Carolina and sought to en-
force the California custody award. The North Carolina Court decided,
in line with prior case law, that North Carolina was not bound to give
full faith and credit to the California decree, as actual presence of the
child in North Carolina at the time of the foreign decree prevented the
California court from having the authority to enter such a decree.
728 N. C. L. REv. 323, 325 (1950).
8242 N. C. 102, 86 S. E. 2d 759 (1955).
O Id. at 106, 86 S. E. 2d at 762. Also in the same case is the statement that
"[w]here one parent is dead, the surviving parent has a natural and legal right
to the custody and control of their minor children. This right is not absolute,
and it may be interfered with or denied but only for the most substantial and
sufficient reasons, and is subject to judicial control only when the interest and
welfare of the children clearly require it." [Italics added.] Id. at 104, 86 S. E.
2d at 761.
10241 N. C. 565, 86 S. E. 2d 916 (1955).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (Supp., 1953): "In a proceeding instituted under
this section, the plaintiff or the defendant may ask for custody of the children of
said parties. . . . Whereupon, the court may enter such orders . . . as might
be entered upon a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus... "
"= When custody is sought to be determined in a habeas corpus hearing, juris-
diction is ousted upon the filing of a divorce action. Phipps v. Vannoy, 229 N. C.
629, 50 S. E. 2d 906 (1948). Does this ouster occur under the amended G. S.
§ 50-16? See Survey of Statutory Changes, 31 N. C. L. REv. 407 (1953).13242 N. C. 432, 88 S. E. 2d 228 (1955).
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SUPPORT
14
State v. Smith' 5 and State v. Outlaw'6 together point out a gap
still unfilled in the North Carolina support law. In the Smith case, it
was sought to hold a father for non-support of a minor child under
G. S. § 14-322. The indictment was held insufficient, as non-support
alone is not an offense under the statute. Willful abandonment plus a
failure to provide adequate support must be charged in the indictment.
The Outlaw'7 case required the statutory language of G. S. § 14-325-
"while living with his wife"-to be used in charging willful neglect
and refusal by the father to provide support for his minor child. Thus,
the two statutes seem to cover the non-support of minor children in
all but one case; namely, where the father, living apart from the wife,
has custody of the children and willfully fails to support them, criminal
action apparently being impossible under these circumstances.
DIVORCE
Ollis v. lli0s8 restates the rule that a complaint in an alimony
without divorce action containing allegations of abuse and violence must
set out with some particularity the acts so charged and must also allege
that such actions were not provoked by the wife.19
EQUITY
INJUNCTION
In a case of first impression in this state,' the Court refused to
enjoin a Mayor and City Council from enacting an annexation ordi-
nance, apparently void for lack of the election required by stat-
tute.2 The case arose on an appeal from orders overruling a de-
murrer to the complaint and denying a motion to dissolve a temporary
restraining order. The orders were reversed by the Court because it
was thought inappropriate for the judiciary to interfere with the pro-
spective exercise of legislative powers unless it appeared that the plain-
tiffs, residents of the territory to be annexed, would suffer irreparable
harm from mere enactment of the ordinance, as distinguished from
"4For a consideration of Mahan v. Read, 240 N. C. 641, 86 S. E. 2d 706
(1954) decided under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 52A-1 (Supp. 1953) see Note, p. 126 infra.
' 241 N. C. 301, 84 S. E. 2d 913 (1954).
10242 N. C. 220, 87 S. E. 2d 303 (1955).
17See CRIMINAL LAW, p. 38 supra.18241 N. C. 709, 86 S. E. 2d 420 (1955).
19 See Howell v. Howell, 223 N. C. 62, 25 S. E. 2d 169 (1943) ; Best v. Best,
228 N. C. 9, 44 S. E. 2d 214 (1947) and the many cases cited therein.
1 Rheinhardt v. Yancey, 241 N. C. 184, 84 S. E. 2d 655 (1954).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-466 (1952).
[Vol. 34
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
what might be done by the municipality thereunder after enactment.
No such harm was alleged. 3
In another case, 4 apparently of first impression,5 the Court refused
injunction to compel the removal of a dead body from interment in
a cemetery. The case arose on an appeal from an order overruling a
demurrer to the complaint. The order was reversed for lack of a
cause of action. Plaintiff and others had purchased lots in a new ceme-
tery, relying upon representations that all sepulchers would be beneath
the ground and marked only by bronze tablets. Defendant, a former
officer of the cemetery, had buried her deceased husband in a granite
tomb above ground. It was held that the repose of the dead should
not be disturbed save for compelling reasons and that plaintiff had
failed to allege any such reasons.6
However, the continuation of a temporary restraining order to final
hearing was sustained in Owen v. De Bruhl Agency,7 where plaintiff
had alleged that defendants had destructively trespassed upon plain-
tiff's cultivated lands adjacent to plaintiff's airfield and established and
operated a shooting gallery dangerous to aircraft approaching and leav-
ing the landing field.
REFORMATION AND RECISSION
In Dunn v. Dunns the Court upheld, as against a motion to strike,
a counterclaim for reformation of a deed so as to supply a seal omitted
by mutual mistake of the parties and by the inadvertence of the drafts-
man. The Court was unwilling to afford relief unless the transaction
was based upon a valuable consideration; for ". . . in respect to a
voluntary conveyance the grantee has no claim on the grantor, and
any mistake or defect is a mere failure in a bounty which the grantor
was not bound to make and hence is not required to perfect. Thus,
a volunteer must take the gift as he finds it." However, valuable con-
sideration was found in the defendant's allegation that the conveyance
was made to reimburse the grantee for his care and support of the
parties' grandmother during the latter part of her life, for his payment
'Cf. Gorman v. City of Phoenix, 70 Ariz. 59, 216 P. 2d 400 (1950); Avey
Drilling Mach. Co. v. Lukowsky, 261 S. W. 2d 432 (Ct. of App. Ky., 1953);
Ritchie v. City of Hamtramck, 340 Mich. 284, 65 N. W. 2d 732 (1954) ; Russell
v. Linton, 52 Ohio Op. 228, 115 N. E. 2d 429 (1953) ; see Annot., 140 A. L. R.
439 (1942).
'Mills v. Cemetery Park Corp., 242 N. C. 20, 86 S. E. 2d 893 (1955).
Cf. Cabe v. Parker-Graham-Sexton, Inc., 202 N. C. 176, 185; 162 S. E. 223,
228 (1932).
, See Yome v. Gorman, 242 N. Y. 395, 152 N. E. 126 (1926) where Cardozo,
J., denied a Protestant widow injunction to restrain a Roman Catholic cemetery
from preventing removal of her Roman Catholic husband's body to a Protestant
cemetery.
7241 N. C. 597, 86 S. E. 2d 197 (1955).
S242 N. C. 234, 87 S. E. 2d 308 (1955).
'Id. at 239, 87 S. E. 2d at 311.
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of her funeral expenses, and for his payments of taxes and other mainte-
nance expenses on the land.
In Zager v. Setzer'0 the Court reversed the dismissal on nonsuit
of a counter-claim for rescission of a conditional sale contract because
of fraud. The sale was of personal property comprising a motion pic-
ture theatre. The evidence that was held sufficient to carry the case
to the jury indicated that the plaintiff in the course of negotiating had
misrepresented the gross income of the previous operator of the theatre.
Although there was no evidence that the plaintiff had knowledge of the
falsity of his representations, the evidence was held ". . . sufficient to
support the inference that the plaintiff's representations as to the gross
weekly income of the former operator was recklessly made, or posi-
tively averred when he was consciously ignorant whether it was true
or false. . . .The evidence tending to show this state of mind is an
adequate substitute for proof of scienter."
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Two cases dealt with options.
In one,12 an involuntary nonsuit at the close of plaintiff's evidence
was sustained when it appeared that plaintiff-optionee had waited eleven
years after his power to accept the offer had accrued before making
the tender required by the contract for acceptance. The contract was
silent as to the duration of the offer after it became effective upon cer-
tain deaths. The Court thought a reasonable time was permitted for
acceptance and that plaintiff had waited too long.
In the other case, 3 suit was brought by the assignee of the optionee.
The option was contained in a lease. The plaintiff had accepted and
made full tender in apt time. On appeal from the action of the trial
court in striking parts of the answer, the Court held that the defendant
optionor could not attack the assignment as having been made while
the assignor was mentally incompetent and that only the assignor, or
his heirs, executor, or administrator (now that he is dead) could thus
avoid the transaction.
Muilenburg v. Blevins14 was a suit brought by the seller against
the buyer to test the enforceability of a forty-four year old restriction
in a deed that the property should be used only for residence purposes.
The present contract called for a deed free and clear from any en-
forceable restrictions which would prevent the property from being used
for commercial purposes. Because the neighborhood had completely
10242 N. C. 493, 88 S. E. 2d 94 (1955).
:1 Id. at 495, 88 S. E. 2d at 95.
2 Sandlin v. Weaver, 240 N. C. 703, 83 S. E. 2d 806 (1954).
" Reynolds v. Earley, 241 N. C. 521, 85 S. E. 2d 904 (1955).1 242 N. C. 271, 87 S. E. 2d 493 (1955).
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changed from one primarily residential to one primarily commercial in
character, the trial court and the Supreme Court agreed that the
restrictions, having ceased to be effective for their original purpose,
were now at an end. The buyer was ordered to complete the purchase.
EVIDENCE
X-Ray Evidence
State v. Norris' presents another example of the North Carolina
Court's following with avid consistency the minority view that an X-ray
is only illustrative evidence.
2
In the majority of jurisdictions, X-ray and photographic evidence
is admitted as substantive evidence, i.e., as proof of the fact to be estab-
lished.3 This position seems sounder as it is not the physician's eyes
that pierce the skin and look at the bone, but it is the eye of the X-ray
that enters the body and shows what lies beneath the skin. The physician
merely interprets what the X-ray shows him. The X-ray itself should




The Court was presented with an interesting fact situation in Hardi-
son v. Gregory6 Plaintiff sued the administrators of the estate of the
defendant for alienating the affections of plaintiff's wife and for crim-
inal conversation.
The plaintiff testified to four occasions when he saw the defendant
and his wife together. On one such occasion, pursuant to a telephone
call, he went out to a deserted cabin from which he saw the defendant
and his wife leave as he drove up in his car. Defendant and plaintiff's
wife drove off in defendant's car, and plaintiff gave chase. The de-
fendant finally crashed into a tree and stopped. Plaintiff went up
to the stopped car and tried to get in, but the doors and windows were
locked. Plaintiff then took a hatchet from his car and started to break
the windows of defendant's car. Upon succeeding in this, he then hit
the defendant in the face with the hatchet. Objection was made that
this was testimony concerning a transaction or communication with a
deceased person and therefore was inadmissible as violating G. S. § 8-
51. 7 The Court held that the statute did apply to tort actions, but
1 242 N. C. 47, 86 S. E. 2d 916 (1955).
2 STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 53 (1946).
333 N. C. L. Rv. 355, 362 (1955).
' This case also presents a complete and exhaustive bibliography of North
Carolina cases on the subject of photographs and X-rays as evidence.
IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 8-51 (1943).
0242 N. C. 324, 88 S. E. 2d 96 (1955).
"Upon the trial of an action, or the hearing upon the merits of a special
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that the facts testified to did not constitute a "transaction or communica-
tion" within the meaning of the statute but only observations of inde-
pendent facts.
The defense cited two cases,8 having substantially the same facts,
holding that a passenger in deceased's car, when suing the estate for
negligent injury, could not testify as to the speed at which deceased was
driving, as this would be a violation of G. S. § 8-51. The Court, in
distinguishing the instant case from the cases cited, said: "It would
seem that the ruling in these two cases was based upon the fact that
each plaintiff was a passenger in the car. We consider these two cases
are not applicable to the present case."' )
The concurring opinion in the instant case points out the illogical
stand of the majority, but concurs in the result because plaintiff's wife
upon cross examination by plaintiff's attorney, testified to substantially
the same facts.
This decision seems to aid neither judges nor attorneys in deciding
just what is a "personal transaction or communication" within the
meaning of G. S. § 8-51.
Silence as an Admission of Guilt
In State v. Temple10 witnesses were permitted to testify to hearsay
statements of a prejudicial nature, made in the defendant's presence,
regardless of whether they were of such a nature that his failure to
deny them might lead to an inference of guilt or guilty knowledge. What
the statements were does not appear.
In regard to the admissibility of this type of evidence the Court
stated the correct rule to be: "It is not sufficient that the statement
was made in the presence of the defendant against whom it is sought to
be used, even though he remained silent; but it is further necessary that
the circumstances should have been such as to call for a denial on his
part, and to afford him an opportunity to make it.""
proceeding, a party or person interested in the event, or a person from, through
or under whom such a party or interested person derives his interest or title by
assignment or otherwise, shall not be examined as a witness in his own behalf
or interest, or in behalf of the party succeeding to his title or interest, against
the executor, administrator or survivor of a deceased person, or the committee
of a lunatic, by assignment or otherwise, concerning a personal transaction or
communication between the witness and the deceased person or lunatic; except
where the executor, administrator, survivor, committee or person so deriving
title or interest is examined in his own behalf, or the testimony of the lunatic
or deceased person is given in evidence concerning the same transaction or com-
munication."
' Davis v. Pearson, 220 N. C. 163, 16 S. E. 2d 655 (1941); Boyd v. Williams,
207 N. C. 30, 175 S. E. 2d 376 (1909).
p242 N. C. 324, 329, 88 S. E. 2d 96, 99 (1955).
10240 N. C. 738, 83 S. E. 2d 792 (1954).
1 Id. at 744, 83 S. E. 2d at 796 (1954).
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Mental Capacity to Make a Deed
In McDevitt v. Chandler'2 the Court reversed the trial judge for
asking a witness, "Is it your opinion on that day she didn't have suf-
ficient mental capacity to make a deed ?"
This seems to be the first time the Court has ruled on this type of
question in cases of deeds. It has consistently followed the approach
that such a question, which it calls a legal conclusion, is reversible
error in cases ascertaining mental capacity of a testator.13
FUTURE INTERESTS
In Morrell v. Building Management' the testator devised property
to a trustee for the benefit of A and B for a period of ten years be-
ginning at the date of his death, with the direction that at the expira-
tion of the ten year period the property was to go to A and B or their
heirs in fee simple. Within the ten year period A conveyed his one-half
interest in the property to the defendant, reserving the right to receive
the income during the life of the trust. After the conveyance, but prior
to the termination of the trust, A died, leaving surviving him his son,
the plaintiff, who claims a one-half interest in the property as a devisee
under the will. The court held for the defendant on the ground that
title to the property vested in A and B immediately upon the death of
the testator with the right of full enjoyment postponed until the termina-
tion of the trust.2 The will created no future interests or remainders
because there were no prior estates less than a fee with a limitation
over to A and B.
ACCELERATION
In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. McEwen3 the testator devised
and bequeathed the residuary estate to the plaintiff as trustee for the
benefit of his wife for life. Upon her death the trustee was to divide
the estate equally between the four children, A, B, C, and D, if they
were living at that date. In the event that before his wife's death, any
of the children should die, leaving issue surviving them, such issue
12241 N. C. 677, 86 S. E. 2d 438 (1955).
"lIn Re Will of York. 231 N. C. 70, 55 S. E. 2d 791 (1949) ; In Re Will of
Lomax, 224 N. C. 459, 31 S. E. 2d 369 (1944). See RAL PROPERTY, p. 63 in!ra.
1241 N. C. 264, 84 S. E. 2d 910 (1954).
2 The Court supported its position by quoting the following: "Where an active
trust is created for the use and benefit of named beneficiaries, or there is a gift
of all or a part of the income therefrom to the beneficiaries, pending final division,
or there is other language in the will evidencing a clear intent that a beneficial
interest in the estate shall vest in the parties named immediately upon the death
of the testator, with directions to the trustee to divide and deliver the estate at a
stated time in the future, the interest vests immediately upon the death of the
testator and the date of division merely postpones the complete enjoyment there-
of." Carter v. Kempton, 233 N. C. 1, 6, 62 S. E. 2d 713, 717 (1950).'241 N. C. 166, 84 S. E. 2d 642 (1954).
1955]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
would be entitled to his parent's share of the trust estate. The widow
dissented from the will, and the trustee sought instructions. The Court
held that the children took a vested remainder. 4  The dissent of the
widow was equivalent to her death and had the effect of accelerating
the interest and the right of enjoyment of the children subject to the
widow's right of dower.
When a remainder is indefeasibly vested there is no problem in ac-
celerating the interests upon the renunciation of the preceding life es-
tate. 5 Here the children were to take on the death of the wife if they
were living at that date. The remainder seems to have been vested
subject to defeasance by death of the children before the termination
of the life estate. The court accelerated the remainder and made it inde-
feasible thus cutting off the contingency that the children survive the
life tenant and also any rights which their issue might have had under
the will."
CONSTRUCTION OF "SURVIVORS"
Two decisions during the past year involve the construction of the
word "survivors." In Hummell v. Hunmmell7 the testatrix devised and
bequeathed her property to A, B, C, and D or survivors. After the
execution of the will and before the death of the testatrix, B died leav-
ing three children. The issue was whether B's children represented
him and took his share under the will. The Court held that they did
not, as the use of the words "or survivors" indicated an intention on
the part of the testator that the survivors should be determined as of
the date of the testator's death. B predeceased the testator and, conse-
quently, was not a survivor. The children could not take by inheri-
tance because B died before he had any estate under the will; nor
could they claim under the will, because the lapsed legacy statutes8 are
inapplicable when the gift is to the children or their survivors.
The second case9 illustrates an application of the same rule to a
SmEs, FUTURE INTERESTS ch. 20, § 95 pp. 301-311 (1951) points out that in
cases where land is devised to the wife for life and then to the children living
at her death, and the wife renounces, some courts will reconstrue the phrase "at
her death" to mean "living at the death of the testator." The contingency is
thus reconstrued in such a way that the remainder is regarded as vesting at the
testator's death. The North Carolina Court said, with reference to the phrase,
"if said children are living at that date (death of wife)" that adverbs of time
and adverbial clauses designating time "do not create a contingency but merely
indicate the time when the enjoyment of the estate shall begin." Wachovia Bank
& Trust Co. v. McEwen, 241 N. C. 166, 169, 84 S. E. 2d 642, 644 (1954).
Baptist Female University v. Borden, 132 N. C. 477, 44 S. E. 47 (1903).
' This is the view taken by the Restatement of Property in the absence of
language and circumstances indicating a contrary intent. RESTATEMENT, PROr-
ERTY § 231, comment h (1936).
7241 N. C. 254, 85 S. E. 2d 144 (1954).
8 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42 through 31-42.2 (1953).
Edwards v. Edwards, 241 N. C. 694, 86 S. E. 2d 268 (1955).
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more complicated set of facts. The terms of the will were, in sub-
stance: T to W for life, then to T's children and grandson for life, then
to their children, and if any of T's children leave no children then to
the survivor or survivors of T's children and their issue in fee simple.
At his death the testator left surviving him, his widow, three children
and a grandson. At the time of the commencement of the action T's
widow had died, and T's children had died without leaving children.
The Court held that from the will it was apparent that the testator
intended that the grandson should stand on an equal footing with his
children. On the death of the widow, the children living at that time
and the grandson took life estates as tenants in common. At the death
of each of the children there existed the alternatives of a fee in one-
fourth of the land going to his children or to the surviving devisees.
On the death of each of the children, without leaving children, this fee
in one-fourth of the land accrued to the survivors. Therefore, the
grandson had a fee in three-fourths of the land as the sole survivor,
and a life estate in the remaining fourth as a devisee under the will
with a remainder to his children.
EXECUTORY DEVISE-TRANSMISSIBILITY
In Seawell v. Cheshire'° the testator conveyed to T in trust for X
for life, and upon X's death T to convey the fee to X's children, but
if X have no lawful issue then T to convey to A, B, C, and D. X was
predeceased by A, B, C, and D and died without leaving issue. The
heirs, next of kin and successors in interest of A, B, C, and D are the
plaintiffs in this action, and the executrix of X's estate and the successor
trustee of the trust are the defendants. The Court held that A, B, C,
and D took a contingent executory devise after a fee conditional, and
that this limitation over was not void for remoteness." An interest
in a contingent executory devise or a contingent remainder is trans-
missible to the heir or executor of a person dying before the occurrence
of the contingency. Therefore, upon the death of X without issue, the
heirs, next of kin and successors in interest of A, B, C, and D became
entitled to the estate.
RULE IN WILD'S CASE
Historically, the Rule of Wild's Case12 applied only to wills.13 How-
10241 N. C. 629, 86 S. E. 2d 256 (1955).
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 41-4 (1950) provides that a contingent limitation in a
deed or will made to depend upon a person's dying without issue takes effect when
such person dies without having issue living at the time of his death, unless
a contrary intent is expressed on the face of the deed or will. Prior to this
statute the rule at common law was that a limitation contingent upon death
without issue was void for remoteness because it referred to an indefinite failure
of issue. American Yarn Co. v. Dewstoe, 192 N. C. 121, 133 S. E. 407 (1926).
2 6 Co. Rep. 16b, Goldsbr. 139, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 181.
" See 2 SImEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 401-402 (1936).
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ever, in Davis v. Brown14 the North Carolina Supreme Court applied
it in construing a deed.
In this case X conveyed land to A "and her children or heirs." The
habendum clause provided: "To have and to hold the aforesaid tract or
parcel of land, and all privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging
to the said Myrtle La Mott Davis and her children her life and then
to her children or heirs and assigns in fee simple forever." The Court
held that as A had no children when the deed was executed she took
an estate tail which by statute15 was converted into a fee simple.
The same result could have been reached without applying the Rule
in Wild's Case to a deed. Since there were no children at the time
of the execution of the deed, they could not be grantees in the deed.
Under G. S. § 39-1 a fee is presumed although the word "heirs" is
omitted from the deed. Therefore, a conveyance to A and her children
would give A a fee simple when there were no children at the date
of the execution of the deed.
INSURANCE
Definition of "Motor Vehicle"
The automobile liability policy in suit1 was issued under the "As-
signed Risk Plan" of the 1947 Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial
Responsibility Act. 2 The word "automobile" was used in the omnibus
clause of the policy, which covered the insured while driving vehicles
not owned by him. The plaintiff contended that the statutory language
controlled the language of the policy; that the act spoke in terms of
"motor vehicles"; that the farm tractor being driven by the insured
on the highway was being used as a motor vehicle or automobile at the
time of the accident; and thus that the policy provided coverage. The
Court agreed that the statutory language was imported into the pro-
visions of the policy3 and that the coverage question depended upon
the definition of "motor vehicle" as used in G. S. § 20-2264 of the act.
This section, in defining the term, specifically excepted "vehicles used in
this State but not required to be licensed by the State." The Court
then turned to other articles in Chapter 20 of the General Statutes and
found that farm tractors were not required to be registered or have
certificates of title;5 that the Uniform Drivers' License Act defined
1- 241 N. C. 116, 84 S. E. 2d 334 (1954).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 41-1 (1950).
1 Brown v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 241 N. C. 666, 86 S. E. 2d 433 (1955).
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-276 (1953) replaced by § 20-279.34 (Supp. 1955).
' Id. § 20-227 (4) (a) (1953) replaced by § 20-279.21 (d) (Supp. 1955).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-226 (1953) replaced by § 20-279.1 (Supp. 1955).
Id. §20-51 (f) (1953) renumbered §20-51 (e) (Supp. 1955) (text un-
changed).
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"motor vehicle" to the exclusion of "agricultural tractors"; 6 that a
person driving a farm tractor "temporarily" on a highway did not need
a driver's license7 The result of no coverage reached by the Court was
clearly demanded by the wording of the statutes.8 However, in view
of the policy9 behind the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Acts, it
seems unfortunate that the General Assembly has chosen to create such
a gap'10 in the coverage provided."-
Residence
In Barker v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co.1 2 the plaintiff's fire insurance policy
on his personal and household property gave ten per cent coverage on
the personal and household property of the insured and of "any mem-
ber of the family of and residing with, the insured, while elsewhere
than on the described premises . . . ."-3 (Emphasis added.) The plain-
tiff's minor son and his wife had gone to Raleigh to attend North Caro-
lina State College. The plaintiff had rented an apartment there for
his son and daughter-in-law, furnishing the apartment with furniture
from the "described premises." There was a fire in the Raleigh apart-
ment, and the plaintiff claimed coverage under the ten per cent clause.
The Court treated the phrase "residing with" as equivalent to "having
residence with," and therefore applied legal definitions of "residence"
8 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-6 (1953) rewritten in 1953 (Supp. 1955) ; the revised
section is now broad enough in language to cover a tractor.7 Id. § 20-8 (b) (1953). Since this section was not changed in 1953 or 1955,
it is felt the broadening of the definition of "motor vehicle" in the Uniform Drivers'
License Act would have no effect from the the standpoint of this case.
' The phrase "except . . . vehicles . . . not required to be licensed" in the
definition of "motor vehicle," N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-226 (1953), has been re-
placed by a specific enumeration of the exempted vehicles in the definition of the
act of 1953, § 20-279.1 (Supp. 1955) ; the list of exceptions includes "farm trac-
tors." If the 1953 rewriting can be held a clarification of what was previously
intended, the result could not have been otherwise in this case.
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-225 (1953): "The purposes of this article are to
promote greater safety in the operation of motor vehicles in this State, and to
require financial responsibility of reckless, inefficient and irresponsible operators
of motor vehicles, and of operators and owners of motor vehicles involved in
accidents; and it is the legislative intent that this article be liberally construed
so as to effectuate these purposes, as far as legally and practically possible."
But see N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.38 (Supp. 1955), replacing the above section:
"This article shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact it."
"0 The "teeth" of the act is the power of suspending drivers' licenses of in-
dividuals rather than any regulation of vehicles themselves. It would seem to
create no registration or licensing problem to redefine "motor vehicle" for the
purpose of the act to include farm tractors when traveling on highways. Cf.
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-51 (Supp. 1955); compare subsection (c) with subsection
(e). This suggested change, however, would still have no effect upon drivers
under 16, who are permitted to drive farm tractors on the highway under our
present laws.
1' The 1955 Session Laws do not affect the particular sections or subsections
treated above.
12241 N. C. 397, 85 S. E. 2d 305 (1955).
23 Id. at 398, 85 S. E. 2d at 305.
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to determine the meaning of the phrase. The Court held that the legal
residence of the plaintiff's son had not shifted from his father's house-
hold to Raleigh since the apartment was only a temporary abode. The
Court also noted that, as a State-supported institution, North Carolina
State College charges, under our statutes, 14 "non-resident tuition" to
students from other states, and that they are not entitled to reduced
tuition simply because they might occupy apartments in Raleigh. Thus
it was decided that the fire insurance policy covered the loss in Raleigh
up to ten per cent of the face amount.
As the coverage was limited, and in view of the rule of strict con-
struction against the insurance carrier,15 the decision is a reasonable
one.' 6 But the phrase "residing with" is susceptible of a general mean-
ing quite distinct from the legal meaning of "residence." 1 Also, the
premium rates charged by the insurer vary with the quality of the con-
struction of the premises covered.' 8 An apartment in Raleigh may not
be so well-constructed and fire-resistant as insured premises in another
town on which policy rates are predicated.
Waiver of Conditions in Policy
The plaintiff took out a life insurance policy in 1935, being forty-
four years old at the time. A rider to the policy provided extra cov-
erage for the insured until he reached the age of fifty-five-disability
payments for life if disability was incurred before the age limit was
reached. The plaintiff reached the age of fifty-five (in 1946) without
having become disabled. However, as a result of a clerical error, the
insurer continued to charge the extra premium applicable to the dis-
ability coverage. The plaintiff became disabled late in 1950, and realiz-
ing that he had been paying the disability premium to date, he made
claim for his disability payments in 1951. Upon receiving the claim,
21 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 116-143 and -144 (1952).
'r- The Court cited and quoted Roberts v. American Alliance Ins. Co., 212
N. C. 1, 192 S. E. 873 (1937). Quaere as to strict construction of statutory
policies? However, the rider considered here is not required by N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-176 (Supp. 1955) as part of the standard policy provisions. Prior
versions of the standard fire insurance policy did not require such a provision
either; annotations to N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-176 and -177 (1950).
16 The Court said the purpose of the 10% clause was to attract more business,
for which insurance carriers were willing to take extra risks. See 4 APLEMAN,
INSURANcE LAW AND PRAcricE §§ 2881-82 (1941) for general treatment of
whether personal property may be moved from the insured premises; cf. 4
APPLEMAN, op. cit. supra § 2350.
27 But see definition of verb "reside": "To dwell permanently or continuously;
to have one's residence or domicile .... " WrisTm's NEw INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY (2d ed. 1934).
1 The Court cited as in point Central Manufacturers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fried-
man, 213 Ark. 9, 209 S. W. 2d 102 (1948). The facts were similar to those
in this case, except that the policy covered theft of personal property in the 10%
"elsewhere" provision. A possible distinction might be made between the two
cases on the rate-basis argument.
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the defendant tendered back the extra premiums erroneously collected;
the plaintiff refused to accept the tender and filed suit for breach of
contract. The jury found the defendant insurer had waived the termi-
nation date of its disability coverage and was thereby estopped to assert
the age limitation in its rider.
The Court reversed,19 saying that defendant's motion for nonsuit
should have been granted. While some conflict in the authorities was
observed on the question, the Court found the weight of authority20 to
be that the doctrine of implied waiver cannot be used to extend the
coverage of a policy to risks not covered by the terms of the policy
or to those expressly excluded by its terms.2' The cases cited by the
plaintiff were distinguished on the ground that they dealt with implied





In order for a municipality to zone property outside its corporate
limits there must be some special enabling legislation giving the mu-
nicipality that power.' In State v. Owens2 the City of Winston-Salem,
with the approval of the county board of commissioners, zoned the
defendant's property in 1949 under the mistaken impression that special
statutory authority had been given.3 Several years later the absence of
special authority was discovered, and in 1953 the necessary power was
given by the General Assembly.4 The Court held that the prior zoning
ordinance could not be enforced against the defendant in the absence
of a provision in the new law validating the prior zoning ordinance
or re-enactment of the ordinance by the municipality.5
Robbins v. Charlotte0 interprets G. S. § 160-173 which provides, in
effect, that where two or more corners at an intersection are zoned by
a municipality for one particular use, the owners of the other corners,
"'Hunter v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 241 N. C. 593, 86 S. E. 2d
78 (1955).
20 The Court cited Annot., 113 A. L. R. 857 (1938).
' The Court quoted 45 C. J. S., Insurance §674 (1946) to this effect.
22 See 16 APPLEMAN, INsURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE § 9090 (1944).
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160-172 through 160-181.1 (1952) do not give munici-
palities the power to zone property outside their corporate limits.
2 242 N. C. 525, 87 S. E. 2d 832 (1955).
IN. C. Sess. Laws 1947, c. 677.
N. C. Sess. Laws 1953, c. 777.
It should be noted that the Court did not question the constitutionality of
the special statutes which give municipalities the authority to zone property out-
side their corporate limits.
(1241 N. C. 197, 84 S. E. 2d 814 (1954).
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upon application, may have their property rezoned for the same use.7
In the instant case the plaintiff owned a lot on a "corner" of a "T inter-
section" (where a street ended at the place of intersection with a
through street). His lot was zoned for residential uses and he sought,
by writ of mandamus, to have it rezoned for business uses under G. S.
§ 160-173. The Court held that there are no corners in a "T inter-
section," pointing out that a "T intersection" does not come within
the definition of "intersection" as used in the statute. Therefore, the
plaintiff was not entitled, as a matter of right, to have his property
rezoned for business use even though the other "comer" and the land
across the through street from his property were zoned for business
uses.
Annexation
In Rheinhardt v. Yancey8 the plaintiff sought to enjoin the city
council of the City of Gastonia from enacting an ordinance which would
purportedly annex territory contiguous to that city. The Court pointed out
that under the general law procedure a referendum is a condition prece-
dent to annexation when there is a petition for a referendum signed by
fifteen percent of the qualified voters in the area to be annexed.9 Since
a petition for a referendum had been submitted to the city council of
Gastonia, the Court held that the ordinance would not be effective unless
a majority of the qualified voters in the area to be annexed approved
the annexation in a referendum. Therefore, the plaintiff had suffered
no irreparable injury and his action was premature. However, the
Court indicated that if the city were to pass the ordinance without the
referendum and to take action pursuant to it, then the plaintiff might
have a cause of action if he could prove a threatened irreparable in-
jury.10
Parking
In Henderson v. New Bern" the Court conceded, without deciding,
that under certain conditions, varying according to the circumstances
in a particular municipality, the operation of off-street parking lots by
a municipality may be considered as a public purpose.
12
I See Marren v. Gamble, 237 N. C. 680, 75 S. E. 2d 880 (1953) which upheld
the constitutionality of N. C. GEN. STAT. § 160-173 (1952).
8241 N. C. 184, 84 S. E. 2d 655 (1954).
o N. C. GEN. STAT. § 160-446 (1952). See Survey of Statutory Changes, 25
N. C. L. REv. 376, 453-455 (1947).
10 See EQurrY, p. 50 supra.
11241 N. C. 52, 84 S. E. 2d 283 (1954).
12 See Britt v. Wilmington, 236 N. C. 446, 73 S. E. 2d 289 (1952).
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REAL PROPERTY
BOUNDARIES
Chapter 38 of the General Statutes establishes a speedy method of
settling boundary disputes between adjoining landowners. In a pro-
cessioning proceeding under this statute the location of the line settles
the dispute, and it is proper to refuse to submit an issue of title to the
jury;1 and where it appears to the Court that title is not in dispute and
that the plaintiff and defendant are adjoining landowners, the Court will
treat the action as a processioning proceeding so far as it relates to the
location of the boundary, although the action was brought in ejectment.
2
In locating the boundary line between the lands of adjoining land-
owners when the plaintiff's deed calls for a corner in the defendant's
land as the beginning comer of plaintiff's land, and then for plaintiff's
line to run along a line of defendant's land, "the beginning comer of
the plaintiff's tract of land must be located, if possible, from the descrip-
tion of the defendant's tract of land before it will be permissible to re-
sort to any call in plaintiff's deed for the purpose of establishing the
comer of the defendant's tract of land, which is the beginning comer
of plaintiff's tract of land. And if any corner of the defendant's tract
of land can be definitely located, the line may be reversed from that
point if necessary, in order to locate the lines and courses called for in
that tract."3  In this situation the plaintiff's deed occupies the status
of a junior deed, notwithstanding the fact that the deeds are derived
from a common source and bear the same date. The principle that
a comer or line called for in the description of a deed controls courses
and distances in that deed applies when a junior deed calls for a line
or corner of an adjoining tract.
4
In determining the sufficiency of a description it must be ascer-
tained whether the description is certain in itself or capable of being
reduced to a certainty by reference to something extrinsic to which the
deed refers.5 A somewhat inartistically drawn deed in Haith v. Roper6
was held to have met this requirement. The description was as fol-
lows:
"'A certain tract or parcel of land in Burlington Township,
County, State of Alamance, sic, adjoining the lands of Fred
Murray, Jerry Williamson, and others . .. and others, bounded
as follows, viz: BEGINNING at stake Fred Murray comer
1 Perkins v. Clark, 241 N. C. 24, 84 S. E. 2d 251 (1954).
2 Coffey v. Greer, 241 N. C. 744, 86 S. E. 2d 441 (1955).
3 Id. at 747, 86 S. E. 2d at 443.
' Coffey v. Greer, supra.
'Haith v. Roper, 242 N. C. 489, 88 S. E. 2d 142 (1955).6 242 N. C. 489, 88 S. E. 2d 142 (1955). See Note, p. infra.
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thence North 2' Y East 150 with said Murrays line to a stake
thence South 870 East 75 feet Jerry Williamson corner thence
South 87' East 15 Jerry Williamson comer thence South 150
feet to Jerry Williamsons comer thence 0 South 20 Y West 75
to Fred Murrays comer the beginning containing 4 acre more
or less.' ,,7
At the trial it was stipulated that at the time of the conveyance
Jerry Williamson owned the lot described and the lot to which the
description referred and no other land. Therefore the tracts referred
to in the description were sufficiently identified, and the corners of these
tracts could be located by parol. When this is done, the description
is complete.
DEEDS
The case of McDevitt v. Chandler8 reiterates the rule that the test
of whether a grantor had sufficient mental capacity to make a deed is
whether he knew "the nature and consequences of his act in making a
deed; that is, whether he knew what land he was disposing of, to whom,
and how."
The right to attack the validity of a deed on the grounds of mental
incapacity or undue influence is vested exclusively in the grantor or his
heirs, except where the grantor is dead and it is necessary that his per-
sonal representative sell real estate in order to create assets to pay debts
of the estate. In such a case the personal representative may bring the
action.9
DETERMINABLE FEE
The Supreme Court of the United States has held as unconstitu-
tional under the Fourteenth Amendment various attempts to exclude
Negroes from certain residential areas. Racial zoning ordinances were
held unconstitutional in Buchanan v. Warley,10 and in Shelley v. Krae-
mer a the enforcement by state action of racial restrictive covenants in
deeds was held unconstitutional. 12  A recent North Carolina case1
indicates that a determinable fee might be a valid device for restricting
the use of property by Negroes without violating the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Haith v. Roper, 242 N. C. 489, 491, 88 S. E. 2d 142, 143 (1955).
8241 N. C. 677, 680, 86 S. E. 2d 438, 440 (1955).
'Kelly v. Kelly, 241 N. C. 146, 84 S. E. 2d 809 (1955).
10245 U. S. 60 (1917).
11334 U. S. 1 (1948).
12 For an excellent discussion of these and other means of restricting the use
of land by Negroes see 27 N. C. L. REv. 224 (1949).
" Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission v. Barringer, 242 N. C. 311,
88 S. E. 2d 114 (1955). This case is one of the first impression in the United
States. See Note, infra p. 113 for a full discussion of this case and the prin-
ciples it involves.
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The granting clause of the deed in the Charlotte Park case conveyed
the land to the plaintiff "upon the terms and conditions, and for the
uses and purposes, as hereinafter fully set forth." The habendum clause
read "to have and to hold the aforesaid . . . land ... upon the follow-
ing terms and conditions, and for the following uses and purposes, and
none other, to-wit. .. . The lands hereby conveyed, together with the
other tracts of land above referred to... shall be held, used and main-
tained . . . as an integral part of a park . . . . said park . . . to be
kept and maintained for the use of, and to be used and enjoyed by
persons of the white race only." The reverter clause provided in part
that "in the event that the ... lands and all of them shall not be kept,
used and maintained for park . . . purposes, for use by the white race
only ... then . . . the lands hereby conveyed shall revert in fee simple
to the said Osmond L. Barringer, his heirs and assigns," provided, that
as a condition precedent to reversion Barringer, his heirs or assigns
pay plaintiff or its successors $3,500. The Court held that the deed
conveyed a fee determinable upon special limitations 14 which would
automatically revert to the grantor by virtue of its own limitation if
Negroes used the golf course in the park, provided the grantor complied
with condition precedent of paying $3,500; and that this result did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment nor come within the purview of
Shelley v. Kraemer.15 To hold otherwise, said the court, would deprive
the grantor of his property without adequate compensation and due
process of law in violation of the "Fifth Amendment" of the United
States Constitution (obviously meaning the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution, as the Fifth Amendment applies only to acts
of Congress) and Article 1 Section 17 of the North Carolina Constitu-
tion.
EASEMENTS
In Goldstein v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co.'6 the defendant con-
tracted to convey certain property with all rights and easements apper-
taining thereto to the plaintiff. This property consisted of a two-story
building with rental offices on the second ffoor. The only means of
ingress and egress to the second floor was by a stairway and hall that
ran through two adjoining buildings owned by defendant. The con-
tract was not recorded. A deed from defendant to plaintiff purported
to convey the property with all the appurtenances thereunto. Subse-
quent to the contract, but prior to this deed, the defendant executed a
1' For a discussion of fees determinable see McCall, Estates on Condition
and on Special Limitation, 19 N. C. L. REv. 334 (1941).
-344 U. S. 1 (1948). The reverter clause does not operate by virtue by state
judicial enforcement.
18241 N. C. 583, 86 S. E. 2d 84 (1955).
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deed, which was duly recorded, conveying the adjoining properties with-
out reserving a right of passage to the plaintiff. Later the passage
was permanently obstructed, and the plaintiff sought damages for de-
fendant's failure to convey the property with the easements. In hold-
ing that the complaint stated a cause of action upon a demurrer ore
tenus, the Court pointed out that a deed to the property described in
the contract with all the rights and easements appertaining thereto, exe-
cuted and recorded prior to a deed to the servient properties, would have
given the plaintiff the right to use the stairway and hall for purposes of
ingress and egress to the second floor. A grant of part of an estate
passes with it by implication a grant of all apparent and visible ease-
ments upon the part retained which are reasonably necessary for the
use of the part granted and which were used at the time by the grantor
for the benefit of the granted estate.1
7
EJECTMENT
G. S. § 1-111 requires that defendant in an action for the recovery
or possession of real property file a defense bond before he is permitted
to plead. Upon failure of the defendant to file the required bond,18
the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment by default final as to title and
possession.'9 Morris v. Wilkins" presents a situation in which the
above statute is inapplicable.
The plaintiff brought an action in ejectment; without filing bond,
the defendant answered. The clerk of the superior court, upon the
motion of the plaintiff, struck defendant's answer and rendered judg-
ment by default final for the failure of defendant to file a defense bond.
On appeal to the superior court the defendant filed an affidavit setting
forth in substance that after the commencement of the action and before
the time for filing an answer had expired, plaintiff went into possession
of substantially the entire land in controversy. The superior court af-
firmed the clerk's ruling, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
"in an action for the recovery or possession of real property a plaintiff
is not entitled to the summary relief of judgment by default final ordi-
narily available upon defendant's failure to give the defense bond pre-
scribed by G. S. § 1-111 when he takes possession of the lands in con-
"' The essentials to the creation of an easement by implication upon sever-
ance of title are: "(1) A separation of the title; (2) before the separation took
place the use which gave rise to the easement shall have been so long continued
and so obvious or manifest as to show that it was meant to be permanent; and (3)
the easement shall be necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the land granted
or retained." Spruill v. Nixon, 238 N. C. 523, 526, 78 S. E. 2d 323, 326 (1953).
'" The defendant may be excused under certain conditions set out in N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-112 (1953).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-112 (4) (1953); Patrick v. Dunn, 162 N. C. 19, 77
S. E. 995 (1913).
20241 N. C. 507, 85 S. E. 2d 892 (1955).
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troversy or any substantial portion thereof by unauthorized entry after
commencement of the action unless and until he first restores the status
quo in respect of possession existing as of the date of the commencement
of the action."1
21
In Kelly v. Kelly2 2 the plaintiff in an action for ejectment sought to
establish that he and defendant claimed title from a common source and
that he had better title from that source. The plaintiff, who claimed
title by way of mesne conveyances from the common owner, introduced
deeds showing that defendant claimed title by way of a tax foreclosure
proceeding against the common owner. The court held that, as the
plaintiff failed to show all the requisites of the tax foreclosure proceed-
ing in that neither the interlocutory judgment nor the final decree of
confirmation of sale pursuant thereto was introduced at the trial, there
was a break in the defendant's chain of title and a nonsuit was proper.
EMINENT DOMAIN
North Carolina State Highway and Public Works Commission v.
Pardington involved a proceeding instituted under G. S. § 136-19 to
acquire lands of respondent for use as part of a right of way for a
public highway. The commissioners appointed by the clerk of the su-
perior court assessed damages for the land taken at $13,747.50. The
petitioner excepted to the report as being excessive and respondent ex-
cepted on the ground that it was inadequate. Thereafter the petitioner
sent the clerk of the superior court -a check for $13,747.50 which stated
that it was in payment of the award by the commissioners. On the
motion of the respondent the clerk ordered that the $13,747.50 be paid
to her. The Court, upholding this payment to the respondent, pointed
out that under G. S. § 136-19 the petitioner was not required to pay
the amount of the award into court as a condition precedent to its
taking possession of the land. Where payment is made to the clerk
it can be either in payment of the award or a deposit, depending upon
the intention and purposes for which it was made. Here the check
expressly stated that it was "in payment of the award by the commis-
sioners." Therefore the payment to the clerk by the petitioner under
these facts constituted an offer which was accepted by the respondent.
2 Morris v. Wilkins, 241 N. C. 507, 512, 85 S. E. 2d 892, 895-896 (1955).
There is no direct authority on this question. The court relied on Rollins v.
Henry, 77 N. C. 467 (1877) which presented a similar situation. The real basis
for the decision seems to be that the facts of the case did not bring it within the
purpose of the statute, which is to secure inesne profits and to protect the plain-
tiff from the damages that he might suffer from the defendant's wrongful pos-
session between the commencement of the action and final judgment. Here
plaintiff did not need protection because he was in possession.-241 N. C. 146, 84 S. E. 2d 809 (1955).
.. 242 N. C. 482, 88 S. E. 2d 102 (1955).
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The question of compensation was settled and petitioner could not there-
after take exception to the award of the commissioners.
24
LANDLORD AND TENANT
Three of the cases arising under this section deserve only summary
treatment and it will suffice merely to state the well established rules
which they affirm. (1) A tenant for a year or more who holds over
at the expiration of the term and is recognized by his landlord without
any qualifying agreement becomes a tenant from year to year and sub-
ject to such terms of the lease as may be applied to existent conditions.
The landlord, at his option, may treat the tenant who holds over as a
trespasser and eject him, or recognize him, in which case a tenancy
from year to year is presumed. This presumption is rebuttable. 25
(2) When a lease does not contain a forfeiture clause for the failure to
pay rent, a forfeiture becomes effective under G. S. § 42-326 only at
the expiration of ten days after demand is made by the lessor or his
agent for the past due rent 7 (3) A liquidating damage clause in a
lease, which is not unreasonable or arbitrarily fixed without regard for
the damages actually suffered, will be enforced by the Court.
28
A fourth case deserves more detailed consideration. In North Caro-
lina a landlord is not liable to the tenant for personal injuries resulting
from his failure to keep the premises in repair, and this is true even
when there is an agreement that the landlord will keep the premises
in repair.29 To avoid the application of this rule, the injured party
often attempts to establish the relationship of master and servant rather
than that of landlord and tenant.
Such was the case in Moss v. Hicks.30 The contract provided that
defendant was to furnish the land, a house for the plaintiff, farming
implements and one-half of the fertilizer. The plaintiff was required
to live in the house and was to furnish the labor and the other half
of the fertilizer. The proceeds from the sale of the crops were to be
- See CONTRACTS, p. 30 supra.
"Duke v. Davenport, 240 N. C. 652, 83 S. E. 2d 668 (1954).
.- N. C. GEN. STAT. § 42-3 provides in part that "in all verbal or written
leases of real property of any kind in which is fixed a definite time for the pay-
ment of the rent reserved therein, there shall be implied a forfeiture of the term
upon failure to pay the rent within ten days after a demand is made by the lessor
or his agent on said lessee for all past-due rent, and the lessor may forthwith
enter and dispossess the tenant without having declared such forfeiture or re-
served the right of reentry in the lease."
"Reynolds v. Earley, 241 N. C. 521, 85 S. E. 2d 904 (1955). N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 42-3 (1950) must be read in conjunction with N. C. GEN. STAT. § 42-33
(1950) which provides "if, in any action brought to recover the possession of
demised premises upon a forfeiture for the nonpayment of rent, the tenant before
judgment given in such action, pays or tenders the rent due and the costs of the
action, all further proceedings in such action shall cease."
2 Weinstein v. Griffin, 241 N. C. 161, 84 S. E. 2d 549 (1954).
29 Moss v. Hicks, 240 N. C. 788, 83 S. E. 2d 890 (1954).
'o 240 N. C. 788, 83 S. E. 2d 890 (1954).
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divided equally between plaintiff and defendant. The faulty condition
of the steps leading up to the house was brought to the attention of
the defendant, and he promised to repair them as provided for in the
contract. Nevertheless, he failed to do so and the steps collapsed as
plaintiff was ascending them, resulting in a fall and personal injuries
to the plaintiff. The Court sustained a demurrer to the complaint,
holding that the contract created the relationship of landlord and tenant
and not that of master and servant. Therefore, the defendant was not
liable for personal injuries resulting from his failure to repair the prem-
ises, notwithstanding the fact that the faulty condition of the steps was
brought to his attention and he agreed to repair them.
LIENS
The 1951 Legislature passed a statute3 l creating a lien on the real
property of recipients of old age assistance. No action to enforce a
lien on the realty "may be brought more than ten years from the last
day for which assistance is paid nor more than one year [changed to
three years in 1955]32 after the death of any recipient. .... 3" In
Lenoir County v. Outlaw 4 the action was not instituted within one
year after the death of the recipient. The issue was whether this barred
the old age assistance lien in regard to a surplus resulting from a fore-
closure sale by a prior lienor. Although the statute expressly states
that no action may be maintained to enforce a lien more than one year
(now three years) after the death of the recipient, the Court held this
provision inapplicable when a person having a prior lien forecloses a
deed of trust on the property, leaving a surplus. However, the ten
year limitation would be applicable in any event. The result of the
decision is to give different interpretations to the time limitations speci-
fied in the statute.
It is important for a person acquiring a lien on property to determine
if the property is owned by a husband and wife. There are many inci-
dents to an estate by the entireties,3 5 among which is the principle that
a lien may not be acquired on lands held by the entireties without the
assent of both the husband and the wife. This principle was. brought
forth forcefully in General Air Conditioning Company, Inc. v. Doug-
lass"0 where plaintiff attempted to enforce a laborer's and materialmen's
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 108-30.1 (1951) (amended by N. C. GEN. STAT. § 108-
30.1 (1953) and N. C. Sess. Laws 1955, c.237.).
N. C. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 237. See Survey of Statutory Changes, 33 N. C.
L. REv. 560 (1955) for other changes.
11 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 108-30.1 (1953) (amended by N. C. Sess. Laws 1955,
c. 237).
:4 241 N. C. 97, 84 S. E. 2d 330 (1954).
"Davis v. Bass, 188 N. C. 200, 124 S. E. 566 (1924). This case spells out
in detail the incidents of a tenancy by the entireties.
30 241 N. C. 170, 84 S. E. 2d 828 (1954).
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lien on property held by the entireties. The contract for the installation
of a heating system was signed by the husband alone. There was no
evidence indicating that the wife was bound on the contract through
agency, ratification, or estoppel. The Court held that, as the wife was
not bound on the contract, the debt was that of the husband alone, and
the lien could not be enforced against property held by the entireties.
QUIETING TITLE
Prior to 1844 a will spoke as of the date of its execution. Since
that time "a will takes effect as of the death of the testator upon the
probate thereof."3 7 Consistent with this, the Court in Vandiford v.
Vandifords held that the execution of a will devising property in which
the plaintiff has an interest does not constitute a cloud on title.89 Like-
wise an assertion of the right to devise property is not a cloud on title.
40
An adverse claim, however-which may be established by parol-as a
parol trust or an oral lease for less than three years, may be a cloud on
title.41
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
A grantee in a deed is bound only by restrictions which appear in
his deed or are on record in his chain of title. Actual knowledge by
the grantee that deeds to other lots in the subdivision contain uniform
restrictions does not subject his lot to these restrictions. 42 No notice,
however full and formal, can be substituted for registration.
43
RIPARIAN RIGHTS
In Young v. City of Asheville44 the plaintiff was the lessee of a
twelve acre tract of land. This tract was composed of a three acre
tract purchased by his father in 1915 and other lands to the south
purchased at a different time and from a different person by his father.
The gravamen of the action was that defendant had negligently dis-
charged raw human sewage into a creek used by the plaintiff to irrigate
his crops. This sewage was pumped through the pipes of plaintiff's
overhead irrigation system and sprayed on his crops, and, as a result,
the crops were condemned by the Commissioner of Agriculture. Only
the three acre tract was described in the complaint, and the description
"Vandiford v. Vandiford, 241 N. C. 42, 46, 84 S. E. 2d 278, 282 (1954);
Williamson v. Williamson, 58 N. C. 142 (1859) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 31-39 (1953)
and N. C. GEN. STAT. § 31-41 (1950).
38241 N. C. 42, 84 S. E. 2d 278 (1954).
"' A person may revoke a will and die intestate. If a person should die leav-
ing a will, his right to devise the property would depend on rights existing at
his death.' Vandiford v. Vandiford, 241 N. C. 42, 84 S. E. 2d 278 (1954).
" Ibid.
42 Hege v. Sellers, 241 N. C. 240, 84 S. E. 2d 892 (1954).
43 Ibid.
"241 N. C. 618, 86 S. E. 2d 408 (1955).
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did not establish that this tract was bordered by the creek. The Court
held that riparian rights extended only to lands in actual contact with
the water. As plaintiff failed to allege that his lessor was a riparian
owner, there was no invasion of his rights by the defendant because
he had no better rights than his lessor. A nonriparian owner has no
right to have the creek "flow with undiminished quantity and unim-
paired quality."
45
The Court posed, but left unanswered, two interesting questions.4 6
Assuming that the plaintiff had alleged and proved that his lessor was
a riparian owner as to the three acre tract, would the riparian rights
extend to the other lands south of the three acre tract? The majority
of the cases "hold that the riparian right to the use of waters cannot
be exercised on nonriparian lands." 47  The Nebraska Court has ex-
pressly held that the right to use waters for irrigation purposes is limited
to riparian lands and cannot be extended to contiguous nonriparian
lands of the same owner.4 8 Under this rule, it would seem that, in
any event, the plaintiff would be limited in his recovery to damage to
crops on the three acre tract, unless of course he could establish riparian
rights in the other lands.
The second question involves the transfer by a riparian owner of
riparian rights to a nonriparian owner. Although there was an allega-
tion that plaintiff's lessor had been granted authority to use the waters
for irrigation purposes by a riparian owner, the Court did not have
to consider this question as no evidence was offered in support of the
allegation. It seems, however, that riparian rights may not be trans-
ferred for use on nonriparian land.49 If this were true, proof of the
grant of authority would not have established plaintiff's right to re-
cover against the defendant.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER
Time is of the essence in an option to purchase land.50 An option
which does not specify the time within which it is to be exercised must
be exercised within a reasonable time.51 Notice of acceptance is suf-
" Young v. City of Asheville, 241 N. C. 618, 627, 86 S. E. 2d 408, 415 (1955).
The Court discussed the possibility of acquiring water rights by prescription or
adverse user but concluded that there was neither allegation nor proof of any such
right in plaintiff.".A Note on riparian rights in the February 1956 issue of the Law Review
will consider these questions in detail.
"' Annot., 14 A. L. R. 330, 333 (1921) ; Annot., 54 A. L. R. 1411 (1928) ; 56
Am. JuR., Waters § 277 p. 732 (1947).
,s Crawford v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N. W. 781 (1903).
M t. Shasta Power Corporation v. McArthur, 292 P. 549 (Cal. 1930) ; Har-
vey Realty Co. v. Borough of Wallingford, 111 Conn. 352, 150 A. 60 (1930);
Hendrix v. Roberts Marble Co., 175 Ga. 389, 165 S. E. 223 (1932). Contra,
Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas, 197 Okl. 499, 172 P. 2d 1002 (1946).
"Douglas v. Brooks, 242 N. C. 178, 87 S. E. 2d 258 (1955).
5 Sandlin v. Weaver, 240 N. C. 703, 83 S. E. 2d 806 (1954) (eleven years
held to be an unreasonable time).
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ficient to exercise an option, unless the contract provides that payment
or tender of the purchase price is a condition precedent. No North
Carolina statute requires that the acceptance of an option be in writ-
ing.
52
Time is not of the essence in a contract for the sale of land.53  The
vendor may not treat the contract as abandoned after accepting pay-
ments in arrears, unless, after definite notice from the vendor that the
contract will be abandoned unless strictly complied with, the vendee fails
to comply with its terms within a reasonable time after the notice. 4
Two cases during the past year raised the question whether an
option in a deed giving the grantor the right to repurchase the land
is an unlawful restraint on alienation. However, this point was not
decided in either case.
The first option provided "that in case the said party of the second
p art should desire to sell the land above described she will first offer
the same to [the grantor]. ' 55 Assuming that the option is construed
to give the grantor the right to repurchase the land on the same terms
as the grantee is willing to sell to another,55 it would seem that the
marketability of the land would not be restrained. The only restriction
is that the grantee must first offer the land to his grantor, otherwise,
he is free to sell to anyone at any price.57 However, an earlier North
Carolina case has held void a right reserved in the grantor and his heirs
to repurchase the land when sold.58
In the second case the grantor was given the option to repurchase
the lots at a fixed price if the two grantees desired to sell during their
lifetime or jthe lifetime of the survivor, and the absolute right to pur-
chase on their death by payment of a fixed sum to a third person.5 9
"3 Kottler v. Martin, 241 N. C. 369, 85 S. E. 2d 314 (1954).
"Douglass v. Brooks, 242 N. C. 178, 87 S. E. 2d 258 (1955).
" Ibid.
" Story v. Walcott, 240 N. C. 622, 623, 83 S. E. 2d 498, 499 (1954) (This was
a suit for specific performance instituted by the grantor, in whose favor the option
to repurchase was reserved, against his grantee who had contracted to sell the
land to the State of North Carolina. The court held that the State of North
Carolina should be made a party as its rights would be affected by the prece-
dent of the decision.).
" See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.65 (1952).
" See SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS ch. 22, § 102 p. 347 (1951); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY §413 (1944); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §26.67, p. 511 (1952).
The restraint must comply with the rule against perpetuities. SIMES, FUTURE
INTERESTS ch. 22, sec. 102 p. 348 (1951).
"Hardy v. Galloway, 111 N. C. 519, 15 S. E. 890 (1892) (The Court pointed
out that no time was fixed for performance and that there was no stipulation
as to the price. "[T]he restriction upon alienation attempted to be imposed after
the grant of the fee, is repugnant to the nature of the estate granted, contrary
to the policy of the law, and therefore inoperative." Id. at 523, 15 S. E. at 890.).
" Sandlin v. Weaver, 240 N. C. 703, 83 S. E. 2d 806 (1954) (The option was
treated as valid and held not to have been exercised within a reasonable time
after the death of the grantees.).
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As the right to purchase if the grantees or the survivor desired to sell
during their lifetime was to be exercised at a fixed price, it might be
said that it was a qualified forfeiture restraint on a fee simple and
void.60 It seems that the absolute right to purchase on the death of
the grantees at a fixed sum would fall with the preemptive right.
1
SALES
In Hendrix v. B & L Motors, Inc.' plainitff purchased from de-
fendant an automobile warranted to be in perfect mechanical condition.
On finding the car not to be as warranted, plaintiff returned it and sued
to rescind the contract and to recover his consideration-the value of
the car he had traded in. The Court held that plaintiff, in a suit for
breach of warranty, is entitled to rescission of the contract provided
that, as here, he is not barred by retention and use of the article after
he discovers or has reasonable opportunity to discover the defect. The
Court pointed out that North Carolina was formerly in the minority
in allowing rescission for breach of warranty, but that since it has been
provided for in the Uniform Sales Act2 it has become the majority rule
in this country.
In its discussion the Court clarified another important point of sales
law. It said, "When a sale is made of an article with knowledge of
the use for which it is intended, and the article is wholly unfit for such
use, the right of the purchaser to rescind and to recover the considera-
tion paid has been recognized by this Court. . . .While emphasis is
placed upon the concept of total failure of consideration, it would seem
that in essence such action is to rescind for breach of implied war-
ranty."3
In re Battery King Manufacturing Co.4 was a receivership proceed-
ing in which the insolvent corporation by a prior agreement had sold
and assigned its accounts receivable. One of these accounts receivable
was against Duke Power Company, which had a claim against the in-
solvent corporation. The assignee claimed the account, and Duke Power
1o SimEs, FUTURE INTERESTS ch. 22, § 102 p. 347 (1951). See also 6 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.65, p. 507 (1952). Contra, Libby v. Winston, 207 Ala. 681,
93 So. 631 (1922). It should be noted that in Hardy v. Galloway, supra note 58,
one of the points mentioned in holding that an option to repurchase was void
was the fact that no price at which the option was to be exercised was stipulated.
" A preemption merely requires the owner to first offer the land to the person
entitled to the preemption when he desires to sell, while technically an option
creates a power in the optionee to compel the owner to sell. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 26.64 (1952).
'241 N. C. 644, 86 S. E. 2d 448 (1955).
-UNIFORM SALES Act § 69 (d).
'Hendrix v. B & L Motors, Inc., 241 N. C. 644, 648, 86 S. E. 2d 448, 451
(1955).
'240 N. C. 586. 83 S. E. 2d 490 (1954).
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asserted its claim against the insolvent assignor as a set-off available to
it in the receivership proceeding. The Court held that since notice had
been given to Duke Power of the assignment, the assignment was pro-
tected, and the account could not be set-off as one owed the insolvent
corporation.
In the same case the Court considered the effect of the sale and
assignment of an account receivable where the debtor later returns the
goods as defective to the assignor, whose receiver then takes them. The
Court held that under G. S. § 44-84, the Returned Goods section of
the Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act,5 the receiver was required




In tort actions based on negligence North Carolina still applies the
common law rule that a plaintiff if found negligent is barred from all
recovery. No consideration is given to the relative degrees of negli-
gence attributable to the defendant and the plaintiff. Because of the
frequent findings of negligence as a matter of law,' and because of the
crucial results such findings have upon the plaintiff's cause of action,
considerable treatment of this phase of the law is justified.
It is well established that a motion for nonsuit on grounds of plain-
tiff's contributory negligence will not be allowed unless the evidence is
so clear that no other reasonable inference is deducible therefrom.2 This
clarity of evidence existed in Moody v. Zimmerman.3 In driving to-
ward the defendant, plaintiff observed the former's stalled car projecting
into plaintiff's driving lane some five hundred feet ahead. Failure to
avoid the collision when there was sufficient time to slow down or stop
was held to be contributory negligence, and the granting of defendant's
motion for nonsuit was affirmed.
Contributory negligence was also found as a matter of law in Ellis
'v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.4 where plaintiff's evidence in an action
for wrongful death revealed that the body of the deceased was found
beside the defendant's tracks three hundred yards from the nearest
5 N. C. GEm. STAT. §§ 44-77 to -85 (1950).
'For a further discussion of contributory negligence as a matter of law see
Note, p. 137 infra.
'Emerson v. Munford, 242 N. C. 241, 87 S. E. 2d 306 (1955). Upon a de-
fendant's motion for nonsuit, the Court views the plaintiff's evidence in its most
favorable light. Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Sistrunk Motors, Inc., 241 N. C. 67,
84 S. E. 2d 301 (1954).
3240 N. C. 752, 83 S. E. 2d 914 (1954).
' 241 N. C. 747, 86 S. E. 2d 406 (1955).
(Vol. 34
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
crossing. The Court stated: "His [plaintiff's intestate] act in placing
himself in a dangerous position, on or near the defendant's railroad
tracks, constituted such negligence 5 on his part as would preclude a
recovery of damages from the defendant for his death, unless the de-
fendant had the last clear chance to avoid the injury."6
Ordinarily it is stated that to be free of contributory negligence
one must exercise due care-the care a reasonable and prudent person
would use under the same circumstances. The yard stick of due care
is said to remain constant, but the circumstances may vary. One cir-
cumstance of which the Court takes judicial notice is blindness, an
affliction which appeared in Cook v. Winston-Salem7 where the blind
plaintiff slipped down a newly excavated bank. The Court stated that
due care is such as an ordinarily prudent person with the same dis-
ability would exercise under the same circumstances. It was found
that an ordinary and prudent blind person would have refrained from
walking along the excavation had he been aware of it, and since plain-
tiff had knowledge of such excavation, his walking there was contribu-
tory negligence.
An interesting case of first impression faced the Court in Dennis v.
Albemarle.8 The evidence revealed that defendant had constructed
and maintained an electric power line at a height of nine feet and nine
inches across a public road, and that plaintiff knew of the wire's exist-
ence. In hauling a load of hay by truck the plaintiff was standing on
the truck bed behind the main load of hay which was stacked "neck-
high." The plaintiff was watching for the wire to avoid its striking him
when a workman on a nearby church steeple shouted a greeting. Plain-
tiff's attention was momentarily distracted and, as he turned to con-
tinue his vigil, the wire struck him and knocked him to the ground.
The Court first observed that North Carolina has no statute pre-
scribing a minimum height for wires crossing public roads and then
held that where accidents occur with overhanging wires maintained
at a height less than twelve feet and six inches, 9 the liability of the per-
son charged with the wire's maintenance is to be determined by the
general law of negligence.
The defendant contended that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
'Although some jurisdictions would label plaintiff's acts assumption of risk,
the North Carolina Court calls it contributory negligence. See Case Survey,
32 N. C. L. REv. 379, 499 (1954).
8241 N. C. 747, 749, 86 S. E. 2d 406, 408 (1955). For discussion of the
doctrine of last clear chance see Case Survey, 32 N. C. L. REV. 379, 502 (1954).
7241 N. C. 422, 85 S. E. 2d 696 (1954). For a full discussion of this case
and the principles with which it deals, see Note, p. 142 infra.
8 242 N. C. 263, 87 S. E. 2d 561 (1955).
SN. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-116 (c) (1953) prescribes twelve feet, six inches as
the maximum height of any vehicle, unladen or with load, with the exception
of automobile transports which may have a height of thirteen feet, six inches.
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negligence in failing to keep a proper lookout for the wire. Having no
previous North Carolina authority, the Court adopted the view of other
jurisdictions that it is not negligent to be momentarily inattentive to a
known danger if some fact, condition, or circumstance exists which
would divert the mind of an ordinary and prudent person. Under this
rule the inference was permissible that the plaintiff responded involun-
tarily to the workman's greeting and therefore was not negligent as
a matter of law.
In Waldrup v. Carver'0 defendants owned an office building in which
plaintiff worked. For the convenience of tenants the owners had in-
stalled an elevator which was closed and locked at the end of the day,
but which could be opened without a key by reaching through an im-
provised hole in the grill work of the elevator door. Plaintiff, who was
working after office hours, desired to leave the building for a few
minutes and rode the elevator to the main floor. A short time later
he returned and found the building dark. Without switching on a light,
plaintiff walked to the elevator shaft, reached through the hole, un-
latched and opened the door, and stepped into the shaft. The elevator
had been moved and plaintiff fell to the basement floor. Affirming the
involuntary nonsuit the Court said, ". . . any reasonable mind would
reach the inescapable conclusion that plaintiff's unfortunate injury re-
sulted from his own failure to exercise ordinary care and precaution
for his own safety."'"
Foreseeability and Proxinmte Cause
Foreseeability is a requisite element of proximate cause.' 2 In State
ex rel. Garland v. Gatewood'3 defendant law officers arrested plaintiff's
in testate for public drunkenness. To continue their duties, defendants
left the prisoner handcuffed in their car and later, when told he had
escaped, took no action to re-arrest him. The mutilated body of the
prisoner was found beside a railroad track, apparently struck by a pass-
ing train. In the action for wrongful death, the Court held that de-
fendants' acts were not the proximate cause of the death of plaintiff's
intestate in that no man of ordinary prudence could have foreseen that
such a result was probable under the circumstances.
Where trespassing children have been injured the Court has up-
held liability of landowners without requiring a finding that their prem-
ises were an attractive nuisance. In Ford v. Blythe Brothers Co.,
14
10240 N. C. 649, 83 S. E. 2d 663 (1954).
I1 1d. at 651, 83 S. E. 2d at 665. For a collection of negligence cases involv-
ing elevators, see Note, p. 145 infra.
12 Whether negligence is based on the common law or statutory standard,
foreseeability is an essential element of proximate cause. Billings v. Renegar,
241 N. C. 17, 84 S. E. 2d 268 (1954).
18241 N. C. 606, 86 S. E. 2d 195 (1955).
1s242 N. C. 347, 87 S. E. 2d 879 (1955).
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defendants were engaged in a huge excavation project in close proxim-
ity to an apartment house area. Children from this area frequented
the site as a place of amusement, and defendant was aware of their
presence. Plaintiff, a three year old child, was severely burned when she
stepped into a bed of hot ashes which defendant had left unguarded.
It was held unnecesasry to establish the operation as an attractive nui-
sance if it could be shown that defendant knew or in the exercise of
ordinary care should have known children frequented the area. Re-
covery was allowed since the defendant in the exercise of reasonable
prevision might have foreseen injury to the plaintiff.
It has been stated often that proximate cause is a matter for the
jury unless reasonable men would reach only one conclusion on the
evidence, and then the court may decide. This statement is difficult
to reconcile with the holding in White v. Keller1 5 in which plaintiff
brought action against defendant for recklessly driving his jeep and
hay baler into plaintiff's oncoming car. Defendant brought in an addi-
tional defendant under G. S. § 1-240 alleging that the latter's automo-
bile had been parked on the roadside with two feet projecting into the
highway and that the hay baler struck the car causing defendant to lose
control of the jeep. The Court affirmed the additional defendant's non-
suit due to lack of evidence showing that his parking the car was a
proximate cause of the injury. Considering that the additional de-
fendant was in violation of G. S. § 20-161 prohibiting the parking of
vehicles on a highway, and that the hay baler struck the illegally parked
car, causing the defendant driver of the jeep to lose control of his
vehicle, it might be strongly argued that violation of the statute was
negligence per se and a cause of the accident. Conceding that it was
a cause of the accident, the debatable issue of whether or not it was
a proximate cause would be an appropriate matter for the jury.
Violation of Statute
As was observed in a previous Case Survey'6 violation of a statute
enacted for the safety and protection of the public is usually held to be
negligence per se. Applying this doctrine in Reynolds v. Murph,1 7
the Court affirmed the overruling of both defendants' demurrers below.
One defendant had purchased from the other defendant one gallon of
white gasoline which was placed in an unlabeled clear glass jug. The jug
was placed in the open bed of the purchaser-defendant's truck which
was parked on a public street. Plaintiff was seriously injured when
an unknown person placed a hot blow-torch in the truck bed causing
the gasoline to explode. G. S. § 119-43 requires both purchaser and
-- 242 N. C. 97, 86 S. E. 2d 795 (1955).
1633 N. C. L. R v. 157, 215 (1955).17241 N. C. 60, 84 S. E. 2d 273 (1954).
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seller to label gasoline containers with the words "Gasoline" and "Un-
safe when exposed to heat or fire." On returning the case for trial the
Court observed that although such violation was negligence per se,
plaintiff still had the burden of proving that this negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury.
Violation of the North Carolina Building Code was involved in two
cases' 8 as a basis for recovering damages to property. In Lutz Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores19 a large recovery was sought for prop-
erty damaged by fire allegedly caused by installation of electrical wiring
in violation of the Code. The Court stated that since the Code, pro-
mulgated by the Building Code Council, had received the force of law
by a reference statute,2° and since it was adopted for the protection
of life, health, and property, violation thereof was negligence per se.
In the past, cases involving statutory violation ordinarily have been
brought for the recovery of damages for injury to the person. This
decision clearly extends the doctrine to include statutes for the protection
of property.
However, the violation of statutes passed for the protection of others
is not always negligence per se. In Moore v. Bezallae' the fact that
plaintiff-pedestrian had violated the provisions of G. S. § 20-1742
was held not to constitute negligence per se, but would be evidence
to be considered along with other evidence of the plaintiff's negligence.0
Duty Arising Out of Contractual Relations
In Pinnix v. TooneyU4 plaintiff was the general contractor and
defendant the plumbing contractor in the construction of a school build-
ing. When the underground water lines, installed by defendant, broke
and damaged the building foundations, for which plaintiff was responsi-
bie, plaintiff brought action in tort to recover damages. The Court
stated that the duty to exercise due care may arise out of contractual
relations, but when plaintiff elects to sue in tort he must accept the
common law standard of care. No contract provisions which have been
breached are relevant to the issue of actionable negligence unless they
satisfy this standard of care.
25
" Pinnix v. Toomey, 242 N. C. 358, 87 S. E. 2d 893 (1955) ; Lutz Industries,
Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N. C. 332, 88 S. E. 2d 333 (1955).
1 241 N. C. 747, 86 S. E. 2d 406 (1955).
'IN. C. GEx. STAT. § 143-139 (1952).
21241 N. C. 190, 84 S. E. 2d 817 (1954).
The pertinent section of this statute provides in essence that pedestrians
crossing roadways at points other than marked crosswalks shall yield right of
way to vehicles.
" Reversing a judgment for plaintiff in Garmon v. Thomas, 241 N. C. 412,
85 S. E. 2d 589 (1954), the Court found that violation of this statute by the
pedestrian along with other evidence of his negligence clearly showed he was
contributorily negligent.24242 N. C. 358, 87 S. E. 2d 893 (1955).
2 For a discussion of the tort principles involved see Note to appear in the
February issue. ,
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Joint Tort-Feasors
An earlier enunciation of the joint tort-feasor doctrine 6 was
quoted with approval in Tillman v. Bellamy:
27
"There may be two or more proximate causes of an injury.
These may originate from separate and distinct sources or agen-
cies operating independently of each other, yet if they join and
concur in producing the result complained of, the author of each
cause would be liable for the damages inflicted, and action may
be brought against any one or all as joint tort-feasors.'
' 28
In this case a vehicle struck the rear of the car in which feme plaintiff
was riding and she elected to sue only the driver of the rear vehicle.
The defendant answered denying his own negligence and alleging the
sole negligence of plaintiff's driver. Reversing a judgment for de-
fendant, the Court found prejudicial error in the trial judge's failure
to instruct the jury as to the law of concurring negligence. The Court
stated that if both drivers were negligent and the negligence of each
was a proximate cause of the injury, plaintiff would not be barred from
recovery against the defendant merely because the other driver was
concurrently negligent.
Where the plaintiff elects to sue two defendants as joint tort-feasors,
the facts alleged must show that the negligence of each defendant was
a concurring and proximate cause of the injury. In Loving v. Whit-
ton29 one defendant's demurrer was sustained because the allegations
revealed that his negligence was insulated by the negligence of the other
defendant.30
An interesting application of G. S. § 1-24031 was made by the Court
in Potter v. Frosty Morn Meats, Inc.3 2 The original defendant brought
in the additional defendant alleging that the latter's negligence was the
sole proximate cause of the injury. Affirming the additional defend-
ant's demurrer, the Court stated that the statute was available only
where the cross action alleged facts establishing concurring negligence,
and therefore allegations of the sole negligence of the additional de-
fendant were demurrable. The Court added: "The right permitted to
be enforced under this section is one of contribution and not one of
20 For discussion of the doctrine see Note, 31 N. C. L. REV. 237 (1953).
-7 242 N. C. 201, 204, 87 S. E. 2d 253, 254 (1955).
" Stacy, C. J., in Barber v. Wooten, 234 N. C. 107, 109, 66 S. E. 2d 690,
691 (1951).
21241 N. C. 273, 84 S. E. 2d 919 (1954).
0 For a discussion of insulating negligence see Note, 33 N. C. L. REv. 498
(1955).
"This statute permits a defendant to bring in, by motion, an alleged joint
tort-feasor for the purpose of contribution to the contingent liability.
22242 N. C. 67, 86 S. E. 2d 780 (1955).
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subrogation."' '  In another case3 4 the Court held that the cross action
must relate to the plaintiff's cause of action, and that G. S. § 1-240 is
available to the original defendant only when the plaintiff could have
initially joined the additional defendant in her complaint.
Physicians and Surgeon-s
An unauthorized surgical operation is an assault and battery; a
patient's consent is necessary unless he is unconscious and unable to
authorize the operation. In Hunt v. BradshauMA plaintiff alleged that
defendant-surgeon represented a particular operation as simple and
involving no danger, and he advised plaintiff to undergo it. The plain-
tiff submitted to the operation and sustained permanent injury to his
arm as a result. Acknowledging plaintiff's proof that injury to his
arm resulted from the operation, the Court stated that res ipsa loquitur
was not available, i. e., that proof of the cause of the injury does not
infer a negligent act on the part of the defendant.3 6
In a concurring opinion it was observed that plaintiff did not
allege defendant's representations about the operation were false to
his own knowledge. Had plaintiff so alleged and substantiated his
allegations with proof, his consent to the operation would have been
invalid and he could have proceeded against defendant for assault and
battery or trespass to the person.
AUTOMOBILES
The cases dealing with automobiles may be grouped as follows :37
six involved accidents at intersections ;38 five concerned vehicles collid-
ing with parked or slow-moving vehicles ;39 two accidents occurred be-
tween vehicles moving in opposite directions;40 seven concerned ve-
" Id. at 70, 86 S. E. 2d at 782.
"Hobbs v. Goodman, 241 N. C. 297, 84 S. E. 2d 904 (1954). Plaintiff's
cause of action was for injury from a falling sign for which defendant, lessee
of the building, was responsible. The original defendant's cross action alleged
that plaintiff was struck not by the sign but by a metal awning for which addi-
tional defendant, owner of the building, was responsible. The latter's demurrer
was sustained.
- 242 N. C. 517, 88 S. E. 2d 762 (1955).
"For a discussion of res ipsa loquitur see Case Survey, 32 N. C. L. Rlv.
379, 505 (1954).
"T For criminal cases involving culpable negligence see CRIMINAL LAw, p. 39
supra.
"Emerson v. Munford, 242 N. C. 241, 87 S. E. 2d 306 (1955); Dixon v.
Wiley, 242 N. C. 117, 86 S. E. 2d 784 (1955); Brady v. Nehi Beverage Co.,
242 N. C. 32, 86 S. E. 2d 901 (1955); Hinson v. Dawson, 241 N. C. 714, 86
S. E. 2d 585 (1955) ; Harrison v. Kapp, 241 N. C. 408, 85 S. E. 2d 337 (1954);
and Loving v. Whitton, 241 N. C. 273, 84 S. E. 2d 919 (1954).
"Davis v. Lawrence, 242 N. C. 496, 87 S. E. 2d 915 (1955); Tillman v.
Bellamy, 242 N. C. 201, 87 S. E. 2d 253 (1955) ; Potter v. Frosty Morn Meats,
Inc., 242 N. C. 67, 86 S. E. 2d 780 (1955); Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Sistrunk
Motors, Inc., 241 N. C. 67, 84 S. E. 2d 301 (1954); and Moody v. Zimmerman,
240 N. C. 752, 83 S. E. 2d 914 (1954).
"'White v. Keller, 242 N. C. 97, 86 S. E. 2d 795 (1955) ; Billings v. Renegar,
241 N. C. 17, 84 S. E. 2d 268 (1954).
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hicles striking persons on or by the road ;41 one involved a passenger
falling from a moving vehicle ;42 one occurred between a vehicle and a
train at a public crossing ;43 and one involved a truck overtaking another
vehicle.
44
The common belief that vehicles on a paved road have right of
way over vehicles entering from unpaved roads was dispelled in Brady
v. Nehi Beverage Co.45 A collision occurred when the defendant's
truck, traveling on a dirt road, entered the paved road on which plain-
tiff was driving. No stop signs were posted on the dirt road which
terminated at the paved road. Referring to G. S. § 20-158,4 the Court
held that in absence of stop signs, public unpaved roads are of equal
dignity with paved roads, and that the provisions of G. S. § 20-15547
control. Since both vehicles arrived at the intersection at approximately
the same time and since defendant's truck was on plaintiff's right, it
was plaintiff's duty to yield the right of way. It is submitted that this
decision places an unreasonable burden on motorists in requiring them
to determine whether or not a stop sign is posted on unpaved, inter-
secting roads when often, as in the principal case, the unpaved road is
hidden from view. Inasmuch as reasonable and prudent men under the
circumstances would consider the motorist on the paved road to have the
right of way, the more logical and safety minded view would accord
such motorist the right of way.
Further application was made of G. S. § 20-155 in Harrison v. Kapp
48
in which an urban intersection traffic light was temporarily out of work-
ing order. The Court referred to the statute in determining that plain-
tiff had the right of way since she entered the intersection first and
since she was on the defendant's right. A driver's right of way is not
absolute,49 but in absence of facts sufficient to give him notice that the
' Elliott v. Killian, 242 N. C. 471, 87 S. E. 2d 903 (1955) ; Hatcher v. Clay-
ton, 242 N. C. 450, 88 S. E. 2d 104 (1955); Parker v. Hensel, 242 N. C. 211,
87 S. E. 2d 201 (1955) ; Keaton v. Blue Bird Taxi Co., 241 N. C. 589, 86 S. E.
2d 93 (1955); Garmon v. Thomas, 241 N. C. 412, 85 S. E. 2d 589 (1954);
Moore v. Bezalla, 241 N. C. 190, 84 S. E. 2d 817 (1954); and Whitson v.
Frances, 240 N. C. 733, 83 S. E. 2d 879 (1954).
2 Johnson v. Cleveland County Bd. of Educ., 241 N. C. 56, 84 S. E. 2d 256
(1954).
" Caudle v. So. R. R. Co., 242 N. C. 466, 88 S. E. 2d 138 (1955).
" Gasperson v. Rice, 240 N. C. 660, 83 S. E. 2d 665 (1954).
"242 N. C. 32, 86 S. E. 2d 901 (1955).
" This statute provides that the State Highway and Public Works Commission
may designate main traveled or through highways by erecting stop signs at
the entrance of intersecting highways.
" This statute provides that vehicles approaching an intersection shall yield
the right of way to vehicles already in the intersection, but that when both
of the vehicles approach the intersection at approximately the same time, the
driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on
the right.
48241 N. C. 408, 85 S. E. 2d 337 (1954).
"For discussion see Case Survey, 33 N. C. L. R-v. 157, 219 (1955).
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other driver does not intend to yield the right of way, he may assume
his rights will be respected.5
A business district is defined as: "The territory contiguous to a
highway where seventy-five percent or more of the frontage thereon
for a distance of three hundred (300) feet or more is occupied by build-
ings in use for business purposes."' After reaffirming an earlier de-
cision"' that buildings on one side of the highway satisfy the require-
ments, the Court made an important interpretation of "business dis-
trict" in Hinson v. Dawson53 where the complaint alleged that defend-
ant had violated the statutory speed limit in a business district."4 It
was held that the intervening space between buildings was not to be
considered as a part of the frontage "occupied by buildings," even if
the space were used for business purposes, and that seventy-five per
cent of the three hundred feet must be actually occupied by buildings.
Questions of agency frequently arise in automobile collisions in
which statutory provisions and the family purpose doctrine play crucial
parts in fastening liability on the vehicle owner. For a thorough dis-
cussion of these questions consult the Agency section of this Survey."
CONVERSION
In Herring v. Creech" plaintiff had purchased a house trailer under
a conditional sales contract which provided that the vendor could re-
possess without notice upon plaintiff's default in payments. The plain-
tiff, who had already defaulted in one payment, put the trailer in posses-
sion of the defendant for purpose of sale, and while it was still in de-
fendant's possession the vendor repossessed it. Action of conversion
was brought against the defendant for failure to redeliver in accord-
ance with the terms of the bailment. In stating that the bailee can never
be in a better position than the bailor against a third party asserting
ownership, the Court held that proof of surrender of the bailed chattel
to the true owner entitled to its immediate possession is a complete
defense for the bailee in an action for conversion.
CIVIL CONSPIRACY
Action for unlawful conspiracy was brought in the case of Reid v.
Holden.57 The plaintiff had purchased tires under a conditional sales
contract with the defendant who sought to repossess them. In exe-
" Loving v. Whitton, 241 N. C. 273, 84 S. E. 2d 919 (1954).
51 N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-38 (a) (1953).
" Mitchell v. Melts, 220 N. C. 793, 18 S. E. 2d 406 (1941).
5-241 N. C. 714, 86 S. E. 2d 585 (1955).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-141 (b) (1953) provides twenty miles per hour as
the maximum speed limit in any business district.
=Z See AGENCY AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, p. 7 stupra.
58241 N. C. 233, 84 S. E. 2d 886 (1954).
rT242 N. C. 408, 88 S. E. 2d 125 (1955).
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cuting claim and delivery proceedings, two additional defendants, a
constable and a deputy sheriff, met resistance from the plaintiff and
shot tear gas into his face causing the loss of his left eye. Plaintiff
had been unsuccessful in a former action against the law officers for
personal injuries, and this was pleaded by defendants as res judicata
barring plaintiff's present action. In attempting to circumvent this
plea the plaintiff contended that this cause of action was an unlawful
conspiracy which was totally different from the former action. Re-
sponding to this contention, the Court quoted certain general prin-
ciples :58
"Accurately speaking, there is no such thing as a civil action
for conspiracy. The action is for damages caused by acts com-
mitted pursuant to a formed conspiracy, rather than by the con-
spiracy itself; and unless something is actually done by one or
more of the conspirators which results in damage, no civil action
lies against anyone. The gist of the civil action for conspiracy
is the act or acts committed in pursuance thereof-the damage-
not the conspiracy or the combination. The combination may be
of no consequence except as bearing upon rules of evidence or the
persons liable." 59
When the plaintiff sues tvo defendants for conspiracy and resulting
injury he is bound to this cause of action. Even though injury from
an intentional tort is proved, failure to prove the conspiracy is fatal to
plaintiff's cause of action.60
LIBEL AND SLANDER
In Kindley v. Privette6l plaintiff was an ordained minister of the
Orthodox Baptist Church and a regular member of the defendant-
pastor's church. Defendant had successfully instigated a resolution
by the congregation excluding plaintiff from membership in the church
and had published this fact in the church bulletin along with defama-
tory remarks about the plaintiff. As a result of this publication, the
plaintiff, who relied on his profession for a livelihood, was no longer
called upon for professional services. The Court stated that publications
are actionable per se6 2 if they tend either to subject one to ridicule, con-
tempt, or disgrace, or to impeach one in his trade or profession. Find-
ing that this publication tended to do both, the Court overruled de-
fendant's demurrer for failure to state a cause of action.
08 Id. at 414, 88 S. E. 2d at 130.
11 Ax. Jua., Conspiracy § 45, p. 577 (1937).
C6 Manley v. Greensboro News Co., 241 N. C. 455, 85 S. E. 2d 672 (1954).
OL241 N. C. 140, 84 S. E. 2d 660 (1954).
62 The phrase "libelous per se" was defined by the Court to mean "actionable
per se." See Note, 33 N. C. L. Rlv. 674 (1955).
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Qualified privilege to comment on public matters was involved in
Yancey v. Gillispie.6 3 The plaintiff-mayor brought action for libel when
he had been charged in defendant's newspaper editorial with improper
use of public funds. The Court held that since the transaction was of pub-
lic interest, defendant had a qualified privilege to comment thereon and
was not liable unless he had abused that privilege. As a key for de-
termining whether or not there had been an abuse of the privilege, the
Court adopted the following view :6
"Everyone has a right to comment on matters of public in-
terest and concern, provided he does so fairly and with an honest
purpose. Such comments or criticism are not libelous, however
severe in their terms, unless they are written maliciously." (Em-
phasis added.)
65
In Manley v. Greensboro News Co.66 plaintiff brought action against
two defendants who, pursuant to a conspiracy, had published libelous
statements about him. The Court affirmed defendants' motions for
nonsuit due to insufficient evidence; since plaintiff's allegations grounded
the cause of action in conspiracy, his failure to prove the conspiracy
automatically defeated the action. Although unnecessary to the decision
the Court discussed the substantive law involved. Most of the authori-
ties quoted in support of this discussion dealt with actions for slander,
in which it is clearly established that joint action against two or more
defendants is available only where the slanderous words are uttered
pursuant to a conspiracy. With such stress placed on slander the Court
seems to have disregarded the distinction between the law of libel and
that of slander in this area. The discussion is not rectified by the
Court's quotation from a well-known legal encyclopedia :67 "Generally
a joint action may not be maintained against two or more persons for
slander except where a common agreement or conspiracy is charged;
where a libel is the joint act of several persons, they may be sued
jointly or separately at plaintiff's election." It is believed that this
brief headnote quotation does not clearly draw the distinction between
the requisites of joint actions for slander (conspiracy) and libel (joint
acts). Further quotation from the same source is desirable: "Every
person who is in anyway responsible for publication of a libel is a
proper party defendant in a defamation action.... Two or more persons
may not be joined in a suit for libel unless it is shown that the publica-
tion of the libel was the common or joint action of all of them. How-
'-242 N. C. 227, 87 S. E. 2d 210 (1955).
,Id. at 229, 87 S. E. 2d at 212.
Hoeppner v. Dumkirk Printing Co., 254 N. Y. 95, 99, 172 N. E. 139, 140
(1930).
"241 N. C. 455, 85 S. E. 2d 672 (1954).
53 C. J. S., Libel and Slander § 159, p. 243 (1948).
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ever, it is sufficient if both defendants participated in the unlawful
action and it is unnecessary that they acted with a common motive or
design."68
ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS; CRIMINAL CONVERSATION
Action for criminal conversation with plaintiff's wife and for aliena-
tion of her affections was brought against the administrators of the
alleged deceased tort-feasor in Hardison v. Gregory.69 The Court stated
that alienation of affections and criminal conversation are two distinct
torts, and further, that generally a physical debauchment of plaintiff's
wife is not a necessary element of a right of action for alienation of
affections.
Although counsel did not develop the issue, a rather disconcerting
question was raised by the Court-but not answered: do these actions
die with the person who caused the injury? The common law rule
that a personal right of action dies with the person was changed by
G. S. § 28-172 which allows actions originally maintainable by or
against a deceased person to be brought by or against his personal
representative. Certain rights of action are excepted from the pro-
visions of this statute by G. S. § 28-175.70 The Court cited only one
case involving survival in which an action for conversion against the
executors of the deceased convertor was impliedly approved.71
FRAUD
The essential elements of fraud in North Carolina have been re-
peatedly stated by the Court.72 Originally, action for fraud lay only
where the alleged wrong-doer knew his statements to be false; this
element was labeled "scienter." Now, by judicial enlargement of the
rule, fraud also exists where reckless representations or positive aver-
ments have been made in conscious ignorance of the truth; this is
6
8 Id. at 244.
0242 N. C. 324, 88 S. E. 2d 96 (1955). The decision turned largely on
admissibility of plaintiff's evidence. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 8-51 (1953) prohibits an
interested party in the litigation from testifying to personal transactions between
himself and the deceased whose personal representative is a party to the litiga-
tion. For discussion of the principles involved, see EVIDENCE, p. 53 supra.
70 "The following rights of action do not survive: 1. Causes of action for
libel and slander, except slander of title. 2. Causes of action for false imprison-
ment and assault and battery. 3. Causes where the relief sought could not be
enjoyed, or granting it would be nugatory, after death." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 28-
175 (1950).
" Suskin v. Maryland Trust Co., 214 N. C. 347, 199 S. E. 276 (1938). Sur-
vival of an action for conversion is no authority that the actions in the principal
case should survive. While an action for conversion reimburses the plaintiff for
actual pecuniary loss, argument could be made that actions for criminal conver-
sation and alienation of affections give damages primarily as punishment for the
defendant. Conceivably, the Court might construe the awarding of such damages
as nugatory, after the defendant's death, within the meaning of the statute.
72 See Case S"urvey, 32 N. C. L. Rw. 379, 501 (1954).
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termed "constructive scienter." In Zager v. Setzer"3 where the plain-
tiff represented that the former proprietor of plaintiff's theatre had made
a weekly gross income of six hundred to seven hundred dollars, when
in fact he had averaged only three hundred forty three dollars, the Court
found sufficient evidence for constructive scienter.
There must be injury to the party caused by his reliance upon the
representation. In Parker v. Hense74 plaintiff, in return for $1,000
and payment of all hospital bills, executed a release for his personal
injury claim, but, unknown to plaintiff, his own hospital insurance had
been applied in part payment of the hospital bills. In absence of aver-
ment of resulting pecuniary loss, the allegation that plaintiff's accident
coverage was thereby exhausted for the remainder of the policy year
was held insufficient to satisfy the element of injury to the plaintiff.
Reliance upon the representation must have been reasonable. 7 In
Keith v. Wicker" the purchaser-plaintiffs relied upon defendant's repre-
sentations that a certain tract of valuable timberland was included in
the sale of timber-rights. Defendants contended that reliance upon the
representations was not reasonable since the parties were on equal bar-
gaining terms and since correct information was readily available to
the plaintiffs. In refusing this contention, the Court restated the rule
that one to whom a positive representation has been made is entitled
to rely thereon if it is of such a character as to induce action by a person
of ordinary prudence.
7 7
ABUSE OF PROCESS; MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
In Barnette v. Woody78 defendant had committed the plaintiff to
the State Hospital with the assistance of supporting affidavits of two
doctors. The plaintiff remained in the hospital for seventy-six days
and was then discharged as showing no evidence of a mental disorder,
whereupon she brought action against defendant and the two doctors
for conspiracy in committing her. The pleadings did not clearly specify
the plaintiff's cause of action, but the Court treated the complaint as
alleging false imprisonment, abuse of process, and malicious prosecu-
tion. Recovery for false imprisonment was barred by the statute of
limitations.
79
73242 N. C. 493, 88 S. E. 2d 94 (1955).
1'242 N. C. 211, 87 S. E. 2d 201 (1955).
"REsTATEENT, ToRTs § 537 (1938) requires that the reliance be justifiable
rather than reasonable. It would seem that reliance could be justifiable while
not reasonable, but that the converse would not be true necessarily. Thus the
North Carolina requirement is more stringent. See Note, 7 N. C. L. REV. 90
(1928).
78241 N. C. 672, 86 S. E. 2d 444 (1955).
7Accord, Roberson v. Williams, 240 N. C. 696, 83 S. E. 2d 811 (1954).
7 242 N. C. 424, 88 S. E. 2d 223 (1955).
11 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-54 (1953) provides a one year limitation to the prose-
cution of this action after it has matured. N. C. GEar. STAT. § 1-52 (1953) pro-
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The Court stated that the action of abuse of process is comprised
of only two elements :.so the existence of an ulterior purpose in causing
the process to issue, and an act in the use of the process not proper in
the regular prosecution of the proceeding. In this case since the proc-
ess had been used for the purpose for which it was intended and since
the result accomplished was warranted by the writ, action for abuse
of process would not lie.
Malicious prosecution consists of the following elements: malice,
lack of probable cause in issuing the process, and termination in favor
of the present plaintiff. The Court found plaintiff's evidence insufficient
to establish conspiracy or malice on the part of defendants, and thus
action for malicious prosecution was defeated.
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
In Childress v. Abeles8 l plaintiff had facilitated the making of a
contract between defendant and a manufacturer whereby the latter was
to manufacture and sell television cabinets to the defendant. The manu-
facturer agreed, with defendant's approval, to pay plaintiff eight per
cent commission on all sales under contract with the defendant, and
this agreement was followed by the manufacturer until defendant
threatened to stop its orders unless the commissions were terminated.
In plaintiff's action for interference with his contract the Court
listed the essential elements of this tort as follows: (1) a valid con-
tract must exist between the plaintiff and a third party, (2) the exist-
ence of which is known to the defendant (3) who intentionally induces
the third party to breach the contract with plaintiff, (4) without justi-
fication, and (5) the breach causes plaintiff actual damages. It was
held that had defendant proved the plaintiff was in business competi-
tion with him, he would have been justified in inducing the breach of
contractSZ That the commission contract was terminable at the will
of either contracting party, and that plaintiff also had a cause of action
against the manufacturer for breach of contract were held to be no
defense.
NUISANCE
A good discussion of the law of nuisance was given by the Court
in Andrews v. Andrews.s8 The defendant had constructed a pond and
vides a three year limitation to litigation of abuse of process and malicious
prosecution.
so Note, 16 N. C. L. REv. 277 (1938) discusses abuse of process and malicious
prosecution.81240 N. C. 667, 84 S. E. 2d 176 (1954).
"2This view is contrary to the majority view that ordinarily business com-
petition alone is not justification for inducing the breach. PROSSER, ToRTs § 106,
p. 738 (2d ed. 1955).
83242 N. C. 382, 88 S. E. 2d 88 (1955).
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placed lame geese and food on it allegedly for the purpose of attracting
wild migratory geese during the winter. The attempt was successful,
and wild geese spent the winter in ever increasing numbers each year,
feeding themselves on the plaintiff's winter crops. Plaintiff brought
action for damages to his crops and for an injunction to prohibit de-
fendant's acts which attracted the fowl. The Court stated that it is a
private nuisance when one improperly uses his property to the injury
of the property rights of another. Private nuisance is subdivided into
nuisance per se (at law) and nuisance per accidens (in fact). The
former exists where the act, occupation, or structure, is a nuisance at all
times and under any circumstances regardless of location, whereas the
latter is a nuisance because of its location or manner of operation.
Plaintiff's cause of action was for nuisance per accidens.
In Young v. Asheville 4 the plaintiff had leased land nearby, but not
adjacent to, a creek from which he pumped water to irrigate his crops.
Unknown to the plaintiff leakage from defendant's sewer contaminated
the creek water. Because of the use of this contaminated water in
irrigating plaintiff's crops, the Secretary of Agriculture condemned the
crops. In plaintiff's action for recovery of the value of his crops based
on nuisance it was held that the plaintiff did not have riparian rights.
This necessarily resulted in defeating his action, since a nuisance is the
invasion of another's property rights. It seems safe to draw an inference
that had plaintiff been a riparian owner, contamination of the creek




In Suits v. Old Equity Life Insurance Co.' it was held that when
a foreign insurance company solicits applications for insurance, delivers
policies and collects premiums in North Carolina through the mails,
it is "doing business" in this state within the meaning of G. S. § 58-
164 (e) and that process served on the Commissioner of Insurance in
compliance with the statute renders the said insurance company amen-
able to the jurisdiction of our courts.
Appealability of Pre-trial Order
In De Bruhl v. State Highway and Public Works Commission2 the
trial court at a pre-trial hearing entered an order specifying the issue
to be submitted to the jury. An immediate appeal from said order was
held to be premature, the order being interlocutory.
8'241 N. C. 618, 86 S. E. 2d 408 (1955).
1241 N. C. 483, 85 S. E. 2d 602 (1955).
-241 N. C. 616, 86 S. E. 2d 200 (1955).
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Reference Procedure
Following a compulsory reference in Crowley v. McDougald3 the
plaintiff, after the taking of evidence, moved for a voluntary nonsuit.
The referee, deeming that he was without authority to enter a nonsuit,
made a report in which he found plaintiff and defendant were owners in
common of a certain tract in question and passed the nonsuit motion
to the court for consideration. Within 30 days the plaintiff sent a
nonsuit order to the clerk which was presented to the court for signa-
ture. The court declined to sign it but instead, before the 30 day period
had elapsed within which plaintiff might file exceptions to the report,
entered judgment confirming the report. The Court held that the
judgment was premature in that the motion for voluntary nonsuit does
not preclude plaintiff from filing exceptions to the report.
Nonsuit
In Marshburn v. Patterson4 plaintiff's evidence was to the effect that
defendant's car was being operated on a servient highway at an ex-
cessive rate of speed, namely 50 to 60 miles per hour. Defendant's
evidence was that his car was being driven at only 20 to 25 miles per
hour. At the end of the presentation of all the evidence the defendant
moved for nonsuit on the ground that the plaintiff was'guilty of con-
tributory negligence in that on his evidence he continued to proceed
on the dominant highway knowing that a car was approaching on the
servient highway at 50 or 60 miles per hour. Denial of the motion
was upheld by the Court on the theory that upon motion for nonsuit
the trial court should consider the defendant's evidence of his own speed
of 20 to 25 miles per hour. In so ruling, the Court said that the evidence
of the lower speed had been vouched for by the defendant and could
not be disregarded.
Improper Remarks in Summation
In State v. Smith5 the court divided four to three, the majority
holding that even in a non-capital case it is the duty of the court to
interfere at once if remarks of the solicitor to the jury are grossly im-
proper and designed to mislead or prejudice the jury, regardless of the
fact that the defendant made no objection until after the verdict. The
case involved a prosecution for driving while intoxicated. The three
dissenting justices were of the view that except in capital cases de-
fendant could not complain of improper remarks by the state's solicitor
for the first time after verdict.
3241 N. C. 404, 85 S. E. 2d 377 (1955).
'241 N. C. 441, 85 S. E. 2d 683 (1955).
t240 N. C. 631, 83 S. E. 2d 656 (1954).
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In State v. Barefoot" counsel agreed that the solicitor's argument
to the jury be taken down by the stenographer and that the stenographer
note an objection as having been made by defence counsel at the end
of each sentence. This was done and on appeal the court held that such
an agreement was ineffective and could not relieve the trial judge of his
duty to see that the argument of the solicitor remained in proper bounds
and also could not relieve the defense counsel from objecting to im-
proper remarks of the solicitor before verdict.
In the same case the solicitor had commented on the demeanor of
the defendant as he walked around and sat in the court room. In this
particular case, such comment was held not to be a comment on the
fact that the defendant failed to testify and was accordingly not deemed
ground for reversal.
Charge to Jury
In Reynolds v. Early7 the trial court instructed the jury that they
should answer the issue submitted "Yes" if they found the facts "to
be as all the evidence which has been introduced tends to show." Such
an answer would have been in favor of the party having the burden of
proof. After the jury had been out ten minutes, the judge asked if
they had reached a verdict and then said, "I didn't know if you under-
stood my instruction. My instructions were: if you find the facts to
be as all the evidence tends to show, you will answer it Yes. You may
retire." A few minutes later the jury returned with the issue answered
"Yes." The Court reversed on the authority of Shelby v. Lackey.8
The situation was not the same in that case, however, for there the
trial court had charged, "If you find from the evidence the facts to be
as all the evidence tends to show, you will answer that issue yes, and
with your permission I will answer it for you. Answer: 'Yes.'" Clear-
ly in the Shelby case it cannot be said that the trial court fairly left
the question of credibility of the testimony in question to the jury, but
query, as to whether or not in retiring the jury the court had not left
the question of credibility up to them in the Reynolds case.
With the Reynolds case one should compare Rhodes v. Raxter9 in
which the Court upheld an instruction similar to that in the Reynolds
case because in an earlier instruction the trial judge had told the jury
to answer the issue no if they did not believe the evidence.
In State v. Street'0 the trial judge in his charge explained the law
applicable on hypothetical facts which were unrelated to the facts in evi-
8 241 N. C. 650, 86 S. E. 2d 424 (1955).
7241 N. C. 521, 85 S. E. 2d 904 (1955).
s236 N. C. 369, 72 S. E. 2d 757 (1952).
p242 N. C. 206, 87 S. E. 2d 265 (1955).
1 241 N. C. 689, 86 S. E. 2d 277 (1955).
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dence. It was held on appeal that G. S. § 1-180 required the trial judge
to explain the law on the facts in evidence and that an explanation on
unrelated hypothetical facts constituted reversible error since it might
well have misled the jury.
Quotient Verdict
While it is well settled that a quotient verdict is invalid, the Court
in Collins v. North Carolina State Highway & Public Works Commis-
sion" refused to declare as a matter of law that a verdict for damages
in an eminent domain case in the amount of $1,666.67 was a quotient
verdict, although the Court recognized that the unusual amount might
prompt a surmise that it was in fact such a verdict.
Revival of Judgment
In Reid v. Bristol12 counsel moved to revive a judgment against
the defendant shortly before the expiration of the ten year statutory
period within which execution might be issued. (G. S. § 1-306) The
clerk, within the ten year period, entered an order that the judgment
be revived, and said order was docketed as a judgment. On appeal it
was held that such order of revival was a nullity and that the proper
remedy of the judgment holder was to institute an independent action
with the usual summons and complaint within the ten year period.
Such action would be based on the old judgment as a debt, and a new
judgment would be entered.
Grouping Exceptions
In Dobias v. White' the Court "by way of dicta and for the in-
formation of the profession" explained when several exceptions may
be grouped under a single assignment of error. If the various excep-
tions present the same single question of law (here whether certain
communications between attorney and client were privileged), they may
be grouped under one assignment of error, but where the various ex-
ceptions present different questions of law, the grouping of them under
one assignment of error constitutes a broadside assignment which will
not be considered. The exception which the Court, under this rule,
found to be broadside was the plaintiff's fourth in the grouping of the
exceptions and read, "4. Plaintiff's Exception No. 10 (R. p. 36). The
action of the Court in finding the facts set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6 and 9 of the Judgment, which findings of fact were made in the
absence of evidence of the same, or are based on incompetent testimony."
Since the evidence which tends to support one finding of fact is not
1% 240 N. C. 627, 83 S. E. 2d 552 (1954).
11241 N. C. 699, 86 S. E. 2d 417 (1955).
11240 N. C. 680, 83 S. E. 2d 785 (1954). Cited and followed in Hardison v.
Gregory, 242 N. C. 324,-- S. E. 2d - (1955).
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relied on to support the others, the Court said the assignment of error
was "insufficient to bring into focus the sufficiency of the testimony
to support any particular finding of fact made by the court below.'
4
Contempt Procedure
In Galyon v. Stuttsa5 the Court discussed in detail the distinction
between criminal and civil and direct and indirect contempts and the
application of the various provisions of the contempt statute.' 6 In this
particular case the defendant had been held in contempt by the judge
on two grounds: (1) failing to produce certain books, documents, etc.,
as previously ordered by the court and (2) failing or refusing to answer
questions on an adverse examination held before a commissioner. In
each instance the judge summarily held the defendant in contempt
without the preliminary issuance of an order directing the defendant
to show cause why he should not be adjudged in contempt.
Upon appeal the Court found that the record affirmatively showed
that the defendant did not have the documents, books, etc. which he
had been ordered to produce, and hence, an order adjudging him in
contempt on that ground was erroneous. The evidence of lack of pos-
session was solely that of the defendant, but there appeared no other
evidence establishing possession. While conceivably the defendant may
have falsified, the Court appears to have accepted his denial.' 7 Conse-
quently, being satisfied that defendant could not comply with the order,
the Court held that the contempt adjudication on that ground must fall.
As to the second ground upoa which the trial judge held defendant
in contempt, namely, failing or refusing to answer questions be-
fore the commissioner, the Court held there was no direct contempt
of the trial court since it was not in the presence of the judge and he
had no direct knowledge of it. Hence, it constituted an indirect con-
tempt, and proper procedure required the judge to issue a show cause
order in accordance with G. S. § 5-7. While expressly not deciding
the point, the Court suggested that the commissioner might have sum-
marily attached the defendant for contempt by virtue of G. S. § 5-6.18
14 Attention is also called to Browning v. Humphrey, 241 N. C. 285, 84
S. E. 2d 917 (1954) where the court held bad, as broadside, an exception to the
finding of facts made by the trial judge which exception did not specify any
particular finding of fact.11241 N. C. 120, 84 S. E. 2d 822 (1954).
10 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 5-1, 9.
1 See Note, 33 N. C. L. REv. 490 (1955) where this aspect of the case is
discussed in detail.
18 See Bradley Fertilizer Co. v. Taylor, 112 N. C. 141, 17 S. E. 69 (1893).
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TRUSTS
Four cases dealt in orthodox fashion with various aspects of the
purchase-money resulting trust.' Two of them raised the question
whether on motion for non-suit there was sufficient evidence to rebut a
presumption of gift; in one instance where the payment was made by
a parent and title taken in the name of a child,2 and in another where
payment was made by a husband and title taken in the name of the
wife.3 These cases seem to conflict as to the quantum of proof required
of the plaintiff to get to the jury on the gift rebuttal issue. The Bowen
case held-it is believed correctly-that the application of the "clear,
strong, and convincing" test is for the jury and that therefore non-suit
should be denied if there is some evidence to support the claim; but
in the Shue case, the judge granted the non-suit because the evidence
was not "clear, strong, and convincing." The Court affirmed, stating
that the evidence was clearly insufficient.
In the other two cases 4 the Court conceded that there could be a
resulting trust in a part of the land in the same proportion as the pay-
ment bore to the entire purchase price. In both instances, however,
evidence as to the fractional portion or amount was lacking.
A further defect was noted in the Rhodes case which prevented the
resulting trust from arising. There the contributions came too late,
being made "after title passed for the purpose of assisting in paying
installments due on the deferred balance of the purchase price." 5
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
ADVANCEMENTS
In Atkinson z'. Bennett' a parent, by deed, conveyed certain property
to two of her children equally. In a special proceeding for the parti-
tion of this property the trial judge ruled that certain gifts made by
the parent, before this conveyance, to one of the children constituted
advancements and that the favored child must, in the division of this
land, account therefor with interest. The Court assumed, for the pur-
poses of this case, that the gifts were advancements, but reversed the
ruling which required repayment. The Court indicated that for an
' See Edwards and Van Hecke, Purchase Money Resulting Trusts in North
Carolina, 9 N. C. L. REv. 177 (1931).2 Bowen v. Darden, 241 N. C. 11, 84 S. E. 2d 289 (1954).
Shue v. Shue, 241 N. C. 65, 84 S. E. 2d 302 (1954)
"Deans v. Deans, 241 N. C. 1, 84 S. E. 2d 321 (1954); Rhodes v. Raxter,
242 N. C. 206, 87 S. E. 2d 265 (1955).
5 242 N. C. at 208, 87 S. E. 2d at 267. See also the Deans case where it ap-
peared that any consideration supplied came after passage of title. 241 N. C.
at 2, 84 S. E. 2d at 322.
1242 N. C. 456, 88 S. E. 2d 76 (1955).
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accounting for advancements to be required in the division of property
conveyed by deed, it must be specifically provided for in the instrument.
The evidence in this case did not show that the deed required an ac-
counting for gifts or advancements previously made; therefore, it was
unnecessary that an accounting be made in the division of the land in
question.
The record did not indicate whether the deceased parent (who died
intestate) left any property. If on remand it is found that there is
property in the estate to divide, the question of advancements will arise.
An advancement has been defined as "an irrevocable gift in praesenti of
money or property, real or personal, to a child by a parent, to enable
the donee to anticipate his inheritance to the extent of the gift."2 The
doctrine of advancements is based on the presumption that the intestate
intended equality among his children in the division of his estate.3
However, regardless of the amount, a child cannot be required to give
up any part of an advancement. A child who desires to share in the
undisposed property which the parent left is required first to put into
hotchpot that which has been advanced. On the other hand, such child
may elect to keep that which has been advanced without an accounting.
If so, he is excluded from sharing further in the estate.
4
AFTERBORN CHILDREN
G. S. § 31-455 provides that "Children born after the making of
the parent's will, and whose parents shall die without making any
provision for them, shall be entitled to such share and proportion of the
parent's estate as if he or she had died intestate. . . ." The question
of what constitutes "making any provision" has given rise to most of the
litigation under this statute.6
In Sheppard v. Kennedy7 the will provided that "all the remaining
2 Nobles v. Davenport, 183 N. C. 207, 209, 111 S. E. 180, 181 (1922).3 Atkinson v. Bennett, 242 N. C. 456, 88 S. E. 2d 76 (1955) ; Nobles v. Daven-
port, .mpra; Annot., 31 A. L. R. 2d 1040 (1953).
'Atkinson v. Bennett, 242 N. C. 456, 88 S. E. 2d 76 (1955).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 31-45 (1950) was completely rewritten by N. C. Sess.
Laws 1953, c. 1098 and codified as N. C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.5 (1953). N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 31-5.5 (1953) in turn was rewritten by the 1955 legislature, N. C.
Sess Laws 1955, c. 541. See Survey of Statutory Changes, 33 N. C. L. REv.
597 (1955).
'In N. C. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 541 the phrase is essentially the same, viz:
"made some provision in the will for the child." See 29 N. C. L. Ray. 219
(1951) for a discussion of a case holding that making an afterborn child a bene-
ficiary of an insurance policy did not constitute making a provision for him. For
discussion of a New York case holding contra on identical facts, see 38 VA. L.
Ray. 1088 (1952).
7242 N. C. 529, 88 S. E. 2d 760 (1955). Rowls v. Durham Realty & In-
surance Co., 189 N. C. 368, 127 S. E. 254 (1925) is a case on all fours. The
plaintiff was a posthumous afterborn child. The devise was to the testator's
wife "to do with as she thinks best for herself and the children." Here, too,
provision was made for a class of beneficiaries of which plaintiff was a member.
The court did not mention this but relied on the intention of the testator.
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property of which I may die seized and possessed . . . shall be ...
distributed among my next of kin and heirs at law in the same manner
as if I had died intestate. . . ." This will was executed in 1948 and
the testator died two years later. Eight months and seventeen days
after the testator's death a daughter was born. The Court decided that
a provision in a will for a class of beneficiaries to which the afterborn
child belonged was sufficient "provision" and that this posthumous
afterborn child was not entitled to an intestate share. Instead, she
was entitled only to share equally with her brother in the division of
the residuary estate in accordance with the above quoted provision in
the will.
JURISDICTION
Under G. S. § 28-1 (1) and (2) the clerk of the superior court of
a county has jurisdiction to issue letters of administration (1) when
the decedent was domiciled in the county of the clerk and (2) when
the decedent maintained a residence in the county of the clerk.8 It is
possible that a decedent could have one domicile and any number of
residences in different counties, and the clerk of court of each county
would have jurisdiction. To avoid obvious difficulties which could arise
in such a situation, provision is made that the first clerk who exercises
jurisdiction acquires exclusive jurisdiction. 9 Nevertheless, hardship
as well as duplication of work often results from the fact that letters
of administration are granted in two counties. For instance, in Tyler v.
Lumber Co.'0 letters of administration for the decedent were granted
in Craven County and in Beaufort County. Both administrators brought
an action against the same defendant in their respective counties for
the wrongful death of the decedent. As a consequence of the granting
of letters in two counties, the defendant was subjected to two suits in
different counties for the same wrong. Other results which might
follow are that each of the two or more administrators might claim
the same assets of the estate, or seek to recover debts of the estate.
Some of these difficulties might be avoided if there were adequate
means for a clerk to determine if letters of administration had already
been issued by another clerk entitled to take jurisdiction."
' For a discussion of domicile as distinguished from residence, see Reynolds
v. Lloyd Cotton Mills, 177 N. C. 412, 99 S. E. 240 (1919).
0 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 28-2 (1950); Vample v. McNeill, 241 N. C. 308, 84
S. E. 2d 908 (1954). (The court held that the superior court of a county which
first issued letters of administration acquired exclusive jurisdiction although the
petition of a creditor was pending in another county at the time the letters were
issued.)10 188 N. C. 274, 124 S. E. 306 (1924).
11 It seems that the only way to determine if letters of administration have
been granted in another county is to write to all the places where letters could
be granted, or conceivably to the Commissioner of Revenue to whom the clerk
of the superior court is required to make reports for inheritance tax purposes
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Related to the foregoing problem is the rule that ordinarily there
can be no collateral attack on the jurisdiction of a probate court in
North Carolina.' 2  The same principle is applied when an estate is
administered outside the State of North Carolina. In Groomn v.
Leatherwood13 the plaintiff brought an action in North Carolina alleg-
ing that she, as an afterborn child, was entitled to (1) part of the
proceeds from the sale of land by defendant as administratrix of her
father's estate in West Virginia, and (2) an accounting by defendant
of the personal property of the estate. The defendant had filed her
final account and had received her discharge by the probate court of
West Virginia. The court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, hold-
ing that the jurisdiction of the probate court of West Virginia was not
subject to collateral attack.
PEREMPTORY INSTRUCTION
Neither a motion for judgment as of nonsuit nor a directed verdict
will be allowed on the issue of devisavit vel non.1 4 The issue raised by
the caveat must be heard by a jury and not by the judge, notwithstand-
ing an agreement by the propounder and the caveator that the judge
may find the facts.1 5 Although a nonsuit and a directed verdict are not
permissible, it has been held that a trial judge may rule that the evi-
dence is insufficient to justify the submission of an issue of undue in-
fluence to the jury.' 6 He may also set aside a verdict as being against
the weight of the evidence. 17 And a peremptory instruction is proper
where no evidence is offered to the contrary.' 8
when an estate is settled. See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 105-10 (1950) and N. C.
GEN. STAT. §105-22 (1950)."2For exceptions to this rule see Hines v. Foundation Co., 196 N. C. 322,
325, 145 S. E. 612, 614 (1928) (upon the face of the record the court was with-
out jurisdiction); Holmes v. Wharton, 194 N. C. 470, 140 S. E. 93 (1927) (The
person whose estate is being administered is not dead.).
1- 240 N. C. 573, 83 S. E. 2d 536 (1954).
"it re Will of Duke, 241 N. C. 344, 85 S. E. 2d 332 (1954). The reason for
this rule is tliat the proceeding to probate a will in solemn form is a proceeding
in rem. In re Will of Redding, 216 N. C. 497, 5 S. E. 2d 544 (1939). An ex-
ception to the rule is that a nonsuit may be given in a proceeding to probate a
will in solemn form when, upon the probate of a lost or destroyed will, the pro-
pounder fails to offer proof of the existence of an instrument such as could be
admitted to probate. Hewett v. Murray, 218 N. C. 569, 11 S. E. 2d 867 (1940).
The exception logically follows from the reason for the rule. There can be
no proceeding in rem without a res. When no proof is offered of the existence of
an instrument such as could be admitted to probate, there is failure of proof of
the res. Hence the proceeding is not in rem and a nonsuit may be given.
It re Will of Roediger, 209 N. C. 470, 184 S. E. 74 (1936).
it re Will of Cassada, 228 N. C. 548, 46 S. E. 2d 468 (1948).
"In re Will of Barfield, 242 N. C. 308, 87 S. E. 2d 516 (1955).
' In re Will of Ball, 225 N. C. 91, 33 S. E. 2d 619 (1945) (The trial court
gave a peremptory instruction upon the issues of (1) the formal execution of
the will, (2) the mental capacity of the testator to make a will, (3) undue in-
fluence and (4) whether the paper writing propounded was the last will and
testament of deceased.).
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In the case of In re Will of Duke'0 the caveators objected to a per-
emptory instruction concerning the formal execution of the will. This
charge was:
"The court instructs you the burden of that issue is
upon the propounders to satisfy the jury upon the evidence and
by its greater weight that the said paper writing propounded as
the last will and testament of Hilda S. Duke was executed in
accordance with the formalities required by law; and the pro-
pounders have offered such evidence and the court is not aware
of any evidence to the contrary, and therefore instructs the jury
that if you believe the evidence and all of the evidence and find
the facts to be as all of the evidence tends to show, and by its
greater weight, it would be your duty to answer that first issue
'Yes.'"
The Court held that the above instruction was correct. The record
supported the statement of the trial judge that the propounders had
offered evidence of the formal execution of the will and that there




Several recent cases involve the rights of parties who have rendered
services in consideration of either a written or an oral promise to de-
vise or convey land, and the recipient of the services dies without de-
vising the land or performing the contract.
2 '
A written contract to devise land in consideration of services ren-
dered will be specifically enforced in a court of equity by declaring a
trust on the land in favor of the person rendering the services ;2" but
an oral contract to convey or devise property is void under the Statute
of Frauds.
23
Although an oral contract to convey or devise land is void under
the Statute of Frauds, a plaintiff may sue on the implied contract and
" 241 N. C. 344, 349, 85 S. E. 2d 332, 336 (1954).
"Query, whether the above would amount to a directed verdict where the
only issue is the formal execution of the will. In this case the caveat was on
the grounds of mental incapacity.
. For a discussion of the rights of a grantor when he conveys property in
consideration of the promise of the grantee to support him for the remainder
of his life, and the grantee breaches his promise to support, see Minor v. Minor,
232 N. C. 669, 62 S. E. 2d 60 (1950) and McCall, Estates on Condition and on
Special Limitation in North Carolina, 19 N. C. L. RRv. 358-360 (1941).2 Clark v. Butts, 240 N. C. 709, 83 S. E. 2d 885 (1954).
" Clapp v. Clapp, 241 N. C. 281, 85 S. E. 2d 153 (1954). As North Carolina
does not recognize the doctrine of part performance, I N. C. L. REv. 48 (1922),
the contract could not be taken out of the Statute of Frauds by the performance
of the services. For a discussion of the alternatives to part performance in North
Carolina see 15 N. C. L. REv. 203 (1937). As to part performance in other
jurisdictions see Annot., 33 A. L. R. 1489 (1924).
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recover in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of the services
rendered.24 The difficulties which may arise in recovering on quantum
meruit when suit is brought on the express contract have been previous-
ly discussed in this Law Review.
25
In 1954 the Court considered a case20 in which the trial judge
instructed the jury on quantum meruit as follows:
"'The court instructs you that where services are rendered
by one person for another, which are knowingly and voluntarily
accepted, without more the law presumes that such services are
given and received in expectation of being paid for and will imply
a promige to pay what they are reasonably worth' (italics sup-
plied) ; and (2) 'If the plaintiff has satisfied you from this evi-
dence and by its greater weight that he did render any services
to Mrs. Parker between the 14th day of June, 1949, and the time
of her death, which were knowingly and voluntarily accepted by
her, and that they were of some value, and that he is entitled
to some compensation for said services, it would be your duty to
answer that first issue Yes .... , ,27
The presumption that the services were rendered for consideration
is rebuttable. The instruction was erroneous in that it failed to allude
to facts and circumstances whereby the presumption could be rebutted,
as where the services were rendered gratuitously or in discharge of a
moral obligation. According to the Court the jury should have been
instructed:
"... if, upon a consideration of all the testimony, it should
find that plaintiff performed the services which are the gravamen
of his action without expectation of compensation or in return
for the services the deceased and her husband had rendered him
during his childhood, youth, and young manhood, or, if, upon
a consideration of all the evidence, it should find that plaintiff
had failed to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that the
services in question were rendered and received with the mutual
24 Jamerson v. Logan, 228 N. C. 540, 46 S. E. 2d 561 (1948).
26 N. C. L. REV. 417, 420 (1948). Two lines of authority exist. One
holds that when the plaintiff declares upon the express contract he may not
also declare upon the implied contract of quantum meruit. An election must
be made. The other, which is supported by a 1948 decision, holds that the
"plaintiff may declare on an express oral contract to devise realty and, if suf-
ficient facts are alleged and proven of services rendered, recover an quantumn
ineruit when the contract is unenforceable because within the Statute of Frauds"
and an election is not necessary.
6 Twiford v. Waterfield, 240 N. C. 582, 83 S. E. 2d 548 (1954). This case
illustrates that although a judge is ordinarily safe in taking his charge from
decided cases, he may not do so without regard for the particular facts of the
case before him.27 Id. at 584, 83 S. E. 2d at 550.
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understanding that they were to be paid for or that they were
performed by plaintiff with the expectation of compensation and
were knowingly accepted by the deceased under circumstances
calculated to put a reasonable person on notice that the services
were not gratuitous, it should answer the first issue in the nega-
five."'
28
s 240 N. C. at 585-586, 83 S. E. 2d at 551.
